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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
A. The ABCO Case 
Basically, this case involved a shareholder buyout dispute between two brothers, 
Branson and Marvin. Branson and Marvin entered a buyout agreement on December 8,1999, 
dividing their construction company known as ABCO, some farm property in Corinne, Utah, 
the land upon which the ABCO offices were built, as well as other property interests which 
- 3 -
attorney's fees for Branson. (R. 9790-91). The judge had previously retained authority to 
award the amount of attorney's fees. (R.9771). 
Branson filed a memorandum of costs and attorney's fees, seeking over $387,000 in 
fees. Marvin filed a motion of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the issues of slander 
of title, breach of fiduciary duty, and the erroneous checking of the box for attorney's fees. 
The trial court granted Marvin's motion for JNOV and refused to award Branson any 
attorney's fees on any of his claims. (R. 10563-70). In addition, the court found Branson's 
award for contract breach as miniscule and certainly not a victory when compared to the total 
damages Branson sought. (R. 10565); that Branson's claims were unmeritorious (R. 
10565 fflf 14 and 16); that Branson, unmeritoriously and unnecessarily, required Marvin to 
participate in the litigation, to assert defenses, and to defend against Branson's claims. (R. 
10565 ]f 17). Marvin's counterclaims at trial were primarily to defend against Branson's 
aggressive action and so during the jury trial, Marvin only asked for one dollar ($1.00) in 
damages for Branson's assault and one dollar ($1.00) in damages for Branson's breach of the 
buyout contract. The jury awarded Marvin all the damages he sought. (R. 9792). 
Branson has appealed only the JNOV decision and malicious prosecution summary 
judgment. He has not appealed the trial court's refusal to award Branson's attorney's fees for 
breach of contract or the jury's no damage award on slander of title or fiduciary duty claim. 
(R. 11425-11426; Branson's Docketing Statement pgs. 3-5). It should also be noted that 
-14-
condition precedent, agreement to agree and various other arguments. (Addendum Exhibit 
M). These arguments consumed the majority of the lawsuit from October 29,2002 to Jan 9, 
2007. The trial court acknowledged in motion practice and at a trial by jury, "the Plaintiff 
failed to recover or succeed on the majority on his claims." (R. 11352). It must be noted, that 
Marvin prevailed on 17 pre-trial claims to counter Branson's attempt to get around the 
buyout contract. (R. 11210-212). Essentially, Branson's 16 causes of action were reduced to 
breach of contract and slander of title. (R. 8707-8736). 
3. The court also found in its June 19, 2007 decision regarding attorney's fees, 
that prior to trial most of Plaintiff s claims were dismissed. (Addendum Exhibit D, R. 10565 
Tf 12). The court further found, "Plaintiffs claim to set aside the subject contract on grounds 
of fraud consumed substantially all of the pre-litigation motions and was totally 
unmeritorious." (Id. at }^14). The court held in paragraph 17 that "Plaintiff unnecessarily 
and unmeritoriously required Defendants to participate in the litigation, to assert defenses 
and to defend against Plaintiffs claims at trial." (Id). (Emphasis added). The ABCO buyout 
agreements allowed for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and costs, "whether an action 
has been commenced or not, which may arise or accrue from enforcing any of the terms of 
this agreement." (See ^ 9.11 and 9.H of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Partnership 
Interest Agreement and Section 9.H of the Membership Interest Redemption Agreement. See 
Trial Ex. 155,156 and 157). (Emphasis added). Those agreements allow for pre-trial motion 
-20-
attorney's fees to successfully defend against a rescission claim and to properly enforce a 
valid, binding contract where Branson seeks to void it for fraud. The court acknowledged 
that Branson should not have even filed this complaint against Marvin stating, "If I find fault 
in this case, frankly it is the bringing of this action in the first case and prosecuting it." (R. 
11483 pg. 7). 
4. Despite these findings made on June 19, 2007, on July 25, 2008, the court 
inappropriately grouped Marvin's necessary defense of Branson's aggressive action together 
with Branson's bad faith lawsuit at trial by generally finding, without pointing to any 
specifics, that both brothers had an acrimonious relationship, distrust of each other to a tragic 
break down of family relationships. (Addendum Exhibit B, R. 11352). The court 
placed Marvin in the same cup as Branson and found that neither party prevailed. "Both 
suffered irreparable loss and this court refuses to compound the loss by awarding fees to 
either party." (M,R. 11353). Judge Low stated that Marvin's pre-trial attorney's fees and 
costs, even though he prevailed on the majority of those motions would not be awarded for 
the reasons above stated. {Id.). That is the sum total of the court's findings and they are 
inadequate as a matter of law and insufficient to support the conclusion reached. In addition, 
they are grossly mistaken regarding the attorney's fees incurred by Marvin Neff prior to trial 
on enforcement of contract issues and avoiding Branson's attempt to rescind the contract. 
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B. Explanation of facts regarding attorney's fees on Manila Ranch. 
5. The attorney's fees for the Manila Ranch trial were based upon both contract 
provisions and the trust documents as well as statutory provisions in the trust code. There is 
no question that Branson misappropriated trust monies to his own private use, breached his 
fiduciary duty to Marvin, misappropriated funds and failed to provide an appropriate 
accounting or distribution to beneficiaries until Marvin actually forced the same with a 
lawsuit. (R. 11484, pgs. 28, 30, 33, 55, 59, 60, 61, 117 and 155). 
6. Indeed the court found: "I think Marvin will prevail, unless there is something 
astounding that you can show me." (Referring to Branson's attempt to offset.) (R. 11484, 
pgs. 137-38). Branson never did show the court any offsets - so by implication, Marvin 
prevailed on Manila Ranch. 
7. The trial court appropriately did not grant Branson any off-sets except for the 
$8,999 jury verdict on breach of contract. (R. 11357). This left Branson owing Marvin a 
substantial amount which Marvin still has never received and is forced to litigate just to 
recover the same. 
8. When one analyzes the Manila Ranch case in isolation from the ABCO trial, 
there is no question that Marvin prevailed, was the only party who prevailed, was awarded 
what he sought, and had to incur substantial attorney's fees just to get that award. Even if 
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insurance, life insurance, equipment and tools, or Marvin's improper deductions (see pg. 17 
to 19 of Branson's Brief). These speculations must be treated as contract breach issues, not 
fiduciary duty issues. (R.10188, f^ 1). The jury gave Branson $9,000 under his breach of 
contract claim but zero under fiduciary duty. (Addendum Exhibit N, R. 10564-65). 
V. FACTS RELEVANT TO MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM 
31. On or about June 5,2000, Judge Ben Hadfield issued a protective order against 
Branson that prohibited him from, among other things, "directly or indirectly contacting, 
harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating" with Marvin. (Trial Ex. 168, Protective 
Order, pg. 2). This was issued against Branson because Branson entered ABCO's offices 
and verbally and physically attacked and harmed Marvin while Marvin was at work. 
(Addendum Exhibit H, R. 7299-7301) (which is Branson's own version of the event at the 
ABCO office). Branson also admitted in an apology letter to assaulting Marvin. (Trial Ex. 
72). Branson's statement of fact on page 16, sentence 2 is therefore a misrepresentation of 
the actual record. 
32. On or about January 26, 2005, Branson, in violation of the protective order 
stopped his vehicle near Marvin's driveway and talked to Marvin. (Addendum Exhibit I, 
R.7124). 
33. This discussion became heated and Branson drove off fast. (Id). Marvin 
grabbed Branson's truck window to keep from sliding under Branson's truck wheels and 
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recent trial date on this matter, the trial court, in an admitted attempt to "bring matters to 
closure," hastily entered a Memorandum Decision on July 25,2008. While, concededly, the 
time had come to bring matters to a closure, the July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision did not 
provide Marvin a sufficient and accurate closure to the remaining matters in three areas: 
first, Marvin's requests for attorney's fees on the pre-trial ABCO case and the Manila Ranch 
case1; second, Marvin's entitlement to prejudgment interest through the date of the final 
judgment; and, third, a clerical error made by the trial court in memorializing relief granted to 
Marvin during a prior trial. 
The contract between the parties provides that attorneys fees shall be paid by the 
"prevailing party." In this case, evidence shows Marvin was the prevailing party in regards to 
the ABCO pre-trial and Manila Ranch matters and, thus, was entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees in both ABCO pre-trial motions and the bifurcated Manila Ranch case. 
However, in the aforementioned July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision, the trial court simply 
stated, "the only feasible and reasoned decision relative to attorney's fees is that neither party 
prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss, and this Court refuses to compound the loss by 
awarding fees to either party." This assertion was supported neither by findings of fact, nor 
analysis of the "flexible and reasoned" factors. Additionally, the July 25,2008 Memorandum 
Decision stated the trial court would consider nothing more, and, thus, precluded Marvin 
1. Note, the trial court seemingly foreclosed either party from an award of attorney's fees on the breach of contract issues 
entertained during the ABCO trial (even though Marvin was never given an opportunity to seek those fees) (R.l 1190), but 
reserved Marvin's right to seek pre-trial motion fees on the ABCO case and Manila Ranch trial. (R. 11484 pgs. 137,140-154). 
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ARGUMENT OF CROSS APPELLANT'S CLAIMS 
I. THE ISSUE OF MARVIN'S ATTORNEY'S FEES (REGARDING BOTH THE 
ABCO PRE-TRIAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND MANILA RANCH TRIAL 
ATTORNEY'S FEES) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
A. The attorney's fees issues should be remanded to the trial court because the trial 
court erred by not entering sufficient findings of fact in support of its July 25,2008 
Order that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney 'sfees. 
The trial court erred by not entering sufficient findings of fact in support of its final 
ruling that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. In Utah, an award of 
attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 
226, 230 (Utah 1997). In exercising that discretion, however, a trial court must make 
findings of fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions. (Id.); Anderson v. Thompson, 
2008 UT App 3,1| 42,176 P.3d 464; Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985); see 
also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). This enables an appellate court to determine if the trial court has 
abused its discretion. Willey, 951 P.2d at 230. Without adequate findings of fact, there can 
be no meaningful appellate review. (Id.); Anderson, 2008 UT App 3 at f^ 42. 
Because it is not the role of an appellate court to find facts, an appellate court will 
normally remand a matter to the trial court for further proceedings if it determines that the 
findings of fact are insufficient to support the trial court's legal conclusions. Willey, 951 
P.2d at 230; Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998). In this case, the trial court 
failed to enter sufficient findings of fact in support of its final order that Marvin was not 
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preservation) for the end of the proceedings. 
After reviewing Marvin's pre-trial ABCO/ Aspen Springs written request for 
attorney's fees, which was sufficient under Utah law, the trial court entered its July 25,2008 
Memorandum Decision and summarily denied Marvin's requests altogether, both oral and 
written. In that decision, the trial court stated that the "flexible and reasoned" approach was 
appropriate under the facts of this case, but failed to enter proper findings of fact or otherwise 
analyze the various factors involved in the "flexible and reasoned" analysis. 
Under the flexible and reasoned approach (discussed in greater detail below), the court 
must make specific findings of fact sufficient to lead the court to the conclusion of law as to 
who, if anyone, is the "prevailing" or "successful" party. J. PochynokCo., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 
2005 UT 39, f21, 116 P.3d 353. A successful party is one who successfully enforces or 
defends against an action. EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 2008 UT App 284, \ 14, 192 
P.3d 296. "Where it is not manifestly obvious which party was the "successful" one, courts 
employ a flexible and reasoned approach to determine which party was victorious." {Id.) 
"Under this approach, the trial court must consider, at a minimum, 'the significance of the net 
judgment in the case [and] the amounts actually sought and ... recovered'". {Id.) It should 
further consider and make findings on things such as contractual language; the number of 
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc. brought by each party and their success on each of 
these claims; the importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in the 
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context of the lawsuit considered as a whole; and the dollar amounts attached to and awarded 
in connection with the various claims. R. T. Nielson Company v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, % 25,40 
P.3d 1119. 
In its July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision (attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit B), 
the court made minimal or no findings of fact regarding the aforementioned "flexible and 
reasoned approach factors" concerning either the ABCO/ Aspen Springs pre-trial request for 
fees or the Manila Ranch trial attorney's fees issues. No findings of fact were made that lead 
to the trial courts conclusion of law that "neither party prevailed." No findings of fact were 
made as to why it was not manifestly obvious as to which party was successful. No findings 
of fact were made showing that the trial court even considered the net judgment of the case in 
comparison with the amounts actually sought and recovered by both parties. 
Rather, the trial court simply stated that the "only feasible and reasoned decision 
relative to attorney's fees is that neither party prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss, and 
this Court refuses to compound the loss by awarding fees to either party." The trial court 
then went on to say that its July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision "will constitute the final 
order herein and any further relief is to be sought on appeal." These statements are 
insufficient under the legal standard set forth above. In concluding that Marvin was not 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees as requested, the trial court was under a legal 
obligation to weigh the evidence presented, and thereafter enter detailed findings of fact that 
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lumps attorney's fees into costs, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure § 54(d)(2), Marvin 
should have been afforded five days after the entry of the Manila Ranch judgment to seek 
costs, including the attorney's fees Marvin incurred in the Manila Ranch litigation. 
Due to the procedural deficiencies of the trial court, Marvin was precluding from even 
exercising his statutory and procedural right of seeking his reasonable costs which include 
reasonable attorney's fees. Under the rules cited above Marvin is allowed to assert his 
affidavit and memorandum seeking attorney's fees and costs at the conclusion of the entire 
matter. The Manila Ranch trial was initially heard before the court on August 29,2007. The 
court ruled in Marvin's favor awarding Marvin $27,865 plus prejudgment interest on a claim 
that Branson did not properly administer the trust. However, the court left the judgment open 
regarding Branson's offsets and statute of limitations arguments. Further, the court failed to 
sign any of the proposed orders, findings of fact, or conclusions of law regarding the Manila 
Ranch trial prior to its decision on the offset and statute of limitations issues. 
Marvin's desire to seek an award of attorney's fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial 
was made known to the court during this trial and the court told Marvin he could file for 
attorney's fees. (See Addendum Exhibit B, pg. 5). Additionally, the court acknowledged 
Marvin had reserved the right to seek an award of attorney's fees at the end of the 
proceedings. (See November 6,2007 Memorandum Decision, Exhibit C). In reliance on this 
reservation, during the eleven month span between the trial and the July 25, 2008 decision, 
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Marvin's counsel prepared an affidavit and memorandum for attorney's fees in accordance 
with the dictates of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 73, waiting to supplement and file it 
after the decision was made as to the offsets and statute of limitations. 
After eleven months of consideration, the court made its determination regarding the 
remaining issues in the Manila Ranch trial (the offset and statute of limitations issues) in its 
Memorandum Decision dated July 25, 2008. Rather than providing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and recognizing Marvin's reservation of the costs and attorney's fees 
issues until after a decision was made on the offset and statute of limitation issues, the court 
made a statement of frustration (deemed the court's "final order") attempting to "bring ... 
matters to closure" and indicating neither party would be awarded attorney's fees in the final 
judgment and no other motions or memorandum would be considered. See July 25, 2008 
Memorandum Decision. 
As a result, the court precluded further filings and never properly allowed Marvin to 
claim, brief, or argue for costs/ attorney's fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial. The court 
did not allow the benefit of the procedural rules, specifically, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
Rule 54(d)'s provision for five days after judgment to file for costs, which pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-7-1004 include reasonable attorney's fees. 
Even if Rule 54(d), as applied in Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 
1998), does not provide a five day grace period with which to file a motion for the statutorily 
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"Whether attorney['s] fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law to be 
reviewed by appellate courts for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, 
f22,100 P.3d 1200. In Utah, attorney's fees are awardable only if provided for by statute or 
contract and, if by contract, only as the contract allows by its terms. Mountain States 
Broadcasting Company v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah App. 1989); Crowley v. Black, 
2007 UT App 245, % 12, 167 P.3d 1087; A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 
2004 UT 47 %/, 94 P. 3d 270. In observance of this rule, a trial court should grant 
reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with a written contractual provision. Crowley, 2007 
UT App. 245 at H 12 (Emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (2008). It is also important to note that in 
cases where the various issues are inextricably tied together, Utah courts have awarded 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees may not have been incurred 
solely on issues for which attorney's fees are customarily available. Brown v. David K. 
Richards & Company, 1999 UT App 109, Tf 16-24, 978 P. 2d 470. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, each of the buyout agreements at issue 
clearly provided that the "prevailing party" was entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the 
event of litigation. For purposes of this provision, the term "litigation" includes attempts by 
one party to rescind the contract at issue. See Chase 2001 UT App. 404 at ^ f 11-17. (holding 
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compounded by the fact that the jury awarded Branson only $9,000 in damages despite his 
claim for more than $879,000 (R. 10256) plus five times that for punitive damages 
($4,395,000), plus an attorney fee claim. 
By contrast, in connection with the ABCO trial, the jury ruled in favor of Marvin and 
against Branson on Marvin's claims for breach of contract, assault and battery, breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. Although Marvin was only 
awarded $2.00 in damages as a result of those verdicts, that amount was the full sum 
requested by Marvin, and does not take into account the many forms of non-monetary relief 
which Marvin received throughout the course of this extended litigation. Moreover, it was 
the trial court's belief that "the jury could have found a whole lot more [damages in favor of 
Marvin] had they been asked to. The evidence was certainly there..." (See April 16,2007 
transcript, and July 25,2008 decision). Marvin was also the only party to receive a monetary 
payout from the Manila Ranch trial. In any event, the Manila Ranch payout came about as 
the result of Branson's wrongful conduct in his trustee or fiduciary capacity. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Marvin was the prevailing party in this matter-
not only on the contractual claims, but on the majority of other claims which were, as a 
whole, inseparably related thereto. Branson's ultimate jury award of $9,000 does not take 
into consideration the fact that nearly all of Branson's claims and causes of action were a 
total failure; does not take into consideration the fact that most of the significant disputes 
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and the slanderous statement must cause actual or special damages to the Plaintiff); Utah 
Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1315 
(D. Utah 1999) (Where the court explained that to prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim, the Plaintiff "must demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as a result of the alleged 
breach"). The real issue then, is whether attorney's fees incurred, without any other damages 
proven, can support a claim for "special damages." The answer, based on case law, reason 
and logic, is that attorney's fees, standing alone, without other special or general damages, do 
not and cannot satisfy the damage element to make the claim viable. 
For instance, in slander of title cases, the Plaintiff cannot prevail unless he alleges and 
proves a pecuniary loss resulting from the act of the Defendant. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 
208 P.2d 956, 958 (Utah 1949). Further, presumed or general damages are not sufficient to 
support the claim. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 
1257 (Utah 1989). "Proof of special damages usually involves demonstrating a sale at a 
reduced price or at greater expense to the seller." Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, 
Inc., 944 P.2d 361,364 (Utah 1997). Additionally, attorney's fees on slander of title are 
limited to those employed to correct the slanderous statement itself rather than to obtain 
compensation for the slander. Banberry, 780 P. 2d at 1258. In Banberry, as in this case, the 
incorrect title recording was voluntarily corrected and thus attorney's fees could not serve as 
the required damages on the slander of title action. As stated in Bass, Neither a judge or a 
-61 -
jury can award gratuitous attorney's fees if the elements of the cause of action were not 
proven. 761 P. 2d at 569. "It is the jury's duty to determine the amount of damages a plaintiff 
in fact sustained, but it is up to the court to conform the jury's findings to applicable law." 
Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, If 34, 89 P.3d 109. 
Only those attorney's fees actually incurred to cure the defect, correct the recording or 
place the property in Branson's name prior to the lawsuit were awardable, and then only if 
actual damages existed. However, any attorney's fees incurred prior to Branson's lawsuit 
were actually performed by Travis Bowen, who did not charge either brother. Moreover, 
Branson himself could have voluntarily corrected the problem by signing his own corrective 
deed. (R. 11487, pg. 503-504). Note, Branson has failed to show one bit of evidence about 
the amount of attorney's fees he specifically incurred to correct the slander of title prior to 
filing the lawsuit. As a matter of law, he failed to prove any special damages. 
Nor can Branson show he must receive attorney's fees on his breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. A successful breach of fiduciary duty claim requires damages to the Plaintiff, 
proximately caused by that breach. See Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson,508 F.3d 277, 
283 (5th Cir. 2007), Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959(11th Cir. 2009). 
Utah courts have consistently held that a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim requires a 
showing of actual damages before attorney's fees can be awarded. Free Motion Fitness, Inc. 
v. Wells Fargo Bank West, NA, 2009 UT App. 120, If 28, 208 P. 3d 1066. In Free Motion 
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Fitness the Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees without a showing of damages, and 
the court ruled that Plaintiffs could not prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. (Id.); See 
also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) ("When a Plaintiff only recovers nominal 
damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, 
\ . .the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all'"). 
The Federal District Court of Utah faced a similar issue in Utah Medical Products, 
Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Incf where the Court held the Plaintiff, "must 
demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as a result from the alleged breach." 79 F. Supp. 
2d at 1315. The Court also explained that, "the fact of damages is an essential element of 
[the]... cause of action that must be substantiated." (Id.) In other words, "because damage is 
an essential element for a claim for breach of fiduciary duty," a claim without damages "fails 
as a matter of law." (Id.) 
C. There are other reasons that JNO V was properly granted as a matter of law. 
The trial court's decision is also justified by other valid reasons that defeated 
Branson's claim for slander of title or fiduciary duty. For instance, slander of title requires 
the statement to have been made with malice. The court in Banberry noted a "difference 
between poor performance and malice." 780 P.2d at 1257. In Banberry, the mistake arose 
when the bank made a clerical error in copying a verbatim description in the recorded Deed 
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C. Summary judgment was proper because the prosecution was initiated with a proper 
purpose: to bring an offender to justice. 
The third element of a malicious prosecution is improper purpose. In Hodges, the 
accusers had an improper purpose because they used the threat of criminal prosecution as 
leverage to force the accused to pay money that was missing. 811 P.2d at 161. Conversely, an 
employee who initiated prosecution "for the legitimate purpose of protecting company 
property" was not malicious. Agler v. Scheidle, 2006 UT App 495, \1. In affirming the trial 
court's granting of summary judgment against a malicious prosecution claim, the Agler court 
noted that "the record is void of any evidence beyond Plaintiffs speculation" of an improper 
purpose. {Id.) 
Unlike Hodges, Marvin did not use the criminal justice process to force Branson to 
pay money or for any other improper purpose. He only asked for $ 1.00 for the assault. As in 
Agler, the trial court in this case explained that "the record is void of any evidence beyond 
[Branson's] speculation that [Marvin] initiated the prosecution allegations for any wrongful 
or improper motive." (R. 8722). This includes the neighbor's affidavit, which "is neither 
conclusive of actual innocence (of Branson) nor is it sufficient proof of malice (by Marvin)." 
(R. 8722). Thus, Branson failed to present any genuine dispute as to the third element. 
As shown above, Branson did not obtain a favorable outcome. Rather, he pled guilty 
to two criminal charges and the other was deferred until the civil trial which also found 
assault. Even if Branson could satisfy one of the elements, the absence of any one of the four 
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contracts broadly so as to award attorney's fees on appeal where a statute or contract initially 
authorizes them. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305, 319 (Utah 1998); see also 
Christopherson, Farris, White & Utley, P. C. v. Pugh, 2006 UT App 68, U 12 (quoting R&R 
Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc. 936 P. 2d 1068,1081 "where party entitled to attorney 
fees below prevails on appeal, attorney fee award on appeal is proper"). On these grounds 
Marvin is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees and costs he has incurred in relation to 
this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
I. CROSS APPELLANT BRIEF 
For the foregoing reasons, Marvin respectfully requests that this case be remanded so 
the trial court can enter an award for Marvin's attorney's fees and costs on the ABCO pre-
trial motion practice and Manila Ranch trial in this matter, that it sua spontae Marvin be 
awarded prejudgment interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum through July 25, 
2008 on all amounts granted to him in connection with the Manila Ranch trial, and that the 
trial court's final order in this matter be corrected as set forth herein to reflect that the total 
principal amount of Marvin's award from the Manila Ranch trial is $27,865 principal and 
$ 17,968.42 in pre-judgment interest, less $8,999 due Branson, for total final judgment due of 
$36,834.42. Marvin also respectfully requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs in 
connection with Branson's appeal and this cross-appeal. 
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IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 
For purpose of clarity and except as otherwise stated, the Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
Branson G. Neff, shall be referred to herein as "Branson." The Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
Marvin G. Neff, shall be referred to herein as "Marvin." 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Branson appropriately cited the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. CROSS APPEAL BRIEF 
Marvin submits the following issues for appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Marvin's request for attorney's fees 
regarding the ABCO/ Aspen Springs pretrial issues and the Manila Ranch trial issues, due to 
the trial court's failure to make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that 
neither party is entitled to attorney's fees, and due to the fact that the trial court did not honor 
Marvin's procedural and statutory rights to seek attorney's fees? Standard of Review: Abuse 
of discretion regarding the question of "Prevailing Party;" but on the issue of whether fees 
are recoverable, it is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Willey v. Willey, 951 
P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997); R. T. Nielsen Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ^16, 40 P.3d 1119. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to amend the Manila Ranch Order to 
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include prejudgment interest at ten percent from August 29,2007 until final judgment on July 
25, 2008? Standard of Review: Correctness. Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19,111, 155 
P.3d917. 
3. Whether the trial court erred and made a clerical mistake when it rendered its 
final order effective July 25,2008 by overlooking the amount previously awarded in the trial 
involving Manila Ranch by omitting the undisputed sum of $7,548 in principal with an 
appropriate award of prejudgment interest thereon? Standard of Review: Correctness. 
Frito-Lay v. Labor Commission, 2008 UT App 314, 193 P.3d 665. 
II. BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
1. Did the trial court correctly grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
breach of fiduciary duty and slander of title claims when the jury held there were no damages 
and damages are a necessary element before attorney's fees can be awarded, and yet the jury 
improperly marked the attorney fee section on the verdict form? 
2. Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment against Branson's 
malicious prosecution claim where Branson failed to present a prima facie case or 
demonstrate material disputes of fact on each of the four necessary elements? 
Branson stated the proper standard of review for these two issues as "correctness." 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah R. App P. 33 (2008). See Addendum. 
2. Utah R. App P. 34 (2008). See Addendum. 
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b) (2008). See Addendum. 
4. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (2008). See Addendum. 
5. Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (2008). See Addendum. 
6. Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (2008). See Addendum. 
7. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) (2008). See Addendum. 
8. Utah R. Civ. P. 73 (2008). See Addendum. 
9. Utah R. Evid. 101 (2008). See Addendum. 
10. Utah R. Evid. 606(b) (2008). See Addendum. 
11. UTAH CODE ANN. §75-7 1004 (2004). See Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
A. The ABCO Case 
Basically, this case involved a shareholder buyout dispute between two brothers, 
Branson and Marvin. Branson and Marvin entered a buyout agreement on December 8,1999, 
dividing their construction company known as ABCO, some farm property in Corinne, Utah, 
the land upon which the ABCO offices were built, as well as other property interests which 
- 3 -
the brothers jointly held including Farr West and Lincoln property. (Trial Ex. 43 as 
Addendum Exhibit E). Branson was to receive the farm property, over $282,000 in 
installment payments and various other payments, in the buyout. (Id). Marvin was to receive 
ABCO and all of ABCO's assets, debts, inventory and equipment, as well as the land 
surrounding the ABCO offices and Farr West and Lincoln. (Trial Ex. 43). Attorney Travis 
Bowen was engaged to draft all of the documents for this buyout including various stock 
redemption agreements, partnership interest redemption agreements, membership interest 
redemption agreements and the necessary real estate deeds to accomplish this division of 
interests. (Trial Ex. 155 and 156). The documents were signed and executed by the brothers. 
Sometime in June 2000, Branson became frustrated with the terms and conditions and 
sought to rescind or set aside the buyout agreement and litigate or re-negotiate all of the 
terms, which terms he claimed included the division of Aspen Springs Storage Units ("Aspen 
Springs"). Aspen Springs was a totally separate entity owned by Marvin individually and 
built in 1993. (Trial Ex. 4 as Addendum Exhibit G). The parties tried to resolve the 
problems, using attorneys Bowen and Ben Hathaway. Branson filed suit on October 29, 
2002 claiming sixteen (16) causes of action against Marvin and Travis Bowen. (R. 1-32). 
Branson stated to Mike Gale he was "jealous ABCO was still doing well without 
him...he wanted ABCO to go broke." (R. 7330 to 7335 ^ 12). Branson was upset about 
Marvin obtaining a protective order against him, for Marvin not paying Branson earlier (Trial 
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Ex. 4), particularly since Branson lost over $210,000 in the stock market. (R. 11487 pg. 384). 
Branson seemed determined to destroy ABCO and Marvin, even threatened to kill Marvin 
with his 9 millimeter handgun. (R. 11486 pgs. 204-207). 
Marvin countered claiming that the buyout agreement could not be rescinded or set 
aside for fraud, but enforceable and that all of Branson's claims outside of the buyout 
agreement were barred by the statute of limitations or doctrines of merger, acceptance, 
ratification, parol evidence and so forth. (R. 132-152). 
The majority of Branson's claims in the ABCO proceedings were dismissed or were 
resolved prior to trial through summary judgment. The remaining issues for trial were 
enforcement of the buyout agreement, whether there had been a breach of said contract, and 
whether anyone's title had been slandered. (R. 8707-8736). Both brothers sought damages 
for breach of contract and other matters. Branson sought a minimum of $879,959, plus 
punitive damages and attorney fees while Marvin only requested $1.00 or nominal damages 
and attorney's fees. (R. 10256). Branson was awarded $9,001 and Marvin was awarded $2.00 
by the jury. (R. 10563-10570). Thereafter, Branson sought attorney's fees and was awarded 
none. (Id). Marvin sought all ABCO pre-trial motion attorney's fees and was denied the 
same.(R. 11349-11358). 
B. The Manila Ranch Case 
Marvin also filed an Amended Counterclaim for damages on a separate issue 
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involving property known as the Manila Ranch; which was a jointly owned ranch inherited 
from the brothers' father through a family trust, and which required the property to be 
divided equally between Marvin and Branson. (Manila Trial Ex. 1 and 2). The brothers' 
father died in July of 1994, but the trust estate had never been formally closed. Branson 
administered the trust but had never supplied an accounting, report, or proper distributions 
for closing to Marvin. The Ranch received income from cattle sales and oil royalties from 
1994 until July of 2000. The Ranch land was sold to Pallesens for $240,000. (Manila Trial 
Ex. 7, 5 and 25). Pallesens had made a $120,000 down payment and were to pay the 
remaining $120,000 in yearly installment payments of $13,903.28. {Id). Branson did not 
properly distribute the profit or income from this property to Marvin, and so Marvin added a 
cause of action by amending his counterclaim on February 10, 2005. (R. 1605-1623). 
Branson's answer denied any wrong doing, claimed the Ranch never had any profits to 
distribute, and even if Marvin deserved a share, Branson was entitled to offset money on the 
buyout which Branson claimed. (R. 5225-5229). 
In the Manila Ranch proceedings, Marvin asked for damages of approximately 
$31,000 plus one-half (14) of a $100,000 payoff, or $50,000; all of which was held in escrow. 
Marvin also was entitled to interest at 10% per annum from the date that funds should have 
been paid. (Manila Ranch Trial Ex. 29 and 30). On August 29, 2007, Marvin was awarded 
$27,865 in principal plus 10% interest. Marvin reserved a claim for attorney's fees, but the 
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trial judge failed to award fees. Additionally, the judgment contains a clerical error of $7,548 
in principal. (R. 11349-11358). 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The ABCO/Aspen Springs proceedings and Manila Ranch proceedings were at first 
part of the whole matter, but just prior to the ABCO trial, the Manila Ranch claims were 
bifurcated for separate trials. 
A. ABCO Proceedings 
Branson brought a lawsuit in Salt Lake County against Marvin on October 29, 2002 
seeking over $5,304,070 in damages, punitive damages and attorney's fees. (R. 1-32; R. 
8581-8584) (Note, this did not include the additional claim for damages against Aspen 
Springs for over $1,600,000). Branson's complaint also included a cause of action against 
Travis Bowen. (Id). The initial complaint was thirty-two pages long with sixteen different 
causes of action. (R. 1-32). 
Marvin immediately requested the Court to change venue, since the bulk of the real 
estate was in Box Elder County and the contract signed there. Marvin's motion to change 
venue from Salt Lake County to Box Elder County was granted on February 14, 2003. (R. 
290-292; 307-308). Branson filed a motion for accounting by a Special Master and various 
other motions. Marvin filed a motion for summary judgment on May 5, 2003 to limit 
Branson's aggressive litigation to purely breach of contract issues and enforcement of the 
- 7 -
buyout agreement. (R. 369-370). Branson argued that Marvin had committed fraud so the 
agreement was void and asked the court to first let the Special Master review all of the 
ABCO books and records including the construction records on Aspen Springs and all 
farm/Westco records before making any decisions. (R. 557-653). The court, out of caution 
and pursuant to Rule 56(f), hired a court appointed accountant, Dan James and Associates, to 
conduct a full audit and review of the books and records and ordered discovery to take place 
before the summary judgment motion would be heard. (R.699-701). 
During this discovery process it became clear that several of Branson's causes of 
action should be barred by the statute of limitations. Marvin filed a motion to dismiss or in 
the alternative for summary judgment under the statute of limitations on February 2, 2004. 
(R.809-810). This motion sought to eliminate the Aspen Springs lost corporate opportunity 
claim, and other fraud claims so as to avoid needless litigation and discovery on barred 
claims. Branson filed a Rule 56(f) motion to stay the proceedings until more discovery was 
obtained. (R. 842-846). The court granted the stay until further discovery was completed. 
In the meantime, Marvin was successful in obtaining a discovery protective order over 
his personal finances and was also successful in obtaining a release of the lis pendens which 
Branson had recorded against four acres surrounding Marvin's home. (See R. 1219-1220; 
R. 1320-1322). The court then ordered mediation. 
The parties attended mediation with Paul Felt but the mediation was unsuccessful, 
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except that Marvin released Travis Bowen from his counterclaim since there appeared no 
evidence that would hold Travis Bowen liable. Branson, however, continued to proceed 
against Travis Bowen. 
Branson also filed motions to release escrow funds from the court and to obtain 
certain farm equipment. (R. 1776-78). The court denied Branson's request to remove 
escrow funds, found it improper that Branson was trying to rescind the contract and yet trying 
to enforce a provision regarding equipment transfer under the contract, but still ordered 
Marvin to turn over said equipment "as is." (R.2134-2135). 
Marvin, on September 15, 2005 renewed his request for summary judgment on the 
statute of limitations because Dan James and Associates had finally completed their 
accounting and audit, which showed no wrong doing. (R. 2022). Branson filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment alleging that the parties buyout agreement or property settlement 
was void for fraud or was merely an agreement to agree and non-enforceable. (R. 2144-
2145). Marvin also filed a motion for summary judgment on October 19, 2005 regarding 
Branson's retirement benefits or salary continuation agreement (R.2418-2419); and on 
November 22, 2005, again renewed his request that the court decide the partial summary 
judgment on the statute of limitations. (R.2582). Marvin also filed a Motion in Limine on 
December 12, 2005 to exclude all prior inconsistent statements regarding the buyout 
agreement and for partial summary judgment to enforce the contract based on the doctrine of 
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merger and integration of contracts. (R. 3218). 
It was not until December 15, 2005 that the court finally, after allowing Branson to 
conduct extensive discovery, issued a ruling on some of the motions. The court partially 
granted a dismissal according to the statue of limitations defense, holding that Branson could 
not assert any separate claim against Aspen Springs during phase one of construction because 
Branson was aware of underlying facts prior to 1995. The court held that Branson could 
have discovered said facts and therefore granted the motion. (R. 3688). However, phase two 
and three of Aspen Springs construction after 1995 remained in dispute, so this was still 
pursued by Branson. Branson, in January of 2006, filed a motion to reconsider the court's 
decision regarding the statute of limitations. (R. 4506). 
The court granted Marvin's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of 
salary continuation on March 13,2006. (R. 5367-5371). However, the court denied Marvin's 
motion to hold the buyout contract valid and binding on the grounds that material issues of 
fact were still present. The court recognized that the buyout contract may be a valid and 
binding contract, but deferred the decision based on disputed facts. (R. 5398). A week later, 
the court denied Marvin's motion to find the contract fully integrated at that time. The court 
stated that Marvin could renew the motion prior to trial to limit the evidence. (See Decision 
dated March 21, 2006, R.5398). On March 31, 2006 the court clarified the ruling regarding 
the statute of limitations and denied Branson's claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty 
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regarding Aspen Springs and any fraud or breach of fiduciary duty claim regarding the 
disproportional payments among the parties' children prior to April 1999. (See R. 5502). 
On March 12,2006 Marvin filed a motion to reconsider the denial of Marvin's motion 
to limit the evidence regarding the contracts and to find the contract binding on the parties. 
(R. 5565). Branson likewise filed a supplemental motion to hold that the contract was merely 
an "agreement to agree" based on new evidence. (R. 5601). Oral argument was held on May 
11, 2006 regarding the various outstanding motions and issues. (R. 5753). Branson was 
ordered to submit a brief showing he had prima facie evidence for punitive damages against 
Marvin and Travis Bowen. (R. 5785). On July 7, 2006 the court issued a Memorandum 
Decision regarding partial summary judgment reversing its March 21, 2006 Memorandum 
Decision by stating that the contract was a valid contract which could not be set aside as 
merely an "agreement to agree," but there were still issues regarding the contract that needed 
to be resolved by trial unless settled. (R. 6115 -6121). 
Travis Bowen then filed a motion for summary judgment to release him from the 
lawsuit. (R. 6251, 6432). Marvin filed a motion to reconsider his motion to limit certain 
evidence and find that Branson had elected his remedy under a contract breach claim and was 
bound thereby. Branson filed a motion to keep Marvin's expert witness Jeff Thorne from 
testifying regarding the contract. On October 27,2006, the judge ruled that Marvin's expert 
Jeff Thorne could testify for Marvin thus denying Branson's motion to exclude him. (R.8468-
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8470). On November 15,2006, the court dismissed Travis Bowen as a party, indicating that 
Branson could not show any damages and further held that Branson would not be allowed to 
bring any punitive damage claims at the trial, except for possibly on slander of title or breach 
of fiduciary duty. (R. 8520-8530). 
Marvin then filed a motion to completely deny Branson's claim to Aspen Springs or 
any other disproportionate payments, and to bar Branson's attempt to value ABCO's worth. 
Because of the confusion created by the numerous orders and the scope of said orders, 
Marvin asked for clarification on the previous statute of limitations ruling; particularly on 
phase two and three of Aspen Springs and Branson's allegations of fraud. Marvin also asked 
for a partial summary judgment regarding the malicious prosecution claim and other slander 
of title claims by Branson. (R. 7089). Marvin, on August 25, 2006 asked for summary 
judgment on breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment and fraudulent non-
disclosure claims. (R. 7218 dated August 25, 2006). Branson sought to introduce at trial 
various appraisals he had obtained regarding the value of Aspen Springs, Farr West, Lincoln, 
and the farm using values in year 2006. Marvin renewed his request that the court decide, 
prior to trial, whether this contract was fully integrated or partially integrated and whether 
Branson had waived his right to rescind that contract as a matter of law. (R. 8196). 
All of the above motions were filed to limit Branson's claims to breach of contract 
and to stop Branson from rescinding or voiding the contract. 
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Finally, on January 9,2007, after nearly four and one-half (4 Vi) years of litigation, the 
court issued its Memorandum Decision regarding all of the pre-trial motions for summary 
judgment and other various motions; which essentially eliminated Branson's breach of 
fiduciary duty claim, fraud claim, fraudulent concealment claim, fraudulent non-disclosure 
claims, malicious prosecution claim, severely limited the slander of title claim, held that the 
contract was a binding contract and was fully integrated in parts and partially integrated in 
others, foreclosed Branson from seeking any remedies against Aspen Springs or 
disproportionate payments and excluded Branson from bringing any appraised values on 
ABCO, Aspen Springs, Farr West, Lincoln or other properties using data obtained after 
December 13,1999, and treated any breach of fiduciary duty claim after December 8,1999 in 
winding up the parties division of property as "akin to breach of contract." (R.8707-8736). 
Branson, in the ABCO trial, sought in excess of $879,000 in damages plus five (5) 
times this sum for punitive damages ($4,395,000) plus attorney's fees on his remaining 
claims. (R. 8585-8587; 10256). The jury returned a verdict of no damages for breach of good 
faith, no damages for slander of title, no damages for breach of fiduciary duty, $9,000 in 
damages for breach of contract, and zero damages for Branson's request for retirement or 
salary continuation, which resulted in no punitive damages. (R. 9788 to 9795). The jury, in 
the special verdict form on slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty, because no damages 
had been awarded, erroneously checked a box that the trial judge should consider an award of 
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attorney's fees for Branson. (R. 9790-91). The judge had previously retained authority to 
award the amount of attorney's fees. (R.9771). 
Branson filed a memorandum of costs and attorney's fees, seeking over $387,000 in 
fees. Marvin filed a motion of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the issues of slander 
of title, breach of fiduciary duty, and the erroneous checking of the box for attorney's fees. 
The trial court granted Marvin's motion for JNOV and refused to award Branson any 
attorney's fees on any of his claims. (R. 10563-70). In addition, the court found Branson's 
award for contract breach as miniscule and certainly not a victory when compared to the total 
damages Branson sought. (R. 10565 f 2); that Branson's claims were unmeritorious (R. 
10565 fflf 14 and 16); that Branson, unmeritoriously and unnecessarily, required Marvin to 
participate in the litigation, to assert defenses, and to defend against Branson's claims. (R. 
10565 f 17). Marvin's counterclaims at trial were primarily to defend against Branson's 
aggressive action and so during the jury trial, Marvin only asked for one dollar ($1.00) in 
damages for Branson's assault and one dollar ($1.00) in damages for Branson's breach of the 
buyout contract. The jury awarded Marvin all the damages he sought. (R. 9792). 
Branson has appealed only the JNOV decision and malicious prosecution summary 
judgment. He has not appealed the trial court's refusal to award Branson's attorney's fees for 
breach of contract or the jury's no damage award on slander of title or fiduciary duty claim. 
(R. 11425-11426; Branson's Docketing Statement pgs. 3-5). It should also be noted that 
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Branson has not marshaled the evidence on appeal, has not presented all evidence that 
supports why the trial court granted Marvin's JNOV motion or his motion for partial 
summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, Marvin has filed a 
motion for summary disposition of Branson's appeal. 
B. Manila Ranch Trial Proceedings 
As previously stated, Branson administered his father's trust from July 1994 until well 
into 2005. 
Marvin learned that Branson, acting as trustee, had failed to distribute the trust assets 
properly under a 50/50 division so he amended his counterclaim and sought recovery. (R. 
1605-1623). 
Depositions and discovery were taken regarding Manila Ranch of Branson and 
attorney Dale Dorius, and bank records were produced, as well as information from the 
Ranch purchasers, the Pallesens. 
The parties approved a stipulated order regarding interpleader of the $100,000 payoff 
of the Manila Ranch sale, entered on May 31, 2005, wherein the court received in escrow 
approximately $99,696.62. (R. 1774). These funds were placed in an interest bearing 
account. (Id). Branson sought to release these funds from escrow on June 22,2005. (R. 1776-
1777). 
The court also entered an order denying Branson's request to withdraw the interplead 
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funds unless a proper bond was posted. (R. 2574-2575). Branson tried to modify the above 
order and his request was denied. (See R. 6034-6048) The funds are still being held in an 
interest bearing account to this day. 
The Manila Ranch case, as indicated, was bifurcated and set for a separate four (4) 
day bench trial (See Notice March 27, 2007, R. 10282-10284). 
Branson filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the Manila Ranch claims on 
August 9, 2007, approximately 20 days prior to the trial. (R. 10653-10713). Marvin filed a 
trial brief on August 16, 2007 as well as his own cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 
10788-10790). 
The bench trial started on August 29,2007 and the court conducted the hearing more 
like an argument for summary judgment with proffers of evidence since several of the facts 
were undisputed. The trial lasted one day with Branson stipulating that he owed Marvin 
$27,865 in principal plus 10% interest from the appropriate dates. (See R. 11484 pgs. 28,30, 
33, 51, 55, 59, 60, 61, 117 and 155). Marvin submitted his own order regarding the Manila 
Ranch trial showing the exact same principal due, as Branson, but calculating the interest at 
10% from the dates the court ordered, which would amount to interest of $15,181.92 to 
August 29,2007. {Id; R.10930; 10932-10935). The parties argued about interest, (R.10980), 
with Branson seeking interest from inappropriate dates. (R. 10981. See also R. 10999 which 
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were the principal calculations written from the chart at trial showing the amount of principal 
due). 
The court never made a decision regarding this matter, and Branson next filed a 
memorandum for off-sets, seeking off-sets totaling more than the Manila Ranch award. (See 
R. 11004-11012). Marvin argued that Branson was not entitled to any off-set, since all off-
sets were decided on the merits prior to the ABCO trial or during ABCO's trial. (R.l 1075-
11091). 
Subsequently, Judge Low retired from the case, but Chief Judge Thomas L. Willmore 
asked Judge Low to please finish up the case. 
In the meantime, Marvin filed a memorandum of points and authorities for his costs 
and attorney's fees incurred in the pre-trial actions on the ABCO case. (R. 11208). These 
fees had been reserved to be requested until after the final order. Marvin asked for a decision 
on the ABCO pre-trial attorney's fees in November 2007. (See R.l 1338). 
Finally, after the file seemed to sit inactive for a significant length of time, on July 25, 
2008 a final order was entered by the court on both ABCO and Manila Ranch. In the order 
the court stated that any further relief was to be sought on appeal. (R.l 1349-11357). That 
order failed to grant Marvin $7,548 in principal previously awarded. The court previously, on 
August 29, 2007 had awarded Marvin $7,548. (R. 11484 pgs. 117 and 155). The court also 
had awarded interest at 10% thereon from March 24,2003 to August 29,2007 or $3,268.28; 
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for a total amount left out of the final order of over $10,816.28. This was purely a clerical 
error. The court did not award Branson any off-sets (other than the $8,999 the jury had 
already granted to Branson) and denied Branson's off-set claims. (R. 11357). 
The court basically overlooked Marvin's attorney fee request on all pre-trial ABCO 
contract enforcement; did not even allow Marvin the right to seek attorney's fees on the 
Manila Ranch trial; and, ignored all subsequent motions thereafter to correct the judgment. 
(R. 11357). Both parties filed notices of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As stated above, Branson has failed to satisfy his marshaling requirement on appeal 
and Marvin now is forced to spend more time, energy, and attorney's fees to list facts that 
support the trial court's decision. (See Marvin's separate motion to strike Branson's 
misleading facts and for failure to marshal the evidence). 
I. FACTS RELEVANT TO MARVIN'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
A. Explanation of facts regarding request for attorney ysfees on all pre-trial motions to 
oppose Branson ys attempt to rescind the contract as well as to enforce a binding 
contract. 
1. It should be noted that the trial court found that neither brother would be 
entitled to attorney's fees for breach of contract, which breach of contract was tried to the 
jury and Branson was awarded $9,000 and Marvin was awarded $ 1.00 (which is all he asked 
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for). (Addendum Exhibit B, C and D). The trial judge treated Branson's recovery of $9,000 
as nominal, or more accurately de minimis, in its nature and awarded Branson no attorney's 
fees. (R. 11352, Addendum Exhibit D). The court further held in November 2007 that 
although the contract did allow the prevailing party to be awarded attorney's fees and even 
though Marvin reserved his request for attorney's fees to be determined after final order, "the 
court finds that neither party is justified in receiving attorney's fees in regards to the breach 
of contract issue." (R. 11190, Addendum Exhibit C). The court reasoned that even if the 
parties were justified in receiving attorney's fees for the trial on breach of contract issues 
they would off-set one another. (Id.) This ruling appeared to be limited to the ABCO trial 
attorney's fees incurred by both parties. 
2. Thus, Marvin did not seek any attorney's fees for the trial on breach of contract 
and did not appeal that decision. Neither did Branson. Instead, Marvin sought attorney's 
fees to enforce the contract regarding all pre-trial motions. Marvin filed his request for fees 
and accompanying affidavit on November 20, 2007, after the court had made the decision 
regarding breach of contract attorney's fees. (See R. 11208-11307 attached as Addendum 
Exhibit F). The filing for these attorney's fees was based on the trial judge's earlier decision 
of January 9, 2007 granting most if not all of Marvin's motions for summary judgment; 
which eliminated most of Branson's claims, including his largest claim attempting to rescind 
the contract based on fraud, misrepresentation, failure to disclose, no meeting the minds, 
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condition precedent, agreement to agree and various other arguments. (Addendum Exhibit 
M). These arguments consumed the majority of the lawsuit from October 29,2002 to Jan 9, 
2007. The trial court acknowledged in motion practice and at a trial by jury, "the Plaintiff 
failed to recover or succeed on the majority on his claims." (R. 11352). It must be noted, that 
Marvin prevailed on 17 pre-trial claims to counter Branson's attempt to get around the 
buyout contract. (R. 11210-212). Essentially, Branson's 16 causes of action were reduced to 
breach of contract and slander of title. (R. 8707-8736). 
3. The court also found in its June 19, 2007 decision regarding attorney's fees, 
that prior to trial most of Plaintiff s claims were dismissed. (Addendum Exhibit D, R. 10565 
T[12). The court further found, "Plaintiffs claim to set aside the subject contract on grounds 
of fraud consumed substantially all of the pre-litigation motions and was totally 
unmeritorious." (Id. at ]fl4). The court held in paragraph 17 that "Plaintiff unnecessarily 
and unmeritoriously required Defendants to participate in the litigation, to assert defenses 
and to defend against Plaintiffs claims at trial." (Id). (Emphasis added). The ABCO buyout 
agreements allowed for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and costs, "whether an action 
has been commenced or not, which may arise or accrue from enforcing any of the terms of 
this agreement." (See <[ 9.11 and 9.H of the Stock Redemption Agreement, Partnership 
Interest Agreement and Section 9.H of the Membership Interest Redemption Agreement. See 
Trial Ex. 155 and 156). (Emphasis added). Those agreements allow for pre-trial motion 
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attorney's fees to successfully defend against a rescission claim and to properly enforce a 
valid, binding contract where Branson seeks to void it for fraud. The court acknowledged 
that Branson should not have even filed this complaint against Marvin stating, "If I find fault 
in this case, frankly it is the bringing of this action in the first case and prosecuting it." (R. 
11483 pg. 7). 
4. Despite these findings made on June 19, 2007, on July 25, 2008, the court 
inappropriately grouped Marvin's necessary defense of Branson's aggressive action together 
with Branson's bad faith lawsuit at trial by generally finding, without pointing to any 
specifics, that both brothers "had an acrimonious relationship, distrust of each other to a 
tragic break down of family relationships." (Addendum Exhibit B, R. 11352). The court 
placed Marvin in the same cup as Branson and found that neither party prevailed. "Both 
suffered irreparable loss and this court refuses to compound the loss by awarding fees to 
either party." (Id, R. 11353). Judge Low stated that Marvin's pre-trial attorney's fees and 
costs, even though he prevailed on the majority of those motions would not be awarded for 
the reasons above stated. (Id.). That is the sum total of the court's findings and they are 
inadequate as a matter of law and insufficient to support the conclusion reached. In addition, 
they are grossly mistaken regarding the attorney's fees incurred by Marvin Neff prior to trial 
on enforcement of contract issues and avoiding Branson's attempt to rescind the contract. 
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B. Explanation of facts regarding attorney's fees on Manila Ranch. 
5. The attorney's fees for the Manila Ranch trial were based upon both contract 
provisions and the trust documents as well as statutory provisions in the trust code. There is 
no question that Branson misappropriated trust monies to his own private use, breached his 
fiduciary duty to Marvin, misappropriated funds and failed to provide an appropriate 
accounting or distribution to beneficiaries until Marvin actually forced the same with a 
lawsuit. (R. 11484, pgs. 28, 30, 33, 55, 59, 60, 61, 117 and 115). 
6. Indeed the court found: "I think Marvin will prevail, unless there is something 
astounding that you can show me." (Referring to Branson's attempt to offset.) (R. 11484, 
pgs. 137-38). Branson never did show the court any offsets - so by implication, Marvin 
prevailed on Manila Ranch. 
7. The trial court appropriately did not grant Branson any off-sets except for the 
$8,999 jury verdict on breach of contract. (R. 11357). This left Branson owing Marvin a 
substantial amount which Marvin still has never received and is forced to litigate just to 
recover the same. 
8. When one analyzes the Manila Ranch case in isolation from the ABCO trial, 
there is no question that Marvin prevailed, was the only party who prevailed, was awarded 
what he sought, and had to incur substantial attorney's fees just to get that award. Even if 
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combined with to the ABCO trial, and the offset of $8,999, Marvin still prevailed with an 
award greater than Branson's (i.e. $27,865 plus over $15,000 interest less $8,999). 
9. The Manila Ranch attorney's fees were reserved, to be made later. (R. 11484 
pgs. 140-143). Because the court's decision regarding the Manila Ranch offset issues was not 
reached until July 25,2008, and because the court would hear no further requests, including 
attorney fee requests thereon (R. 11357), Marvin was forced to appeal that decision to recover 
his attorney's fees. (R. 11429). 
II. FACTS RELATING TO CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERROR AND 
INTEREST 
10. Both parties agreed that Marvin was entitled to $27,865 in principal and the 
court awarded the same on August 29, 2007. (R. 11484 pgs. 28, 30, 33, 55, 59, 60, 61, 117 
and 155). But, by oversight, due to a delay of nearly a year, the court clerically erred when 
awarding principal and interest on the Manila Ranch trial in the final order. (R. 113 57). The 
interest on the principal was 10% and is easily calculated. (The proper calculation is 10% on 
$7,548 from March 24, 2003 to August 29, 2007 or 4.33 years = $3,268.28). The 10% 
prejudgment interest should have been carried forward to July 25,2008 (Final Order) which 
is $27,865 * 10% *(11/12) = $2,554.29. 
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III. FACTS RELEVANT TO SLANDER OF TITLE CLAIM 
11. In 2000, Attorney Travis Bowen, as part of the buyout and division of property 
through tax sheltered tax entities, erroneously prepared deeds to transfer the jointly held 
property through Steelwater Investments L.P., (a clerical mistake), which was a non-existent 
entity, rather than Steelwater Properties L.P., the actual entity. (Trial ex. 50-52,161-162 and 
165). 
12. The property remained titled in this entity until Branson obtained a survey 
dividing the farm from ABCO's land. (R. 11482, pgs. 29-31). Branson completed the survey 
on July 13, 2001. (Id). (Trial Ex. 14c). 
13. Branson, at all times relevant to this case, was in full and complete possession 
of his property, the farm and home, and exercised full control over the same. (R. 10565 ^ j 15). 
Branson never lost money on his property. (R. 11482, pgs. 31-33). In contrast, Marvin, lost 
his sale on the Farr West property and on his home, in part due to Branson's refusal to sign a 
new deed on Farr West or to remove the lis pendens. (R. 11482, pg. 30). 
14. On August 9, 2001 and December 31, 2001, Deeds were signed with only 
Marvin's signature, transferring the farm and home to Branson's wife, which deeds were 
recorded on July 16, 2002 and July 30, 2002, well before Branson brought the lawsuit on 
October 29, 2002. (Addendum Exhibit J and K, Trial Ex. 274-275). This cured any alleged 
problem with Branson's title. (R.l 1487, pgs. 503-504). 
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15. Marvin also signed deeds correcting his title himself in November 2006. 
(Addendum Exhibit L, Trial Ex. 229). Travis Bowen indicated that either Marvin or 
Branson could have corrected the title by simply signing a deed from Steelwater Investments 
to themselves. (R. 11487 pgs. 503-504). 
16. Branson thereafter filed suit against Marvin and Travis Bowen on or about 
October 29, 2002 alleging, among other things, slander of title to his farm and home. (R. 1). 
17. On or about November 15,2006, the court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Defendant Travis Bowen against Branson because Branson could not prove damages from 
the conduct of Travis Bowen. (Memorandum Decision, November 15, 2006, pg. 9). (R. 
8527-28). 
18. Marvin also sought summary judgment on the slander of title claim. During 
oral argument on Marvin's partial summary judgment motion, the court opined that he could 
not see how Marvin would be responsible on slander of title, especially where Branson could 
not show damages against Travis Bowen. (R. 11482, pgs. 31-33). 
19. On or about January 9,2007, the court also noted in his Memorandum Decision 
on the issue that "the Plaintiff fails to present sufficiently disputed issues of fact whether 
malice was present, and whether Defendant's statements caused actual or special damages," 
but allowed Branson an opportunity to prove otherwise at trial. (R. 8724, Addendum Exhibit 
M,pg.l8). 
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20. Before trial, neither party objected to the jury instructions or verdict form. (R. 
10564, Findings of Fact, June 19, 2007,12). 
21. After a two (2) week jury trial, the jury signed the verdict form finding Marvin 
technically committed slander of title, but held that said conduct caused Branson zero 
damages. (R. 9789 ^ 6.A, Addendum Exhibit M). 
22. The court found that all of the evidence produced before or at trial supported 
the jury's award of zero damages. (Addendum Exhibit D, R. 10564, Findings of Fact, 12). 
23. The court ruled that Branson did not prevail on the whole, received a minute 
portion of the damages sought, should never have brought the claim in the first place, and 
awarded Branson no attorney's fees whatsoever. (Id). 
24. Despite the court's ruling that it was a violation of Rule 606(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Branson's attorney later sought an affidavit of jurors, and recorded it after 
the trial without notice to opposing counsel. (R. 10555-59). Now, counsel cites from that 
affidavit on page 12 of Branson's Brief for record facts to support his attorney fee claim 
under slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty. (The jury affidavit should be stricken and 
all facts thereon barred from the record). 
IV. FACTS RELEVANT TO BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM 
25. The court's summary judgment decision of January 9,2007, held that "none of 
Plaintiffs assertions were sufficiently supported with material facts in regards to Defendant's 
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fiduciary duties prior to the parties' entering into the Property Settlement Agreement (of 
December 8, 1999)." (R. 8718, Addendum Exhibit M, pg. 12). 
26. During trial, the court ruled there were no fiduciary duties owned by Marvin on 
any of Branson land, farm or home. (R.l 1486, pg. 247). 
27. Although the court noted a few disputed issues of fact regarding events after 
December 8, 1999 that possibly should go to trial on fiduciary status, the decision noted that 
the issues "are more akin to breach of contract assertions than of breach of fiduciary duty." 
(Id.) The findings and order actually limited Branson's fiduciary claims of winding up the 
buyout to "breach of contract" claims. (R. 10188 Tf 1). 
28. Although the jury technically found Marvin had breached his fiduciary duty 
(apparently on contract type issues), the jury also provided that Branson suffered no 
damages for said breach. (R. 9790, Addendum Exhibit N j^ 8A). Branson's only damage 
awarded in the trial fell under his breach of contract claim for $9,000.00, consistent with the 
court's order in paragraph 27 above. (Id). 
29. The court held that all evidence presented at trial supported the jury' s award of 
no damages under breach of fiduciary duty and granted JNOV. (Addendum Exhibit D, R. 
10564 ^ 16). 
30. Branson has speculated and made bald assertions regarding what he believes 
were breaches of Marvin's fiduciary duties regarding Branson's continued work, health 
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insurance, life insurance, equipment and tools, or Marvin's improper deductions (see pg. 17 
to 19 of Branson's Brief). These speculations must be treated as contract breach issues, not 
fiduciary duty issues. (R.10188, | 1). The jury gave Branson $9,000 under his breach of 
contract claim but zero under fiduciary duty. (Addendum Exhibit N, R. 10564-65). 
V. FACTS RELEVANT TO MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM 
31. On or about June 5,2000, Judge Ben Hadfield issued a protective order against 
Branson that prohibited him from, among other things, "directly or indirectly contacting, 
harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating" with Marvin. (Trial Ex. 168, Protective 
Order, pg. 2). This was issued against Branson because Branson entered ABCO's offices 
and verbally and physically attacked and harmed Marvin while Marvin was at work. 
(Addendum Exhibit H, R. 7299-7301) (which is Branson's own version of the event at the 
ABCO office). Branson also admitted in an apology letter to assaulting Marvin. (Trial Ex. 
72). Branson's statement of fact on page 15, sentence 2 is therefore a misrepresentation of 
the actual record. 
32. On or about January 26, 2005, Branson, in violation of the protective order 
stopped his vehicle near Marvin's driveway and talked to Marvin. (Addendum Exhibit I, 
R.7124). 
33. This discussion became heated and Branson drove off fast. (Id). Marvin 
grabbed Branson's truck window to keep from sliding under Branson's truck wheels and 
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Branson drove off with Marvin hanging from the window of the truck and Marvin's feet 
dragging on the road. (Id, R.7133). Marvin plead with Branson to stop before he was killed. 
(«, R.7124,7133). 
34. The court found: "[Branson] knowingly carried [Marvin] a number of feet with 
his truck until [Marvin] verbally expressed that the parties' actions qualified as a risk to his 
life." (R. 7124, Addendum Exhibit M, pg. 15). Marvin fell and rolled as Branson sped away. 
(Addendum Exhibit I, R. 7124). 
3 5. "(T)here *s n o dispute that [Branson's] actions may have qualified as an assault, 
in that he alone controlled the speed of the vehicle." (Addendum Exhibit M, R. 8721). 
36. "[Branson] concedes that certain risks were present and perceived by [Marvin] 
in relation to his driving of the vehicle and that he alone controlled the speed of the vehicle." 
(id). 
37. Marvin cut his forehead and right hand, cut and scratched his right knee, and 
lost his shoe and wrist bracelet. (R. 7121). 
38. The police responded to Alice Neff s 911 call and went directly to Branson's 
home. Branson refused to open the door. When he finally did, he argued, resisted arrest and 
got into a physical altercation with the police. Branson did not submit peacefully. (R. 7121, 
Addendum Exhibit I, pg. 2). 
39. Branson was arrested on the spot for violation of a protective order. (R.7142). 
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40. Branson submitted a statement to the police where he admitted to stopping at 
Marvin's, talking and arguing with Marvin, speeding off with Marvin pleading for his life, 
and stopping fast so Marvin fell off to his injury. (Addendum Exhibit I). 
41. At Branson's preliminary hearing, Judge Hadfield found that there was 
probable cause for all four (4) charges and bound Branson over for trial. (R.7154). 
42. On or about September 27,2005, Branson pled guilty to two counts: Violation 
of a Protective Order and Interference with Arresting Officer. (R. 7980-88, Deferred 
Judgment Agreement and Order, pg. 2). 
43. In exchange, Amy F. Hugie, the Box Elder County Prosecutor, deferred the 
charge of aggravated assault without prejudice and committed to "refilling it as soon as the 
civil action is complete." (R. 7149, Letter from Amy F. Hugie, pg. 1). 
44. The Court's (Judge Low) decision to dismiss Branson's malicious prosecution 
claim held the finding of probable cause by the magistrate in the Plaintiffs criminal 
proceeding is dispositive of the matter. (Addendum Exhibit M, pg. 15). The court also 
stated there appeared to be no element of maliciousness by Marvin. (R. 8722). 
45. The Court's (Judge Low) specifically found that absent more proof, "the court 
fails to discern how [Marvin's] action in calling the police and raising an allegation of assault 
translates into any benefit in the parties' currently contested partnership dissolution 
litigation." (Id). 
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46. The jury in Branson's civil case, also found Branson liable for assaulting 
Marvin, and awarded Marvin all he asked for ($1.00). (R. 9792, Addendum Exhibit N). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. CROSS APPELLANT BRIEF 
As stated in the trial court's final Memorandum Decision, this action arose primarily 
from a "separation of two brothers from a business relationship" and Branson's acrimony, 
discontent, jealousy, ill will and overall determination to undermine Marvin because of 
Marvin's business successes without Branson. The trial court's final decision mentions 
Branson's "general discontent...with the final results of the dissolution, separation and 
success or lack thereof of the remaining separate business efforts and intents." Branson's 
discontent with ABCO's "post-Branson" success and resulting ill will towards Marvin was 
never more evident than when he testified at trial about the time he grabbed his gun, got in 
his truck, and went looking for Marvin testifying that if he would have found Marvin, he 
would have killed him. It is this ill will and jealousy towards Marvin that is the basis of the 
multitude of Branson's unmeritorious claims that have forced Marvin's difficult and costly 
defense. Branson's discontent, ill will, jealousy and resulting litigious nature against Marvin 
has required Marvin to take an aggressive defense during the course of this matter's 
extensive and drawn out litigation history. 
After seven years of protracted litigation and an eleven month span since the most 
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recent trial date on this matter, the trial court, in an admitted attempt to "bring matters to 
closure," hastily entered a Memorandum Decision on July 25,2008. While, concededly, the 
time had come to bring matters to a closure, the July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision did not 
provide Marvin a sufficient and accurate closure to the remaining matters in three areas: 
first, Marvin's requests for attorney's fees on the pre-trial ABCO case and the Manila Ranch 
case1; second, Marvin's entitlement to prejudgment interest through the date of the final 
judgment; and, third, a clerical error made by the trial court in memorializing relief granted to 
Marvin during a prior trial. 
The contract between the parties provides that attorneys fees shall be paid by the 
"prevailing party." In this case, evidence shows Marvin was the prevailing party in regards to 
the ABCO pre-trial and Manila Ranch matters and, thus, was entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees in both ABCO pre-trial motions and the bifurcated Manila Ranch case. 
However, in the aforementioned July 29,2008 Memorandum Decision, the trial court simply 
stated, "the only feasible and reasoned decision relative to attorney's fees is that neither party 
prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss, and this Court refuses to compound the loss by 
awarding fees to either party." This assertion was supported neither by findings of fact, nor 
analysis of the "flexible and reasoned" factors. Additionally, the July 25,2008 Memorandum 
Decision stated the trial court would consider nothing more, and, thus, precluded Marvin 
1. Note, the trial court seemingly foreclosed either party from an award of attorney's fees on the breach of contract issues 
entertained during the ABCO trial (even though Marvin was never given an opportunity to seek those fees) (R.l 1190), but 
reserved Marvin's right to seek pre-trial motion fees on the ABCO case and Manila Ranch trial. (R. 11484 pgs. 137,140-154). 
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from supplementing and filing his drafted Motion for Attorney's fees regarding the Manila 
Ranch trial, even though this issue had been preserved for the end of trial (as acknowledged 
by the trial court), and even though the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure arguably provide 
Marvin a five day window after judgment in which to file the motion. Thus, because no 
findings of fact were given and because Marvin's procedural and statutory rights were 
violated, there can be no meaningful appellate review, and Marvin's attorney fee request 
should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Even if it is determined that 
the findings of fact given were sufficient, the flexible and reasoned analysis, purportedly 
used by the trial court, would clearly favor Marvin being deemed the prevailing party, and it 
was an abuse of discretion to not award Marvin his attorney's fees pursuant the parties' 
contract, and statute. 
Second, Marvin is entitled to prejudgment interest from the time the trial court 
determined Marvin's loss was "fixed" as of final judgment. As the name suggests, 
prejudgment interest is to accrue through final judgment. The trial court properly awarded 
Marvin prejudgment interest, but inexplicably determined Marvin was only entitled to 
prejudgment interest until August 29, 2007, the date of the trial in which the prejudgment 
interest issue was argued before the trial court. Utah law states that parties entitled to 
prejudgment interest are entitled to damages for the loss of use of the money that, but for the 
[other party's] breach and ensuing delay, would have been paid in satisfaction of their claim. 
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Marvin was not paid the money due and owing him on August 29, 2007 nor on July 25,2008 
(and, in fact, still has not been paid that sum), thus, in order to properly compensate Marvin, 
the prejudgment interest award should be extended until final judgment, with post-judgment 
interest accruing on that sum thereafter. 
Finally, in its July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision the trial court committed a clerical 
error, that it has failed to correct, in awarding Marvin $7,548.00 less than it previously and 
undisputedly had during the August 29, 2007 Manila Ranch trial. This mistake is apparent 
on the record and is undisputed between the parties. Thus, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(a), this matter should be remanded to the trial court to be corrected or corrected 
sua sponte by the Supreme Court. 
II. BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Even after a two (2) week jury trial, Branson continues his litigation against his 
brother Marvin. Branson's only goal is to be awarded attorney's fees. In spite of his 
arguments, however, Branson is unable to show that Judge Low committed reversible error. 
Branson did not appeal Judge Low's decision to not award Branson any attorney's fees. (R. 
11190-91; R. 10563-10567). He only appealed the JNOV ruling on slander of title, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and summary judgment on malicious prosecution, apparently seeking a refund 
for attorney's fees spent on said claims. 
The JNOV was justified because Branson failed to prove damages as a necessary 
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element for slander of title or breach of fiduciary duty. The jury found that Branson did not 
suffer any damages. Branson never appealed this jury finding. Without the necessary damage 
element to support the claims there can be no underlying cause of action. 
Branson's sole award of damages came from breach of contract, not breach of 
fiduciary duty or slander of title. Judge Low, who reserved the amount of attorney's fees 
unto himself, refused to award Branson any attorney's fees on any of his claims. Therefore, 
even if the court had mistakenly granted JNOV, it was harmless since Branson was not 
awarded any attorney's fees and failed to appeal that portion of the decision. 
The trial court was also correct in granting partial summary judgment against 
Branson's malicious prosecution claim. Branson failed to prove any of the four necessary 
elements to support his claim. Failure to prove one element is fatal. Essentially, the court 
ruled that Marvin had reasonable probable cause, did not act with any improper purpose, and 
Branson was not an innocent party, but pled guilty and that probable cause supported the 
claims. The jury in this case also awarded Marvin $1.00 for Branson's assault, again 
showing Marvin had probable cause and proximate cause on the assault. Probable cause was 
also proven independently and affirmed by Judge Ben Hadfield at the criminal preliminary 
hearing. Summary judgment was appropriate. 
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ARGUMENT OF CROSS APPELLANT'S CLAIMS 
I. THE ISSUE OF MARVIN'S ATTORNEY'S FEES (REGARDING BOTH THE 
ABCO PRE-TRIAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND MANILA RANCH TRIAL 
ATTORNEY'S FEES) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
A. The attorney's fees issues should be remanded to the trial court because the trial 
court erred by not entering sufficient findings of fact in support of its July 25,2008 
Order that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
The trial court erred by not entering sufficient findings of fact in support of its final 
ruling that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. In Utah, an award of 
attorney's fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 
226, 230 (Utah 1997). In exercising that discretion, however, a trial court must make 
findings of fact explicit in support of its legal conclusions. (Id.); Anderson v. Thompson, 
2008 UT App 3, Tf 42, 176 P.3d 464; Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622,624 (Utah 1985); see 
also Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). This enables an appellate court to determine if the trial court has 
abused its discretion. Willey, 951 P.2d at 230. Without adequate findings of fact, there can 
be no meaningful appellate review. (Id.); Anderson, 2008 UT App 3 at f^ 142. 
Because it is not the role of an appellate court to find facts, an appellate court will 
normally remand a matter to the trial court for further proceedings if it determines that the 
findings of fact are insufficient to support the trial court's legal conclusions. Willey, 951 
P.2d at 230; Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998). In this case, the trial court 
failed to enter sufficient findings of fact in support of its final order that Marvin was not 
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entitled to an award of attorney's fees, thus, this matter should be remanded to the trial court. 
On or about November 20, 2007, Marvin filed a separate affidavit and brief for 
attorney's fees for prevailing on the numerous pretrial motions in the ABCO/ Aspen Springs 
case. (See Addendum Exhibit F). It was argued in that affidavit and brief that Marvin is 
entitled by law to attorney's fees under the contract for defending against Branson's attempt 
to rescind or void the buyout contract. See generally Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, 38 
P.3d 1001 (concluding that successfully defending against an opponents suit to rescind a 
contract is deemed "litigation to enforce" the contract and, as such, entitles the party 
successfully defending against the rescission of the contract to attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in said defense). The trial court ultimately determined that the contract in the 
ABCO/ Aspen Springs case was fully enforceable. 
Marvin was also successful in the second part of the bifurcated proceeding, the Manila 
Ranch trial. During that trial, Marvin voiced that he would seek attorney's fees. The trial 
court told Marvin he could submit an affidavit and brief for attorney's fees. Marvin's 
counsel prepared said documents and waited to supplement and file the documents until after 
the trial court decided the offset claims made by Branson. As will be discussed in more 
detail in a later section, the court waited eleven months before coming to a decision, and 
when it did so, the order precluded additional filings, including the issue of Marvin's right to 
Manila Ranch attorney's fees, which Marvin had preserved (and the court acknowledged said 
- 3 7 -
preservation) for the end of the proceedings. 
After reviewing Marvin's pre-trial ABCO/ Aspen Springs written request for 
attorney's fees, which was sufficient under Utah law, the trial court entered its July 25,2008 
Memorandum Decision and summarily denied Marvin's requests altogether, both oral and 
written. In that decision, the trial court stated that the "flexible and reasoned" approach was 
appropriate under the facts of this case, but failed to enter proper findings of fact or 
otherwise analyze the various factors involved in the "flexible and reasoned" analysis. 
Under the flexible and reasoned approach (discussed in greater detail below), the court 
must make specific findings of fact sufficient to lead the court to the conclusion of law as to 
who, if anyone, is the "prevailing" or "successful" party. J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 
2005 UT 39, ^[21, 116 P.3d 353. A successful party is one who successfully enforces or 
defends against an action. EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanqffl 2008 UT App 284, f 14, 192 
P.3d 296. Where it is not manifestly obvious which party was the "successful" one, courts 
employ a flexible and reasoned approach to determine which party was victorious. (Id.) 
Under this approach, the trial court must consider, at a minimum, the significance of the net 
judgment in the case and the amounts actually sought and recovered. (Id.) It should further 
consider and make findings on things such as contractual language; the number of claims, 
counterclaims, cross-claims, etc. brought by each party and their success on each of these 
claims; the importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in the 
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context of the lawsuit considered as a whole; and the dollar amounts attached to and awarded 
in connection with the various claims. R. T. Nielson Company v. Cook, 2002 UT 115 \ 25,40 
P .3d l l l9 . 
In its July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision (attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A), 
the court made minimal or no findings of fact regarding the aforementioned "flexible and 
reasoned approach factors" concerning either the ABCO/ Aspen Springs pre-trial request for 
fees or the Manila Ranch trial attorney's fees issues. No findings of fact were made that lead 
to the trial courts conclusion of law that "neither party prevailed." No findings of fact were 
made as to why it was not manifestly obvious as to which party was successful. No findings 
of fact were made showing that the trial court even considered the net judgment of the case in 
comparison with the amounts actually sought and recovered by both parties. 
Rather, the trial court simply stated that the "only feasible and reasoned decision 
relative to attorney's fees is that neither party prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss, and 
this Court refuses to compound the loss by awarding fees to either party." The trial court 
then went on to say that its July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision "will constitute the final 
order herein and any further relief is to be sought on appeal." These statements are 
insufficient under the legal standard set forth above. In concluding that Marvin was not 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees as requested, the trial court was under a legal 
obligation to weigh the evidence presented, and thereafter enter detailed findings of fact that 
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explicitly support its legal conclusion relative to any such award (or denial thereof). This is 
particularly important in a case of this magnitude, where the facts are complex, and where the 
trial court purportedly employed the multi-faceted "flexible and reasoned" approach for 
purposes of its attorney fee decision. 
Based on the language of the July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision, this appellate 
court cannot possibly undertake a meaningful review of Marvin's attorney fee claim because 
it has no way of knowing which factors the trial court considered (or failed to consider). 
Based on seven years of extensive litigation in this case, it was entirely unfair and 
inappropriate for the trial court to essentially dismiss Marvin's written request for attorney's 
fees without providing any specific reasons in support of that dismissal other than the vague 
assertion that "neither party prevailed" in the matter, and to thereafter refer the bulk of the 
matter to the appellate courts who, in reality, are in a far less advantageous position to 
consider the whole of the evidence and enter a proper ruling on Marvin's request for 
attorney's fees. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court has failed to enter sufficient findings of fact in 
support of its decision that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this 
matter. Because the trial court has not satisfied its legal obligation in this regard, this issue 
should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
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B. The Manila Ranch trial costs/attorney'sfees issues should be remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings because the trial court erroneously denied Marvin of 
a costs/attorney's fees award before Marvin was allowed to even request such an 
award. 
Marvin was denied of his statutory and procedural right to petition the trial court for 
an award of attorney's fees incurred in the Manila Ranch Trial. According to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure Rule 54(d)(1) - (2), costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party and "the 
party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon 
the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of 
his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, 
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding" 
(Emphasis added). 
During the bifurcated Manila Ranch trial, Marvin prevailed on his claim that Branson 
did not properly administer the trust and was awarded a judgment in the amount of $27,865 
principal plus prejudgment interest on this claim. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004 
"[i]n a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court may, as justice 
and equity may require, award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to 
any party, to be paid by another party or from the trust that is the subject of the controversy." 
This statutory provision clearly provides for a full and equitable restitution of a party's costs; 
and those costs include a reasonable attorney's fee. Because Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004 
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lumps attorney's fees into costs, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure § 54(d)(2), Marvin 
should have been afforded five days after the entry of the Manila Ranch judgment to seek 
costs, including the attorney's fees Marvin incurred in the Manila Ranch litigation. 
Due to the procedural deficiencies of the trial court, Marvin was precluding from even 
exercising his statutory and procedural right of seeking his reasonable costs which include 
reasonable attorney's fees. Under the rules cited above Marvin is allowed to assert his 
affidavit and memorandum seeking attorney's fees and costs at the conclusion of the entire 
matter. The Manila Ranch trial was initially heard before the court on August 29,2007. The 
court ruled in Marvin's favor awarding Marvin $27,865 plus prejudgment interest on a claim 
that Branson did not properly administer the trust. However, the court left the judgment open 
regarding Branson's offsets and statute of limitations arguments. Further, the court failed to 
sign any of the proposed orders, findings of fact, or conclusions of law regarding the Manila 
Ranch trial prior to its decision on the offset and statute of limitations issues. 
Marvin's desire to seek an award of attorney's fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial 
was made known to the court during this trial and the court told Marvin he could file for 
attorney's fees. (See Addendum Exhibit A, pg. 5). Additionally, the court acknowledged 
Marvin had reserved the right to seek an award of attorney's fees at the end of the 
proceedings. (See November 6,2007 Memorandum Decision, Exhibit C). In reliance on this 
reservation, during the eleven month span between the trial and the July 29, 2008 decision, 
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Marvin's counsel prepared an affidavit and memorandum for attorney's fees in accordance 
with the dictates of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 73, waiting to supplement and file it 
after the decision was made as to the offsets and statute of limitations. 
After eleven months of consideration, the court made its determination regarding the 
remaining issues in the Manila Ranch trial (the offset and statute of limitations issues) in its 
Memorandum Decision dated July 29, 2008. Rather than providing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and recognizing Marvin's reservation of the costs and attorney's fees 
issues until after a decision was made on the offset and statute of limitation issues, the court 
made a statement of frustration (deemed the court's "final order") attempting to "bring ... 
matters to closure" and indicating neither party would be awarded attorney's fees in the final 
judgment and no other motions or memorandum would be considered. See July 25, 2008 
Memorandum Decision. 
As a result, the court precluded further filings and never properly allowed Marvin to 
claim, brief, or argue for costs/ attorney's fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial. The court 
did not allow the benefit of the procedural rules, specifically, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
Rule 54(d)'s provision for five days after judgment to file for costs, which pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-7-1004 include reasonable attorney's fees. 
Even if Rule 54(d), as applied in Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 
1998), does not provide a five day grace period with which to file a motion for the statutorily 
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proscribed attorney's fees, the trial court erred by knowingly failing to honor Marvin's 
reservation of the attorney's fees issues for the end of the trial phase. Rather, the trial court 
"washed its hands" of this case and advised that if either party had any problems with the 
way the case was handled, to take it up with an appellate court. 
Thus, because the trial court failed to follow proper procedure, failed to honor 
Marvin's reservation of the issues, and denied Marvin of the opportunity to seek attorney's 
fees regarding the Manila Ranch trial, this matter should be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions that it allow Marvin to submit and consider Marvin's previously drafted affidavit 
and memorandum in support of attorney's fees. 
II. EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, THE TRIAL COURT DID ENTER SUFFICIENT 
FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTING ITS CONCLUSION THAT MARVIN 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON THAT ISSUE WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE 
MARVIN WAS THE "PREVAILING PARTY" IN THAT PORTION OF 
LITIGATION. 
If it is determined that the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient, then it should 
be held that the conclusion of law that Marvin was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
was in error since the contract between the parties provided that, in the event of litigation, the 
prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees. Marvin was indeed the prevailing party in the 
Manila Ranch litigation as well as all pretrial motions for summary judgment in the ABCO/ 
Aspen Springs litigation. 
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Whether attorney's fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law to be 
reviewed by appellate courts for correctness. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, 
TJ22,100 P.3d 1200. In Utah, attorney's fees are awardable only if provided for by statute or 
contract and, if by contract, only as the contract allows by its terms. Mountain States 
Broadcasting Company v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah App. 1989); Crowley v. Black, 
2007 UT App 245, \ 12, 167 P.3d 1087; A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 
2004 UT 47 Tf7, 94 P. 3d 270. In observance of this rule, a trial court should grant 
reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with a written contractual provision. Crowley, 2007 
UT App. 245 at ^ 12 (Emphasis added). Similarly, Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure requires that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the 
court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (2008). It is also important to note that in 
cases where the various issues are inextricably tied together, Utah courts have awarded 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees may not have been incurred 
solely on issues for which attorney's fees are customarily available. Brown v. David K. 
Richards & Company, 1999 UT App 109, \ 16-24, 978 P. 2d 470. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, each of the buyout agreements at issue 
clearly provided that the "prevailing party" was entitled to an award of attorney's fees in the 
event of litigation. For purposes of this provision, the term "litigation" includes attempts by 
one party to rescind the contract at issue. See Chase 2001 UT App. 404 at ^ j 11-17. (holding 
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that when a party defends against a claim for contract rescission, that defense constitutes 
litigation for purposes of attorney fee provisions). This is significant given the fact that the 
majority of the parties' claims and defenses pertaining to the buyout agreements were 
resolved judicially prior to trial. 
Which party is a prevailing party is an appropriate question for a trial court. The 
appellate court therefore reviews the trial court's determination as to who was the prevailing 
party under an abuse of discretion standard. Crowley 2007 UT App 245 at f^ 6. Typically, 
determining the "prevailing party" for purposes of awarding attorney's fees is quite simple. 
{Id. at f 13). For example, "where a plaintiff sues for money damages, and the plaintiff wins, 
the plaintiff is the prevailing party; if a defendant successfully defends and avoids adverse 
judgment, the defendant has prevailed." {Id.) (Emphasis added). 
In Mountain States, the Utah Court of Appeals outlined the "net judgment rule" for 
determining which party was the "prevailing party." Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 551-57. 
The net judgment rule simply requires the court to consider only which party recovered a net 
judgment and award attorney's fees to that party. {Id. at 551). Under the circumstances of 
Mountain States, the Court of Appeals held that the party receiving the "net judgment" is 
entitled to an award of attorney's fees. {Id.) 
The case at issue involved prolonged and complex litigation that resulted in bifurcated 
trials. In the Manila Ranch trial the awards were straightforward and appropriate for analysis 
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under the net judgment rule; Marvin was awarded over $27,865 plus prejudgment interest at 
ten percent, while Branson was awarded nothing and was not successful in defending the 
action. Thus, even if you consider Branson's $9,000 offset for the jury's breach of contract 
judgment in the ABCO/ Aspen Springs case, there is no question that Marvin was the 
prevailing party in the Manila Ranch trial since he was awarded in excess of $27,865 plus 
pre-judgment interest at ten percent. 
Under the net judgment rule it is also clear Marvin was the prevailing party when both 
trials are considered together. The bottom line of the trial as a whole, awards over $42,000 to 
Marvin ($27,000 judgment for Branson's improper administration of the trust plus $15,000 
prejudgment interest), and only $9,000 to Branson ($9,000 breach of contract plus $1 for the 
assault claim). 
However, Utah courts generally hold the analysis is somewhat more complex when 
both plaintiff and defendant obtained some monetary relief against the other. Mountain 
States, 783 P.2d at 556. The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that a simplistic, 
mechanical application of the net judgment rule is not appropriate in cases where both parties 
obtained some type of recovery. Whipple, 2004 UT App. 47 at ffl[ 11-12. Instead, courts 
should employ a common sense "flexible and reasoned" approach to resolving issues of this 
nature. {Id) at ^ j 11-14. The "flexible and reasoned" approach is particularly applicable "in 
cases involving multiple claims and parties; the granting of non-monetary relief to one or 
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more parties; and where the ultimate award of money damages does not adequately represent 
the actual success of the parties under the peculiar posture of the case." Mountain States, 783 
P.2d at 556, fn. 7 {internal citations omitted). The ABCO/ Aspen Springs trial falls clearly 
within these parameters, and the "flexible and reasoned" approach is appropriate. 
Under the Utah Supreme Court's "flexible and reasoned" approach, determining the 
"prevailing party" depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case. R. T. Nielson 
Company v. Cook, 2002 UT 11 at f 25. As such, appropriate considerations for the trial court 
include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: (1) contractual language; (2) the 
number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought by the parties; (3) the 
importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in the context of the 
lawsuit considered as a whole; and (4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in 
connection with the various claims. {Id.) This standard was designed to permit "a case-by-
case evaluation by the trial court, and flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or 
neither, parties may be considered to have prevailed." {Id.) Under the facts of this case, 
Marvin should also be considered the "prevailing party" under the flexible and reasoned 
analysis purportedly used by the trial court and should be reimbursed by Branson for the 
considerable attorneys' fees and costs which he has incurred as a result of Branson's 
unmeritorious legal action. 
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A. Application of the flexible and reasoned approach. 
Instead of using the "net judgment rule" to determine the "prevailing party" in this 
matter, the court could employ the "flexible and reasoned approach" and consider all of the 
relevant factors. This case has evolved into approximately seven consecutive years of intense 
motion practice and complex litigation between two brothers and several additional parties. 
Originally, Branson asserted sixteen separate causes of action against Marvin alone, 
and claimed that Marvin was liable for more than $3,000,000 in damages for his alleged 
wrongful conduct on ABCO buyout plus $1,600,000 on Aspen Springs in addition to 
attorney's fees which he also claimed Marvin should pay. As the litigation progressed, 
however, it became abundantly clear that the large majority of Branson's claims were 
unmeritorious, and those on which he was "successful" were miniscule in relation to the 
totality of the relief sought. Of the sixteen separate causes of action Branson originally 
asserted against Marvin (not to mention those which he asserted against other parties who 
were ultimately dismissed), only his claim for breach of contract was successful. All of his 
other claims, including his claims for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust, money had 
and received, disproportionate family payments, fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent 
nondisclosure, malicious prosecution, retirement benefits, etc., were dismissed by the trial 
court prior to a trial ever taking place. As stated by the trial court in its July 25, 2008 
Memorandum Decision, "In light of the money damage claimed for over three million dollars 
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plus punitive damages, [Branson's] recovery can only generously be described as nominal 
and more accurately de minimus in it's nature and amount." 
In obtaining these dismissals, Marvin filed at least six separate pre-trial motions 
(together with several supplemental motions) for summary judgment, covering seventeen 
(17) claims made by Branson, all of which were granted by the trial court. In addition to 
these motions, Marvin also requested that the trial court enter partial summary judgment in 
his favor and hold that the Salary Continuation Agreement entered into between the parties 
was unambiguous and an asset of ABCO Construction, Inc. The trial court agreed with 
Marvin on this issue, and entered partial summary judgment as requested. 
Similarly, Marvin filed a pre-trial Motion in Limine requesting that the trial court 
enter an order precluding Branson from introducing expert testimony concerning values of 
various assets and properties using data after December 13, 1999. This information was 
critical to Branson's case, and Marvin's motion was granted by the trial court thereby 
prohibiting Branson from introducing evidence of this nature. Although Marvin did not 
receive any monetary damages as a result of his success on these motions, the non-monetary 
relief sought by and awarded to Marvin was significant and cannot be ignored or viewed as 
inconsequential. By defeating the foregoing claims, Marvin avoided a considerable amount 
of Branson's alleged financial damages, including punitive damages. 
In addition to the various pre-trial motions set forth above, Marvin also prevailed over 
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Branson on a variety of other significant issues prior to trial. For example, Branson filed a 
pre-trial Motion for Partial Summary Judgment requesting that the trial court rule that the 
parties' Property Settlement Agreement was unenforceable. This motion was denied by the 
trial court. Branson also made several arguments prior to trial that the buyout agreements 
were not enforceable because Marvin had failed to satisfy a condition precedent, because 
there was no meeting of the minds, because they were executed under fraudulent inducement, 
fraud, or purely agreements to agree. Marvin disputed these claims, and Branson's claims 
were summarily rejected by the trial court in favor of Marvin. Branson also attempted to 
obtain a declaratory judgment on at least seven different issues, but prevailed on none. When 
asked by the trial court to present prima facie evidence in support of his punitive damages 
claim, the evidence submitted by Branson failed to prove that he was in any way entitled to 
punitive damages against Marvin or Travis Bowen and Branson was awarded no such 
damages. Branson also attempted to set aside the parties' buyout agreements based on parol 
evidence, but failed, and then voluntarily dismissed his claim against Marvin for 
"conversion" prior to trial. 
Even after the foregoing issues were resolved in Marvin's favor, the claims tried by 
Branson and submitted to the jury during the ABCO trial were almost entirely rejected. In 
fact, of the fourteen claims submitted by Branson to the jury, the jury found in favor of 
Branson on only one issue, breach of contract. Branson's failure in this regard is 
- 5 1 -
compounded by the fact that the jury awarded Branson only $9,000 in damages despite his 
claim for more than $879,000 (R. 10256) plus five times that for punitive damages 
($4,395,000), plus an attorney fee claim. 
By contrast, in connection with the ABCO trial, the jury ruled in favor of Marvin and 
against Branson on Marvin's claims for breach of contract, assault and battery, breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. Although Marvin was only 
awarded $2.00 in damages as a result of those verdicts, that amount was the full sum 
requested by Marvin, and does not take into account the many forms of non-monetary relief 
which Marvin received throughout the course of this extended litigation. Moreover, it was 
the trial court's belief that "the jury could have found a whole lot more [damages in favor of 
Marvin] had they been asked to. The evidence was certainly there..." (See July 29, 2008 
decision). Marvin was also the only party to receive a monetary payout from the Manila 
Ranch trial. In any event, the Manila Ranch payout came about as the result of Branson's 
wrongful conduct in his trustee or fiduciary capacity. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Marvin was the prevailing party in this matter -
not only on the contractual claims, but on the majority of other claims which were, as a 
whole, inseparably related thereto. Branson's ultimate jury award of $9,000 does not take 
into consideration the fact that nearly all of Branson's claims and causes of action were a 
total failure; does not take into consideration the fact that most of the significant disputes 
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(both before and during the trials) were resolved in favor of Marvin; and does not take into 
consideration the fact that Marvin was awarded the full amount of damages which he sought, 
while simultaneously avoiding the imposition of more than $879,000 and $4,395,000 in 
damages claimed by Branson. 
Even considering Branson's $9,000 jury award for partial recovery on his breach of 
contract claim during trial (which is the only evidence in support of the trial court's finding 
that "neither party prevailed" and does support the trial court's November 6, 2007 
Memorandum Decision finding that "neither party is justified in receiving attorney's fees in 
regards to the breach of contract claim"), Marvin should still be deemed the prevailing party 
with regards to the ABCO pre-trial matters, the Manila Ranch matters, and if the prevailing 
party is determined by considering the case as a whole. Thus, Marvin is clearly entitled to an 
attorney's fees and costs award regarding the ABCO pre-trial and Manila Ranch matters. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, Marvin was clearly the "prevailing party" in 
this matter, and the trial court erred by not awarding Marvin the attorneys' fees and costs he 
requested. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD MARVIN 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 10% PER ANNUM FROM 
AUGUST 29, 2007 THROUGH JULY 25, 2008. 
The trial court erred by failing to award Marvin prejudgment interest at the rate often 
percent (10%) from August 29, 2007 (the date of the Manila Ranch trial) through July 25, 
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2008 (the date of final judgment) on the amounts he received in connection with the Manila 
Ranch trial. In Utah, prejudgment interest is appropriate when the recipient's loss has been 
fixed as of a definite time, and the amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of damages. Iron Head Construction, Inc. 
v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, ^ 11, 207 P. 3d 1231; Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 
P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, the trial court properly awarded Marvin 
prejudgment interest at the statutory rate often percent (10%) per annum. Marvin does not 
dispute this portion of the trial court's award. However, the trial court erroneously held that 
prejudgment interest in the foregoing amount was to accrue only until August 29,2007 rather 
than until the July 25, 2008 final judgment. It is this portion of the trial court's award with 
which Marvin takes issue. 
The purpose of an award of prejudgment interest is to compensate a party for the 
depreciating value of the amount owed to that party over time and, as a corollary, to deter 
parties form intentionally withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing. Iron Head, 
2009 UT 25 at [^10. Those who are awarded prejudgment interest "are entitled to damages 
for the loss of use of the money that, but for the [other party's] breach and ensuing delay, 
would have been paid" in satisfaction of their claim. {Id.) 
An award of prejudgment interest, such as the award given by the trial court to Marvin 
in this case, should accrue up until the date of final judgment. The phrase "prejudgment 
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interest" itself suggests as much. This interpretation that prejudgment interest accrues until 
the date of final judgment is further supported by a 2009 decision of the Supreme Court of 
Utah. In Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, the Supreme Court of Utah was 
considering the requirement of mathematical certainty for prejudgment interest. 2009 UT 7, 
f^ 67, 210 P.3d 263. Pertaining to this requirement, the Supreme Court of Utah stated "[the 
mathematical certainty requirement] does not require, however, that a party must demonstrate 
that its damage figures are known and static from the date the claim is filed through the 
final judgment.*" (Id.) (Emphasis added). This consideration evidences a clear 
interpretation by this supreme court that the "prejudgment interest period" runs "through the 
final judgment." 
In this case, the trial court's July 25,2008 Memorandum Decision awarded Marvin his 
prejudgment interest through August 29, 2007 (i.e., the date of the Manila Ranch trial). 
However, for no apparent reason, the trial court failed to take into consideration the fact that 
the final judgment on the Manila Ranch matter was not entered until July 25,2008, due to the 
trial courts consideration of Branson's offset claims and various other matters -
approximately eleven months after the original trial took place, during which Branson has 
continued in possession of the money due and owing Marvin. By limiting Marvin's award of 
prejudgment interest to August 29,2007, the trial court failed to compensate Marvin for his 
inability to use the funds at issue during the time period between August 29, 2007 and July 
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25,2008. As such, Marvin has not received the full amount of prejudgment interest to which 
he is lawfully entitled, and the very fundamental purpose of an award of prejudgment interest 
has not been served in this case. 
What the trial court should have done, by way of its final judgment and order, is award 
Marvin prejudgment interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum on his damages up to 
the date of July 25, 2008, the final order. Doing so would have fulfilled the purpose of a 
prejudgment interest award by fully compensating Marvin for his loss of use of those funds 
prior to the date of that judgment. Although the Manila Ranch trial took place on August 29, 
2007, that date is not the date of final judgment and is, therefore, not relevant for purposes of 
calculating prejudgment interest on the amounts awarded to Marvin in connection with the 
Manila Ranch matter. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred by not awarding Marvin prejudgment 
interest through July 25, 2008 at the rate often percent (10%) per annum on all damages 
which he received as a result of the Manila Ranch trial. As such, the trial court's decision on 
this issue should be reversed and corrected. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A CLERICAL MISTAKE THAT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED WITH REGARD TO THE DAMAGES 
AWARDED TO MARVIN IN MANIANILA TRIAL UNDER THE JULY 25, 
2008 MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
The trial court committed a clerical mistake in its July 25, 2008 Memorandum 
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Decision by erroneously omitting $7,548 from the damages it had previously awarded to 
Marvin during the August 29, 2007 Manila Ranch trial. This clerical mistake should be 
remanded to the trial court for correction pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the 
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on 
the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 60(a). 
For purposes of this rule, a clerical mistake is a type of mistake or omission that is 
"mechanical in nature" and is "apparent on the record" and "does not involve a legal decision 
or judgment by an attorney." Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Company, 669 P.2d 
1201,1206 (Utah 1983). "The correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be undertaken for 
the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties." Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 
P.2d 401, 401 (Utah 1984). 
In this case, the trial court awarded Marvin damages in the amount of $27,866.87 
(plus prejudgment interest thereon at ten percent (10%)) during the August 29,2007 Manila 
Ranch trial. Both parties made note of this amount during the Manila Ranch trial, and both 
parties submitted this as the proper amount owed to Marvin in their respective proposed 
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findings of fact and orders (none of which were signed or entered by the trial court). Based 
on what transpired during the August 29, 2007 Manila Ranch hearing, and the subsequent 
documents prepared and submitted to the trial court, it is clear that the trial court ordered, and 
the parties understood, that Marvin was to receive a total judgment of $27,866.87 from the 
Manila Ranch portion of this litigation, plus prejudgment interest on that amount at the rate 
often percent (10%) per annum. In its July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision, however, the 
trial court erroneously, and without explanation, noted that Marvin was entitled to receive 
only $20,318.87, thereby reducing its prior award to Marvin exactly by $7,548 ($27,866.87-
$7,548 = $20,318.87). Coincidental^, this $7,548 reduction equals the amount that Marvin 
was previously awarded during the August 19,2007 Manila Ranch hearing in relation to the 
"real estate commission" issue ($5,000) and the "estate bank account" issue ($2,548). 
Neither of those awards were referenced or noted in the trial court's July 25, 2008 
Memorandum Decision, despite the fact that they had been clearly awarded to Marvin during 
the August 29,2007 trial. As a result of this omission, there is no existing written order from 
the trial court which requires the payment of the $7,548 that was undisputedly awarded to 
Marvin during the August 29, 2007 Manila Ranch trial, and the court's final Memorandum 
Decision has effectively revoked a portion of Marvin's prior award and deprived him of 
funds to which he is rightfully, and undisputedly, entitled. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court has committed an obvious clerical mistake in 
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its July 25, 2008 Memorandum Decision by omitting $7,548 in damages that it had 
previously awarded to Marvin during the course of the August 29,2007 Manila Ranch trial. 
As such, this issue should be remanded to the trial court for correction, and the trial court's 
final order should be modified to include this $7,548 damage award to Marvin, with 
prejudgment interest accrued thereon at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum through July 
25, 2008. 
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
L JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS PROPER ON 
ISSUES OF SLANDER OF TITLE AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
BECAUSE THE NECESSARY ELEMENT OF DAMAGES WAS NOT 
PROVEN BY BRANSON AND THE JURY FOUND NO DAMAGES. 
A. The jury erred as a matter of law in checking box 6.C and 8.C of the jury form 
(attorney's fees) where no damages existed. 
The jury found that Branson was not entitled to damages for slander of title or breach 
of fiduciary duty. (See 6.A. and 8.A. of Special Verdict). The jury mistakenly went on to 
conclude that Branson was entitled to attorney's fees, despite the plain language of the 
special verdict form that instructed the jury to answer box 6.C. and 8.C. only if damages 
were awarded in paragraph 6.A. or 8.A. The court properly corrected this legal error. 
So long as the trial court was correct in concluding that there was no competent 
evidence to support the jury verdict or conclusion, the court was justified in granting a 
JNOV. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060,1066 (Utah 1996). Branson did 
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not contest the jury's finding of no damages, but only the court's correction that without 
damages there are no attorney's fees. Nor did Branson appeal the court's subsequent ruling 
of no attorney's fees on any of Branson's claims. There is no case law holding that attorney's 
fees, as special damages, are automatically awarded if there are no other general or special 
damages to support the underlying claims. 
Branson's argument that Marvin was required to marshal the evidence in his motion 
for JNOV is legally in error. The marshalling requirement is actually Branson's, to be 
applied on appeal, which Branson has failed to do. Fitz v. Synthes, 1999 UT 103, |8-9, 990 
P.2d. 391. For this reason, Branson's appeal should be dismissed. In addition, Marvin's 
JNOV motion did not attack the evidence, but instead attacked the erroneous legal conclusion 
reached by the jury that suggested attorney's fees be awarded when damages are zero. 
B. JNOV, on the slander of title and fiduciary duty claims, was justified because 
attorney's fees, standing alone, cannot satisfy the necessary damage element. 
The law regarding an award of attorney's fees in slander of title or breach of fiduciary 
duty cases is clear. Before either claim can actually withstand dismissal, the advancing party, 
Branson, must show that he incurred actual or special damages that could support an attorney 
fee award in the first place. Both claims have the necessary element of damages. See Bass v. 
Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988) (Where all the elements 
are necessary and must be proven by legally sufficient evidence before the claim is viable, 
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and the slanderous statement must cause actual or special damages to the Plaintiff); Utah 
Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1315 
(D. Utah 1999) (Where the court explained that to prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim, the Plaintiff "must demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as a result of the 
alleged breach"). The real issue then, is whether attorney's fees incurred, without any other 
damages proven, can support a claim for "special damages." The answer, based on case law, 
reason and logic, is that attorney's fees, standing alone, without other special or general 
damages, do not and cannot satisfy the damage element to make the claim viable. 
For instance, in slander of title cases, the Plaintiff cannot prevail unless he alleges and 
proves a pecuniary loss resulting from the act of the Defendant. Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 
208 P.2d 956, 958 (Utah 1949). Further, presumed or general damages are not sufficient to 
support the claim. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 
1257 (Utah 1989). Proof of special damages usually involves demonstrating a sale at a 
reduced price or at greater expense to the seller. Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, 
Inc., 944 P.2d 361,364 (Utah 1997). Additionally, attorney's fees on slander of title are 
limited to those employed to correct the slanderous statement itself rather than to obtain 
compensation for the slander. Banberry, 780 P. 2d at 1258. In Banberry, as in this case, the 
incorrect title recording was voluntarily corrected and thus attorney's fees could not serve as 
the required damages on the slander of title action. As stated in Bass, "Neither a judge or a 
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jury can award gratuitous attorney's fees if the elements of the cause of action were not 
proven." 761 P. 2d at 1258. "It is the jury's duty to determine the amount of damages a 
plaintiff in fact sustained, but it is up to the court to conform the jury's findings to applicable 
law." Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 9, Tf 34, 89 P.3d 109. 
Only those attorney's fees actually incurred to cure the defect, correct the recording or 
place the property in Branson's name prior to the lawsuit were awardable, and then only if 
actual damages existed. However, any attorney's fees incurred prior to Branson's lawsuit 
were actually performed by Travis Bowen, who did not charge either brother. Moreover, 
Branson himself could have voluntarily corrected the problem by signing his own corrective 
deed. (R. 11487, pg. 503-504). Note, Branson has failed to show one bit of evidence about 
the amount of attorney's fees he specifically incurred to correct the slander of title prior to 
filing the lawsuit. As a matter of law, he failed to prove any special damages. 
Nor can Branson show he must receive attorney's fees on his breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. A successful breach of fiduciary duty claim requires damages to the Plaintiff, 
proximately caused by that breach. See Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 508 F.3d 277, 
283 (5th Cir. 2007), Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). 
Utah courts have consistently held that a successful breach of fiduciary duty claim requires a 
showing of actual damages before attorney's fees can be awarded. Free Motion Fitness, Inc. 
v. Wells Fargo Bank West, NA, 2009 UT App. 120,128, 208 P. 3d 1066. In Free Motion 
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Fitness the Plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees without a showing of damages, and 
the court ruled that Plaintiffs could not prevail on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. (Id); See 
also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (When a Plaintiff only recovers nominal 
damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, 
".. .the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all"). 
The Federal District Court of Utah faced a similar issue in Utah Medical Products, 
Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc, where the Court held the Plaintiff, "must 
demonstrate that it has suffered some harm as a result from the alleged breach." 79 F. Supp. 
2d at 1315. The Court also explained that, "the fact of damages is an essential element of the 
cause of action that must be substantiated." (Id.) In other words, "because damage is an 
essential element for a claim for breach of fiduciary duty," a claim without damages "fails as 
a matter of law." (Id.) 
C. There are other reasons that JNOV was properly granted as a matter of law. 
The trial court's decision is also justified by other valid reasons that defeated 
Branson's claim for slander of title or fiduciary duty. For instance, slander of title requires 
the statement to have been made with malice. The court in Banberry noted a "difference 
between poor performance and malice." 780 P.2d at 1257. In Banberry, the mistake arose 
when the bank made a clerical error in copying a verbatim description in the recorded Deed 
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of Trust. {Id.) Although the statement was false, this court qualified that, "a published false 
statement.. .does not constitute slander of title without the element of malice." {Id.) Malice 
exists if there is, "willful and knowingly recorded a false and fraudulent instrument for the 
purpose of slandering the Plaintiffs title." Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 
481, 486 (Utah 1975). In addition, a holder of title cannot act with malice against himself 
where he is a joint owner on the property. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association v. 
Bagley & Co.} 863 P.2d 1, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (reversed on other grounds); see also 
JackB. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131,1134-35 (Utah 1988) (Noting that when 
liquidation occurred before the title holder's interest was extinguished, the facts could not 
sustain a claim for slander of title). 
In this case, Branson and Marvin were joint owners on the property which was 
transferred to Steelwater Investments, L. P. It was legally impossible to slander their own 
title. The simple clerical error and recording did not have the requisite willfulness since none 
of the parties knew about this mistake until afterwards. Travis Bowen then corrected this 
problem by recording corrective deeds in July 2002 before the lawsuit ever began. Travis 
Bowen was dismissed from the lawsuit because Branson could show no damages and the 
court released Marvin as well because Branson could show no damages or malice. 
Regarding breach of fiduciary duty, the court properly treated any windup of the 
contract terms as a breach of contract rather than breach of fiduciary duty. The court ruled in 
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the Findings and Order on Summary Judgment dated February 9, 2007 the fiduciary duty 
claim will be treated as "breach of contract" claims. (R. 10188 ^ 1). Note, the court never 
awarded any attorney's fees to Branson on any of his claims, including breach of contract. If 
no attorney's fees were awardable on breach of contract that had $9,000 in damages, 
certainly no attorney's fees would be awardable on a breach of fiduciary duty claim that had 
zero damages. 
Branson admits that the judge was to determine and award the amount of attorney's 
fees. See Branson's brief, pg. 8. Branson also admits that both sides had the opportunity to 
object to the jury instructions. Branson did not object to those instructions. According to 
Branson, the instructions "accurately reflect the law and elements for the claims." See 
Branson's brief, pg. 9. Branson cannot use the same jury instructions as both a sword and a 
shield and the trial court's finding of no attorney's fees was not only proper under JNOV but 
also under the subsequent order granting Branson zero attorney's fees. The court made 
detailed findings and orders refusing to grant Branson's attorney fees, holding he was not the 
prevailing party. (R. 10566). Branson did not appeal this part of the decision. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 
CLAIM WAS PROPER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO GENUINE DISPUTE AS 
TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. 
A judge must grant summary judgment when one party has failed to present a genuine 
dispute as to a material fact (i.e. a necessary element of the tort) and the other party is entitled 
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to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a summary judgment 
motion, a court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but 
"bald statements do not suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact.55 Rawson v. 
Conover, 2001 UT 24, ^25, 20 P.3d 876. "An adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response . . . must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.5' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). "Once the moving party 
challenges an element of the non-moving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of 
material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence that 
is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact..." Shaw Resources Limited, LLC v. 
Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313, f 22, 142 P.3d 560. The judge in this 
case granted summary judgment against Branson's claim of malicious prosecution because 
Branson's elements were challenged and Branson could not supply proof of any material fact. 
To establish a prima facie case for malicious prosecution, Branson must prove four 
necessary elements: (1) Marvin initiated or procured the initiation of criminal proceedings 
against an innocent Branson; (2) Marvin did not have probable cause to initiate the 
prosecution; (3) Marvin initiated the proceedings primarily for a purpose other than that of 
bringing Branson to justice; and (4) the proceedings terminated in favor of Branson, or the 
accused. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). "The absence of 
any one of the four elements is fatal to the cause of action.55 Callioux v. Progressive 
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Insurance Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Emphasis added). 
A. Summary judgment was proper because Marvin did not instigate the prosecution 
against Branson. Branson brought it on himself, he was not innocent; and, he pled 
guilty to two counts. 
Branson violated a protective order, then drove off recklessly, knowing Marvin was 
hanging on the door for dear life. Branson controlled the speed of his vehicle and refused to 
stop or slow down. He traveled a significant distance while Marvin begged Branson to stop 
before Marvin was killed. Only then, after traveling several hundred feet, did Branson stop 
and Marvin fell and skidded or rolled down the road. These facts were undisputed. The 911 
call was made by Marvin's wife who feared for Marvin's safety. The police responded 
directly to Branson's home and Branson gave them such a hard time he was arrested on the 
spot and charged with violation of a protective order. The court opined that Marvin really 
never instigated this claim because Branson brought it upon himself and the State of Utah 
took over after the 911protective order violation call. The court made it clear in oral 
argument that it makes no sense to subject a private citizen to malicious prosecution when 
said prosecution is taken from the citizen's hands and controlled by the State. (R. 11482 pg. 
22 to 23). 
Nor was Branson an innocent plaintiff. In Hodges, the jury found by a special verdict 
that the plaintiff was innocent; she did not commit the acts she was accused of. 811 P.2d at 
158. Conversely, in the present case, Branson not only pled guilty to two charges brought 
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against him in connection with Branson's attack on January 26,2005, but Branson admitted 
to arguing with Marvin and driving away several feet with Marvin hanging on begging 
Branson to stop before he was killed. Although the aggravated assault charge was deferred 
until after the civil litigation, the civil jury subsequently found Branson had assaulted Marvin 
and awarded Marvin $1.00, all he asked for. 
In the eyes of the law, Marvin never advanced this case, the State did and Branson is 
not an innocent plaintiff. Branson was convicted and held liable for his actions. Thus, 
Branson failed to present any genuine dispute as to the first or fourth element. 
B. Summary judgment was proper because both the accuser and the court had 
probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. 
Second, a malicious prosecution action must lack probable cause. The Supreme Court 
of the United States has explained that lack of probable cause "must be proved by the 
plaintiff by some affirmative evidence." Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544,550 (1861). Again, 
to avoid summary judgment, an adverse party "may not rest upon... mere allegations." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Probable cause is a relatively low threshold. To have probable cause, "[t]he accuser 
must have a reasonable basis for believing the accusation and must also subjectively believe 
the accusation to be true." Hodges, 811 P.2d at 158. In Hodges, the accuser lacked probable 
cause because he not only expressed doubt as to the guilt of the accused but also created a 
-68-
serious question as to his own culpability when he lied. (Id. at 158-59). To further explain 
probable cause, the court also approved of a jury instruction that required the accusers to be 
"sufficiently informed of the facts to initiate the criminal proceedings.55 (Id. at 160.) 
Judge Hadfield's judicial finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing is an 
absolute defense. Utah courts have long explained that "[i]f it is found that probable cause 
did, in fact, exist, it would be a complete answer and defense . . . in all actions of malicious 
prosecution.55 Singh v. MacDonald, 188 P. 631, 632 (Utah 1920). Similarly, where a criminal 
trial resulted in "two findings of probable cause,55 the Court of Appeals of Utah noted that the 
absence of probable cause in a malicious prosecution claim "cannot be proven.55 Calliovx v. 
Progressive Insurance Co., 745 P.2d 838, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Emphasis added). 
In this case, Marvin was not only the victim of a crime but also a person with full 
understanding of Branson's violation of his own protective order since Marvin obtained that 
protective order and knew its terms. Unlike the accuser in Hodges, Marvin knew of 
Branson's guilt and called the authorities in response to a violent altercation. Unlike the 
accuser in Hodges, Marvin was "sufficiently informed55 because he was the victim of a crime. 
Marvin had actual knowledge of the circumstances and never denied them. Notably, Branson 
has failed to provide any affirmative evidence showing that Marvin lacked probable cause. 
To substantiate Marvin's probable cause, the jury in the civil case also believed and found 
proximate cause when they awarded Marvin $1.00 (all he asked for) for Branson's assault. 
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C. Summary judgment was proper because the prosecution was initiated with a proper 
purpose: to bring an offender to justice. 
The third element of a malicious prosecution is improper purpose. In Hodges, the 
accusers had an improper purpose because they used the threat of criminal prosecution as 
leverage to force the accused to pay money that was missing. 811 P.2d at 161. Conversely, an 
employee who initiated prosecution "for the legitimate purpose of protecting company 
property" was not malicious. Agler v. Scheidle, 2006 UT App 495, \1. In affirming the trial 
court's granting of summary judgment against a malicious prosecution claim, the Agler court 
noted that "the record is void of any evidence beyond Plaintiffs speculation" of an improper 
purpose. (Id.) 
Unlike Hodges, Marvin did not use the criminal justice process to force Branson to 
pay money or for any other improper purpose. He only asked for $ 1.00 for the assault. As in 
Agler, the trial court in this case explained that "the record is void of any evidence beyond 
[Branson's] speculation that [Marvin] initiated the prosecution allegations for any wrongful 
or improper purpose." (R. 8722). This includes the neighbor's affidavit, which "is neither 
conclusive of actual innocence (of Branson) nor is it sufficient proof of malice (by Marvin)." 
(R. 8722). Thus, Branson failed to present any genuine dispute as to the third element. 
As shown above, Branson did not obtain a favorable outcome. Rather, he pled guilty 
to two criminal charges and the other was deferred until the civil trial which also found 
assault. Even if Branson could satisfy one of the elements, the absence of any one of the four 
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is fatal to his cause of action. Because Branson failed to present any genuine dispute as to 
any of the elements of malicious prosecution, it was proper for the judge to grant summary 
judgment against the claim as a matter of law. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL 
Marvin respectfully requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
connection with Branson's appeal and this cross appeal. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 33 provides, "if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these 
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just use damages, which may include 
single or double costs.. .and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party." 
Because Branson's appeal has no legal or factual basis, was meritless, and/or was 
brought in bad faith, without marshalling the evidence, this court should determine it was 
frivolous and award Marvin costs and attorney's fees. Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. 
Hall 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In the event this court determines Branson's 
appeal has a reasonable factual and legal basis and, thus, determines attorney's fees and costs 
are not appropriate under Rule 33, Marvin requests an award of costs pursuant to Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure Rule 34. 
Further, Marvin is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
connection with this appeal on the same grounds he was entitled to them at the trial level: by 
the parties' contract and by statute. The Supreme Court of Utah has interpreted statutes and 
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contracts broadly so as to award attorney's fees on appeal where a statute or contract initially 
authorizes them. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305, 319 (Utah 1998); see also 
Christopher son, Farris, White & Utley, P.C. v. Pugh, 2006 UT App 68,115 (quoting R&R 
Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc. 936 P. 2d 1068,1081 "where party entitled to attorney 
fees below prevails on appeal, attorney fee award on appeal proper"). On these grounds 
Marvin is entitled to an award of the attorney's fees and costs he has incurred in relation to 
this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
I. CROSS APPELLANT BRIEF 
For the foregoing reasons, Marvin respectfully requests that this case be remanded so 
the trial court can enter an award for Marvin's attorney's fees and costs on the ABCO pre-
trial motion practice and Manila Ranch trial in this matter, that it sua spontae Marvin be 
awarded prejudgment interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum through July 25, 
2008 on all amounts granted to him in connection with the Manila Ranch trial, and that the 
trial court's final order in this matter be corrected as set forth herein to reflect that the total 
principal amount of Marvin's award from the Manila Ranch trial is $27,865 principal and 
$17,968.42 in pre-judgment interest, less $8,999 due Branson, for total final judgment due of 
$36,834.42. Marvin also respectfully requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs in 
connection with Branson's appeal and this cross-appeal. 
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II. APPELLEE BRIEF 
As the Appellant explained, he "got his day in court." (Br. at 6.) Branson simply could 
not sufficiently prove the elements of his claims for slander of title, breach of fiduciary duty, 
or malicious prosecution. The trial court correctly denied the claims and did not award any 
attorney's fees. Thus, this Court should affirm the decisions of the lower court regarding 
JNOV and partial summary judgment. 
DATED this < ^ T d a y of September, 2009. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
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*** THIS DOCUMENT REFLECTS CHANGES RECEIVED THROUGH JULY 1, 2009 *** 
STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
URCP Rule 60 (2009) 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party 
and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with 
leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of 
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judg-
ment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judg-
ment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
HISTORY: Amended effective April 1,1998 
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. ~ The 1998 amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion the following: "(4) 
when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action." This basis for a motion is not found in the federal rule. The 
committee concluded the clause was ambiguous and possibly in conflict with rules permitting service by means other 
than personal service. 
Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
— Abuse of discretion 
~ Default judgment. 
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*** THIS DOCUMENT REFLECTS CHANGES RECEIVED THROUGH JULY 1, 2009 *** 
STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 33 (2009) 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which 
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The 
court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any im-
proper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the 
party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A party may request damages 
under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's 
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney 
or both an order to show cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the 
allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise or-
dered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing. 
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. - Rule 33 is substantially redrafted to provide definitions and procedures for as-
sessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court must award damages. This is in keeping with Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the amount of damages — single or double costs or attorney fees or both ~ is left to 
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended to make express the authority of the court to impose sanctions upon the 
party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid the con-
flict created for appointed counsel by Anders v. California, 386 US 738 (1967) and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 
(Utah 1981). Under the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by the defen-
dant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 34 (2009) 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the 
appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall 
be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the 
appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be 
allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an 
award of costs for or against the state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or prohibited by 
law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed as 
costs in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or memoranda and 
attachments not to exceed $ 3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, 
including costs of the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for supersedeas or cost 
bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees for filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. A party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed with 
the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified 
bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection, 
together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allot-
ted time, the clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto, which 
judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of 
record. If the cost bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax 
the costs and enter a final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with the 
same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of the clerk shall be reviewable by 
the trial court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters before the court, including appeals from an 
agency, costs may be allowed as in cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the time in 
which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an order denying such a petition, the party to whom 
costs have been awarded may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party an itemized and 
verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection 
and a motion to have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within the allotted time, the 
clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to 
the cost bill, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs, tax the same, and a 
judgment shall be entered thereon against the adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the 
UtahR.App.P.Rule34 
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court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral argu-
ment shall not be permitted. A judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in the state, 
who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and with the same force and effect as judgments of the dis-
trict court. 
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1999 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Costs awarded. 
Cited. 
Costs awarded. 
Although the court denied the award of attorney fees to husband under Rule 33(a) because the wife's appeal had a 
reasonable factual and legal basis, costs were awarded to husband under Rule 34. Cooke v. Cooke 2001 Utah App. 
LEXIS 28 2001 UTApp 110, 22 P.3d 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
Cited in Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. 2006 Utah 
LEXIS 96. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. ~ 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 909 et seq 
CJ.S. - 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 995 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VI. TRIALS 
URCP Rule 52 (2009) 
Rule 52. Findings by the court; correction of the record. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts spe-
cially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8 A; in grant-
ing or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to 
the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear 
in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend 
its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, 
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party 
raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(d) Correction of the record. If anything material is omitted from or misstated in the transcript of an audio or video 
record of a hearing or trial, or if a disagreement arises as to whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in the 
proceeding, a party may move to correct the record. The motion must be filed within 10 days after the transcript of the 
hearing is filed, unless good cause is shown. The omission, misstatement or disagreement shall be resolved by the court 
and the record made to accurately reflect the proceeding. 
HISTORY: Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; July 1, 2009 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
URCP Rule 54 (2009) 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments 
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed 
by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is pre-
sented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties 
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 
the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that spe-
cifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, 
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary dis-
bursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowl-
edge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A 
party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion 
URCP Rule 54 
Page 2 
to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of 
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, 
shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any in-
terest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. 
The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the 
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof 
in the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
HISTORY: Amended effective January 1, 1985; November 1, 2003 
NOTES: Compiler's Notes. - Subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the appellate court and 
costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P. 
This rule is similar to Rule 54, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References.-- Continuances, discretion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P. 40(b). 
State, payment of costs awarded against, § 78B-5-806. 
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, U.R.C.P. 62(h). 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 78B-1-147. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Absence of express determination. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Appeal as of right. 
Certification not determinative. 
Costs. 
— In general. 
— Challenge of award. 
— Depositions. 
— Discretionary. 
~ Expenses of preparation for action. 
~ Extension of time for filing. 
~ Failure to object. 
— Liability of state. 
~ Mediation. 
~ Service on adverse party. 
— Statutory limits. 
~ Time for claiming 
— Untimely filing of memorandum. 
~ When not demanded. 
Default judgments. 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
Final order. 
— Appealability. 
-- Attorney's fee award. 
~ Certification. 
~ Claims for relief. 
— Complete disposal of claim or party. 
~ Effect of counterclaim. 
— No just reason for delay. 
~ Review of finality. 
URCP Rule 56 
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004 
NOTES: Compiler's Notes. - This rule is similar to Rule 56, F.R.CP. 
Cross-References.-- Contempt generally, § 78B-6-301 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affidavit. 
-- Bad faith 
— Contents. 
~ Corporation. 
— Experts. 
— Extension of time to submit 
— Failure to submit. 
— Inconsistency with deposition. 
— Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
~ Objection. 
— Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
~ Superseding pleadings. 
— Unpleaded defenses. 
~ Verified pleading. 
-- Waiver of right to contest. 
~ When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
— Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
~ Adversely affected party. 
~ Standard of review. 
Applicability. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Burden of proof 
Compliance with rule. 
Continuance for further discovery. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Effect of denial. 
Evidence. 
~ Admissions of plaintiff. 
— Facts considered. 
— Improper evidence. 
— Proof. 
— Unsupported motion 
— Weight of testimony. 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
URCP Rule 56 (2009) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without sub-
stantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the 
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof re-
ferred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judg-
ment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts show-
ing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to 
file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART IX. ATTORNEYS 
URCP Rule 73 (2009) 
Rule 73 Attorney fees. 
(a) When attorney fees are authorized by contract or by law, a request for attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit 
or testimony unless the party claims attorney fees in accordance with the schedule in subsection (d) or in accordance 
with Utah Code Section 75-3-718 and no objection to the fee has been made. 
(b) An affidavit supporting a request for or augmentation of attorney fees shall set forth: 
(1) the basis for the award; 
(2) a reasonably detailed description of the time spent and work performed, including for each item of work the 
name, position (such as attorney, paralegal, administrative assistant, etc.) and hourly rate of the persons who performed 
the work; 
(3) factors showing the reasonableness of the fees; 
(4) the amount of attorney fees previously awarded; and. 
(5) if the affidavit is in support of attorney fees for services rendered to an assignee or a debt collector, the terms of 
any agreement for sharing the fee and a statement that the attorney is not sharing the fee or any portion thereof in viola-
tion of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4. 
(c) If a party requests attorney fees in accordance with the schedule in subsection (d), the party's complaint shall 
state the basis for attorney fees, state the amount of attorney fees allowed by the schedule, cite the law or attach a copy 
of the contract authorizing the award, and, if the attorney fees are for services rendered to an assignee or a debt collec-
tor, a statement that the attorney will not share the fee or any portion thereof in violation of Rule of Professional Con-
duct 5.4. 
(d) Attorney fees awarded under the schedule may be augmented only for considerable additional efforts in collect-
ing or defending the judgment and only after further order of the court. 
Amount of Damages, Exclusive of Costs, 
Attorney Fees and Post-Judgment 
Interest, 
0.00 
1,500.01 
2,000.01 
2,500.01 
3,000.01 
1,500.00 
2,000.00 
2,500.00 
3,000.00 
3,500.00 
Attorney 
Allowed 
250.00 
325.00 
400.00 
475.00 
550.00 
URCP Rule 73 
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3,500.01 4,000.00 625.00 
4,000.01 4,500.00 700.00 
4,500.01 or more 775.00 
HISTORY: Added effective November 1, 2003; amended April 1, 2005 
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. - The schedule does not limit the amount of a reasonable attorney fee if an affida-
vit is submitted. The schedule of attorney fees includes amounts for routine orders supplemental to the judgment and 
routine collection writs. For attorney fees for collection efforts beyond such routine steps, the lawyer should apply to the 
court under subsections (a) and (b). 
Repeals. — Former Rule 73(a) to (g) and (m), relating to notice of appeal and the required bond, were deleted with 
the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1,1985. For present provisions, see Rules 6 to 
13, Utah R. App. P. The remainder of the rule, prescribing procedure for appealing a judgment of a city or justice court, 
was repealed in 1990. 
Amendment Notes.- The 2005 amendment deleted "No affidavit is required" from the beginning of Subdivision 
(c), added the language beginning "and, if the attorney fees are for services rendered" at the end, and made related 
changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Action against former client. 
Compliance with rule 
Reasonableness. 
Action against former client. 
Law firm's counsel was entitled to attorney fees in breach of contract action to recover for services rendered before 
former client hired new counsel in an underlying dispute; the fee contract clearly provided for such fees and the work 
performed on the firm's complaint for breach of contract was inextricably mixed with the defense on the client's coun-
terclaims based on the client's belief that the firm had not properly represented her in the dispute. (Unpublished deci-
sion.) Christopherson, Farris, White & Utley, P.C. v. Pugh 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 70. 
Compliance with rule 
The affidavit submitted by the prevailing party's counsel satisfied the requirements of this rule; while only one at-
torney from the firm submitted an affidavit, the affiant stated that he was operating from personal knowledge and he 
included the firm's billing records with his affidavit. The entries in the billing records stated the work performed, the 
person performing the work, and the hourly rate charged by the person performing the work. Kenny v. Rich court of 
Appeals of Utah 2008 Utah App. LEXIS 189 2008 UT App 209, 186 P3d 989, 0809141711 OASIS (Utah Ct. App. 
2008), cert, denied, 2008 Utah LEXIS 191 (Utah Sept. 17, 2008) . 
Reasonableness. 
Attorney fee award of $ 885 to a recipient of unwanted email under former § 13-36-105(2)(b) was a reasonable ex-
ercise of the trial court's discretion. Although claimant had requested over $ 4000 in attorney fees, reduction was rea-
sonable because plaintiffs attorneys did not reasonably need to expend all of the time they claimed in researching, dis-
cussing, and documenting the case; the requested hourly rate exceeded the customary fees charged in the locality for the 
type of work performed; and the requested fee was far in excess of the $ 10 in damages awarded. Amyx v. Columbia 
House Holdings court of Appeals of Utah 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 114 2005 UTApp 118, 110 P.3d 176 (Utah Ct. App. 
2005). 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 606 (2009) 
Rule 606. Competency of juror as witness. 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which the 
juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the 
presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of 
anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict 
or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the 
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any out-
side influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement 
by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these pur-
poses. 
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992 
NOTES: Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with Rules 41 and 44, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), and Utah case law, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 R2d 662 (1972). 
Cross-References.-- Judge or juror may be witness, § 78B-1-133. 
Jurors, Rule 47, U.R.C.P. 
Misconduct of jury, proof by juror's affidavit, Rule 59(a)(2), U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Validity of verdict or information. 
~ Outside influence. 
Cited. 
Validity of verdict or information. 
Evidence by affidavit or testimony of a juror will not be received to impeach or question the jury verdict or to show 
the grounds upon which it was rendered, or to show their misunderstanding of fact or law, or that they misunderstood 
the charge of the court, or the effect of their verdict, or their opinions, surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at 
a verdict. State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972). 
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TITLE 75. UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
CHAPTER 7. UTAH UNIFORM TRUST CODE 
PART 10. LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES AND RIGHTS OF PERSONS DEALING WITH TRUSTEE 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1004 (2009) 
§ 75-7-1004. Attorney's fees and costs 
(1) In a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a trust, the court may, as justice and equity may require, 
award costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from the 
trust that is the subject of the controversy. 
(2) If a trustee defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, the trustee is entitled 
to receive from the trust die necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 75-7-1004, enacted by L. 2004, ch. 89, § 109. 
NOTES: EFFECTIVE DATES. - Laws 2004, ch. 89, § 123 makes the act effective on July 1, 2004. 
USER NOTE: For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle, 
or title. 
Exhibit B 
In the First Judicial District Court 
In and for Cache County, State of Utah 
BRANDON NEFF 
vs. 
MARVIN NEFF 
Plaintiff(s), 
Defendant(s). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case Number: 030100275 
JUDGE: GORDON J LOW 
On the 7th day of February, 2008, Judge Thomas L Willmore, Presiding Judge of the First 
District Court Ordered that all remaining and outstanding issues in this case were to be 
adjudicated by Judge Gordon J Low the undersigned Judge. In accordance with the said order, 
the undersigned has received the file and the outstanding unresolved motions and issues 
addressed therein and issues this Memorandum Decision. 
It should be noted that requests have been made for oral argument, but the Court has 
before it five (5) years of pleadings, comprising of forty-one (41) volumes, conducted numerous 
hearings and presided over a ten (10) day trial. The Rules do not provide for further hearings nor 
will the Court or parties be benefitted thereby. It is time to bring those matters to closure and this 
Memorandum Decision is the Court's best efforts in doing so. 
It is first to be noted that on the 6th day of November, 2007, the Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision denying attorney fees to either side. That ruling addresses the issues 
raised relative to the Motions for Reconsideration. 
On the 24th day of January, 2008, the Defendant filed a second Request to Submit for 
Decision requesting the Court to address the final Order on Manila Ranch, Statute of Limitations, 
- 1 -
Offsets and Amounts Due and Pre-Trial attorney fees claimed by the Defendant. 
On the 30th day of January, 2008, the Plaintiff filed a document styled, Clarification 
Regarding Outstanding Motion Submitted for Decision. Therein he identified the following: 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike or in the Alternative, Stay Marvin's (Defendant's) 
Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion for Expedited Consideration of Plaintiffs Motion to 
Strike, or in the Alternative, Stay Marvin's Motion for Entry of Judgment for 
Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion to Enlarge Time to Respond to Marvin's Motion for 
Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
The Plaintiff also identified by reference to the Court's above referenced 
Memorandum Decision issued on the 6th day of November, 2007, the Defendant's 
Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs, Offsets and 
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order on 
the Manila Ranch. 
It should also be noted that filed on the 30th day of November, 2007, by the Plaintiff, was 
filed a Request to Submit for Decision requesting a ruling on his Motion to Enlarge Time to 
Respondent's (Marvin) Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and Costs and the 
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Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motions Expedited Consideration of Plaintiff s Motion to Strike, or in the 
Alternative, Stay Marvin's (Defendant's) Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and 
Costs. 
The Court had neither seen nor ruled upon the last two (2) motions immediately identified 
above until now, nor has the Defendant responded to the same. The motions are conflicting as 
one requests an enlargement of time to respond before ruling, the other for an expedited 
consideration of the Motion to Strike. In any event, it has now been six months since those last 
two request, no responses have been filed by the Defendant and no proposed response by the 
Plaintiff for which the enlargement of time was requested. 
Consistent with the Court's repeated admonition relative to unnecessary, cumulative and 
overly technical motions, the Court will address the heart of the matter without further motions, 
memoranda or other supporting documents or oral argument. 
This action was initiated by, the Plaintiff Branson Neff, by the filing of a complaint 
against multiple Defendant's, all of whom were removed as the litigation proceeded, except the 
Defendant Marvin Neff Though the complaint named at least seventeen different primary 
causes of action, they all arose from the family, brotherly relationship of the final two parties. 
The claims or causes of action were variously styled, but all related to the separation of the two 
brothers from a business relationship and the acrimony, misunderstandings, distrust lack of 
communication and general discontent of the parties, (primarily that of the Plaintiff) with the 
final results of the dissolution, separation and success or lack thereof of the remaining separated 
business efforts and intents. 
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In motion practice and at trial by jury, the Plaintiff failed to recover or succeed on the 
majority of his claims. On a single claim described as a breach of contract, the Plaintiff did 
receive a judgment in the sum of nine thousand dollars ($9,000.00). In light of the money 
damage claimed for over three million dollars plus punitive damages, the recovery can only 
generously be described as nominal and more accurately de minimus in it's nature and amount. 
The Plaintiff however, seeks an award of attorney fees on the breach of contract claim on 
the basis that he prevailed in a large fashion thereon extend-limited as it may be. 
Claims, except breach of contract by the Plaintiff were voluntarily withdrawn by the 
Defendant before the matter was submitted to the jury. On the Defendant's breach of contract he 
requested and was awarded one dollar ($1.00). 
Both parties cite the contractual language and case law in support of their claims. The 
Defendant also graphically sets forth the Plaintiffs claims and the Plaintiffs failure to receive 
any awards thereon. 
The case law supplied by the Defendant is persuasive and a flexible and reasoned in 
approach is appropriate. However this entire, unfortunate lawsuit arises not so much out of a 
breach of contract or proven non-breach, but rather out of the tragic breakdown of family 
relationships, convoluted, complicated and infused with emotion, both healthy and unfortunately 
unhealthy. To cast the whole controversy as one of breach of contract, though there was a 
contract and to consider or not consider the other claims does not adequately describe or address 
the terrible mess these two brothers created for themselves. The attorneys fees expended and 
incurred on both sides are enormous, the time and energy spent, the precious family ties and 
relationships lost, the public's forum and taxes, money wasted can all only be adequately 
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described as a disaster. The only feasible and reasoned decision relative to attorney's fees is that 
neither party prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss and this Court refuses to compound the loss 
by awarding fees to either party. 
The jury's award of nine thousand dollars ($9,000.00) for breach of contract to the 
Plaintiff as well as it's award of one dollar ($1.00) to the Defendant are both unsupportable and 
without basis under the facts of the case. Though the Court will not sua sponte set them aside, 
nor solicit or entertain motions to do so, the Court is not bound by the award to find therefrom a 
"prevailing party' in this catastrophic litigation, and no fees to either side are awarded. 
The Defendant has also sought his Pre-trial attorney fees and costs as they relate to the 
Aspen Spring/ABCO portion of this bifurcated action. He seeks these under both the language of 
the contract(s), the outcome of the litigation, both ultimately and on various Pre-trial motions 
and pursuant to Rule 54 (d) U.R.C.P (costs) and under §78-27-50.5 UCA. The Court questions 
the application of the provisions of the Code section to this action, but regardless, the Court for 
the reasons above stated declines to award fees. As no fees are awarded the issues of whether the 
fees were properly applied for and will not be addressed. 
As to this motion and ruling, and in order to avoid additional objections or further motion 
practice, this is the formal and final Order. Neither party need submit any further pleadings on 
Proposed Orders. 
On the 29th day of August, 2007, a hearing was conducted on what is variously described 
as the Manila Ranch or Estate matter. The hearing was in the form of a bench trial and Rule 56 
hearing, and resulted in a number of stipulations involving claims, merits, statute of limitations, 
offsets, defenses, money sums and of course attorneys fees. Some settlement discussions also 
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occurred and assignments were given to counsel relating to supplemental memoranda and/or 
orders. Exhibits were received subject to objections. 
Since the hearing, the Plaintiff filed a Proposed Order on the 17th day of September, 2007. 
On the 19th day of September, the Defendant filed an objection to the Plaintiffs Proposed Order 
and his own Proposed set of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. On the 3rd day of October, 
2007, Plaintiff filed his objections to the Defendant's Proposed Order and a Response to 
Defendant's Objection. On said date was also filed by the Plaintiff a memorandum regarding 
Plaintiffs claimed offsets. The Court then received the Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs 
Objection on October 7, 2007. 
Some argument is addresses by the parties regarding style, order, procedure, and 
timeliness. Those issues are secondary and by this time now moot. 
On the 16th day of October, 2007 Defendant filed his memorandum regarding Plaintiffs 
claims for offsets. The Plaintiff on November 16th, 2007 filed his reply as invited by the Court 
relative to his claim for offsets. 
Addressing first the issue of offsets, the Court has found, and the trial was conducted on 
the basis that the contract for separation, dissolution and dividing up of the assets as between 
these two family members was binding, though the actual litigation involved far more than a 
simple "arms length contract". 
Whatever else the parties were trying to achieve, in all this was a global settlement, 
resolution, separation and division of their relationship, business and economic entanglement. 
The claims by the Plaintiff regarding breach of contract, accounting, breach of fiduciary duty, 
damages, offsets and the like related to ABCO and Westco were resolved either in pre-trial 
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motion rulings or at trial by the jury and they cannot be revisited here. The above relates as well 
to the claims of disproportionate payments to family members. Specially relative to those claims, 
the Court ruled on Statute of Limitations grounds, but regardless they were part of the 
dissolution. The only way they could have survived the merged dissolution is on the grounds of 
fraud, which the court ruled on in motions prior to trial. The Court is precluded now from 
revisiting those matters. 
Each of the Plaintiffs claims were either ruled upon in pre-trail motion practice, or 
merged and tried before the jury. Though the Dan James Report regarding the some of eighteen 
thousand dollars ($18,000.00) has been referred to in support of Plaintiff s claim, it is not 
evidence upon which this Court can rely in adjudicating the issue before it. It is not competent 
evidence to be received under the Rules and cannot be reviewed as evidence of offset. As to 
Claims for offset, affirmative defenses, counter-claims on both sides, the Court on Motion, 
already ruled thereon or it was necessarily part of the jury's adjudication. The Claims simply 
cannot survive the trial given the fact it was a trial on, among numerous other claims, breach of 
contract, fraud, fair dealing, misrepresentation, damages, conversion and a whole host of other 
claims. 
Plaintiff, in both his initial memorandum regarding offset, and more particularly in his 
Reply, suggests the Defendant misses the mark and ignores the Court's rulings on offsets as they 
affect the accounting and relief sought regarding the Manila Ranch on Estate Matters. 
At the outset, telling in this litigation is the footnote on page 4 of Plaintiff s Reply 
Memorandum. This Court has been equally unable to congratulate either side for its acrimonious 
actions and forest destroying the approach to this litigation. Both have fired off reams of 
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paperwork. The Defendant is even criticized for dismissing the claims made. In this Courts 
view, both parties should have done so before any action was even filed. It has largely been a 
war of attrition over family relationships gone bad and over what could have been a happy filial 
separation that has turned into the War of the Roses. All of the issues regarding the payments to 
the parties children were barred as above stated either on statute of limitations, 
integration/merger, lack of standing (they are after all claims of the children supposedly for 
services rendered and not claims of the parties) or by adjudication by the Court or jury. The 
argument that the Court, in pre-trial, ruled on certain claims, but left others viable, results in the 
opportunity to at once have the jury address them, they cannot now be adjudicated as offsets 
against the bifurcated issues in relation to the Manila Ranch/Estate case. 
Through the Statue of Limitations ruling does not alone bar offset, that does not negate 
the Plaintiffs burden to show that either the claims were not, or could not have been adjudicated 
at trial, and also that the offset claims are supported (proven) by the facts in evidence. 
The Plaintiff is correct that the statue of limitations bar the claim for relief, but does not 
bar the claim as offset. That however was a trial issue by the jury and should have been made 
there. To the extent it was made and proven or not proven, the Court must assume that the jury 
considered it. No specific findings were made by the jury so it can only be considered as part of 
the general verdict and is now res judicata. 
The claims of fraud, conversion, disproportionate payments, breach of trust or fiduciary 
duty, constructed trust were all elements of the claims either for fraud pre-trial or of breach of 
contract at trial. They either explicitly were part of the claim before the jury or could have been, 
or should have been and were either considered by the jury or not. With respect to the two 
- 8 -
f\ -6 -* r\ r* r\ 
conflicting proposed orders submitted by the parties, and based upon the proffers, exhibits, 
stipulations, and interim rulings on the 29th day of August, 2007, the Court here rules, without 
finding breach of fiduciary duty or otherwise that the Defendant is entitled to receive from the 
accounting the following: 
1. Ranch. Payment 
$6,951.61 Principle 
$5,387.49 Interest 
2. Oil Royalty 
$2,141.64 Principle 
$1,568.41 Interest 
3. Cattle Sale 
$11,225.62 Principle 
$4,957.70 Interest 
Against those sums, Plaintiff is entitled to offset of $8999.00 plus interest at the judgment 
date. 
The money inter pled into the Court are to be paid out to the parties evenly after reflecting 
the above stated offsets and accounting. 
This will constitute the final order herein and any further relief is to be sought on appeal. 
Dated thjjfrfS day of July, 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
Neff vs Neff 2008-07-25/GJlVjl 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
BRANSON NEFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARVIN G. NEFF, et al, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No: 030100275 
Judge: Gordon J. Low 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs Request for 
Reconsideration or Modification of June 19,2007, Order. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs 
Request, Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Request for an Order on Attorney Fees, 
Plaintiffs Notice of Docketing Error in Entry of Findings and Order Dated June 19,2007, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike, Defendant's Reply and 
Objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Notice of 
Docketing Error, and relevant case law and statutory provisions. 
The contractual language indicated that the prevailing party may be awarded attorney 
fees. The Jury found that both parties prevailed on the Breach of Contract and that both parties 
breached their contractual obligations. The Jury awarded Plaintiff $9,000.00 and the Jury found 
$1.00 for Defendant. 
Even though Defendant reserved attorney's fees to be determined at the end of trial, the 
Court finds that neither party is justified in receiving attorney's fees in regards to the breach of 
contract issue. The Court finds that even if the parties were justified in receiving attorney's fees, 
the fees would offset one another. 
Therefore, Attorney's fees in regards to the breach of contract issue will not be awarded 
to either party. 
In the case of Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, PI (Utah 2006) the Utah Supreme Court 
states, we "absolutely rejecting the practice of filing postjudgment motions to reconsider. We 
also warn that future filings of postjudgment motions to reconsider will not toll the time for 
appeal and therefore may subject attorneys to malpractice claims." The Court will not reconsider 
or modify its June 19,2007, Order. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs Request for Reconsideration or Modification of June 19,2007, 
Order is denied. In denying Plaintiffs Request the Court finds that the parties other Motions, 
Objections, and Notices in regards to the issue at hand are moot. Defendant's counsel is directed 
to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this Qr- day of November, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 030100275 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail MARLIN J GRANT 
Attorney DEF 
130 SOUTH MAIN STE 200 
P O BOX 525 
LOGAN, UT 84323-0525 
Mail JAMES C JENKINS 
Attorney DEF 
130 SOUTH MAIN 
POB 525 
LOGAN UT 84323-0525 
Mail JAMES E MAGLEBY 
Attorney PLA 
170 S MAIN ST STE 350 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Mail BLAKE D MILLER 
Attorney PLA 
165 REGENT ST 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail MICHAEL F SKOLNICK 
Attorney DEF 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 4TH FLR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Mail CHRISTOPHER M VON MAACK 
Attorney PLA 
170 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SUITE 350 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Dated this U day of AIV^^L.^ 20 e/-\ 
Paap i t"* ="-+-^  
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MAIN, SU ITE 200 
BOX 525 
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752-1551 
•ON OFFICE: 
AST MAIN 
30X 115 
I, UTAH 84337 
157-3885 
Marlin J. Grant (#4581) 
jjames C. Jenkins (#1658) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
(Attorneys for Defendants 
130 South Main, Suite 200 
p.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
[Telephone: (435) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
[BRANSON G. NEFF, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
NS. 
MARVIN G. NEFF, an individual, 
nTRAVIS L. BOWEN, ESQ., an individual, 
fTRAVIS L. BOWEN, P.C, a Utah 
professional corporation, ABCO 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and WESTCo, an unregistered 
bartnership between BRANSON G. NEFF 
|and MARVIN G. NEFF, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. 030100275 
Honorable Gordon J. Low 
This matter came before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Judge, upon Plaintiffs 
[Motion for Attorneys Fees and Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
[The Court having considered the record of this case, having conducted the trial herein, and 
paving considered memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties and oral arguments presented 
after hearing on April 16, 2007, now enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the written contracts between the parties provides for the 
recovery of attorneys fees to be awarded to the prevailing party. 
2 . Neither party objected to the jury instructions or verdict form. 
3. Plaintiff in this action asserted multiple claims against the Defendants. 
4. The jury verdict provides that Plaintiff Branson G. Neff suffered no damages for 
slander of title. The evidence at trial supported the jury award of no damages to be awarded to 
Plaintiff on Plaintiffs cause of action for Slander of Title. 
5. The jury verdict provides that Plaintiff Branson G. Neff suffered no damages for 
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The evidence at trial supported the jury award of 
no damages to be awarded to Plaintiff on Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of duty of good 
faith and fair dealing 
6. The jury verdict provides that Plaintiff Branson G. Neff suffered no damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty. The evidence at trial supported the jury award of no damages to be 
awarded to Plaintiff on Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. 
7. The jury verdict provides that Plaintiff Branson G. Neff suffered no damages for 
breach of salary continuation agreement. The evidence at trial supported the jury verdict against 
Plaintiff on Plaintiffs cause of action for breach of salary continuation agreement. 
8. The Special Verdict Instructions to the jury regarding the cause of action for 
Slander of Title, provides under instruction 6C, that it is to be answered only if the jury found 
damages under instruction 6A. Because there were no damages awarded under Special Verdict 
6A, the jury should not have answered Special Verdict 6C. 
9. The Special Verdict Instructions to the jury regarding the cause of action for 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, provides under instruction 8C, that it is to be answered only if the jury 
found damages under instruction 8A. Because there were no damages awarded under Special 
Verdict 8 A, the jury should not have answered Special Verdict 8C. 
10. Plaintiff sought an award of attorney fees for substantially all his claims, except for 
those relating to the dismissed claims against Defendants Travis L. Bowen and Travis L. Bowen, 
P.C. 
3 
11 Plaintiff failed to allocate the attorneys fees to specific causes of action or to causes 
of action for which recovery of attorneys fees might be allowed.. 
12. Prior to trial, most of Plaintiff s claims were dismissed. Plaintiff proceeded at trial 
against the Respondent on causes for Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Slander of 
Title, Assault/Battery, Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Breach of Salary 
Continuation Agreement. 
13. At trial, Plaintiff sought monetary damages in excess of one million dollars for 
[those causes of action. 
14. Plaintiff incurred his attorneys fees primarily on causes of action which were either 
dismissed or for which attorneys fees are not recoverable. For instance, Plaintiffs claim to set 
aside the subject contract on grounds of fraud consumed substantially all of the pre-litigation 
motions and was totally unmeritorious. After four years of litigation, Plaintiff could not 
substantiate the fraud claim with any evidence. Regarding Plaintiffs claims for recovery of 
personal property under the contract, such personal property was junk or of little or no actual 
value. 
15. The Court finds that Plaintiff, at all times relevant to this case, was in possession of 
his farm and home, and exercised control over the same. 
16. Despite seeking hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages for breach of 
contract, Plaintiff was awarded a verdict of only $9,000.00 under that cause of action. The Court 
finds that the jury verdict supports the Court's finding that substantially all of Plaintiff s claims 
were unmeritorious. 
17. The Court finds that Plaintiff unnecessarily and unmeritoriously required 
Defendants to participate in the litigation, to assert defenses, and to defend against Plaintiffs 
claims at trial. 
18. At trial, Defendants only requested damages of $1.00 for Breach of Contract, 
Defendants only requested $1.00 for Assault; Defendants only requested $1.00 for Slander of 
Title, Defendants only requested $1.00 for Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and 
Defendants only requested $1.00 for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. 
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[ 19. At trial, the jury by verdict, found that Plaintiff had breached the contract with 
Defendant, and awarded damages of $1.00 to Defendant. 
! 20. At trial, the jury by verdict, found that Plaintiff had assaulted Defendant and 
awarded damages of $ 1.00. 
21. At trial, the jury by verdict, found that Plaintiff did not slander Defendant's title. 
22. At trial, the jury by verdict, found that Plaintiff had breached his duty of good faith 
and fair dealing owed to the Defendant but awarded no damages. 
23. At trial, the jury found by verdict that Plaintiff breached his fiduciary duty to 
Defendant but awarded no damages. 
24. The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes as a matter of law that attorneys fees may be awarded to the 
prevailing party in this case on issues of contract. 
2. The Court concludes that Plaintiff is not the prevailing party on the issues of 
contract. 
3. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the jury erred and failed to follow the 
Court's instructions, regarding the Special Verdict and instructions 6C and 8C. 
4. The Court concludes as a matter of law that Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict should be granted. 
5. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs request for attorneys fees is unreasonable. 
6. The Court concludes as a matter of law that Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery of 
attorneys fees against the Defendants, and that no attorneys fees should be awarded to the 
Plaintiff. 
7. The Court notes that Defendants have remaining claims to be adjudicated in the 
bifurcated trial regarding Manila Ranch and estate distribution. Trial on these issues is scheduled 
to commence August 28, 2007. 
DATED this ^ , 
BY THE COURT 
l \\ day ofShy, 2007. 
Approved as to Form: 
James E. Magelby 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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J MAILING AND RULE 7(f) CERTIFICATE 
I I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
I Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict 
and Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees, to James E. Magleby of Magleby & Grenwood, 
P.C., 170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage paid in Logan, 
I Utah, this J X day^f May, 2007. 
"Pursuant" to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if no objection to this 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict and Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees is submitted 
to the Court and counsel within five (5) days after service, the original will be filed with the 
Court for signature. 
J:\JCJ\PLEADINGS\Neffi FOF> COL, Mtn Judg, Atty Fees 5.17.07 
k HOGGAN, P.C. 
RNEYS AT LAW 
H MAIN, SUITE 200 
5. BOX 525 
TAH 84323-0525 
5)752-1551 
NTON OFFICE-
EAST MAIN 
>. BOX 1 15 
DN, UTAH 84337 
) 257-3885 
Marlin J. Grant (#4581) 
James C. Jenkins (#1658) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
130 South Main, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone: (435)752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
BRANSON G. NEFF, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARVIN G. NEFF, an individual, 
TRAVIS L. BOWEN, ESQ., an individual, 
TRAVIS L. BOWEN, P.C, a Utah 
professional corporation, ABCO 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and WESTCo, an unregistered 
partnership between BRANSON G. NEFF 
and MARVIN G. NEFF, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
VERDICT 
Civil No. 030100275 
Honorable Gordon J. Low 
This matter came before Judge Gordon J. Low for hearing on April 16, 2007, on 
Plaintiffs request for costs and attorneys fees, and upon Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. Both parties have supplied briefs and affidavits, and presented oral 
argument on the issues. The Court, having read the briefs and exhibits, heard oral argument, and 
having fully considered the matter and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is 
now therefore Ordered as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is granted. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees is denied and the Plaintiff is awarded no 
attorneys fees. 
FNTTi IHK1 1 Q 9007 /%S 
3. Defendants still have claim to be adjudicated in the bifurcated trial regarding 
[Manila Ranch and estate distribution. Trial is scheduled to commence August 28,2007. 
DATED this _j^_ day of May, 2007. 
'JUKI/ 
Approved as to Form: 
James E. Magelby 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING AND RULE 7(f) CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing Order on Plaintiffs Motion 
for Attorneys Fees and Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict, to 
James E. Magleby of Magleby & Grenwood, P.C., 170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, postage paid in Logan, Utah, t h ^ T l ^ i a ? of May, 2007. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if no objection to this 
foregoing Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees and Defendants' Motion foi 
Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict is submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days 
after service, the original will be filed with the Court for signature. 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees 
And Defendants9 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict 
Neffv.Neff 
Civil N. 030100275 
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Exhibit E 
Property Settlement 
12/08/99 
1 Pay off pickup $30,000 or payment MN discretion 
2 Cash now (Dec 1999)== $50,000 
Cash spring of 2000==$52,000 
Cash Dec of 2000==$25,000 
Cash Spring of 2001 ==$25,000 
Cash Dec of 2001 ==$25,000 
Cash spring of 2002==$25,000 
Cash spring of 2003==$25,000 
Cash Spring of 2004==$25,000 
Note: No interest on lump sum amounts 
option to pay off sooner 
3 Health Insurance 
Starting Jan 2000 pay $3,000 per year for 3.5 years to age 65 
4 BG has use of equipment and tools from Company for personal/farm use. 
Company will have use of tractor.disk, eta and has maintained. 
5 Westco to make farm payment this year, due this month. 
6 Farm to BG, personal Guardian Policy to BG 
MN has residence & land bank descnption, horse pasture and shed, shop, office 
and yard, Lincoln, Farrwest, ABCO to MN 
7 BG to continue and finish up Buck, Bayview etc. 
8 Buy/Sell insurance policy owned by BG sold to MN for cash value 
rather than lapsed. (Cash Value $16>230) 
9 Request for BG to bid and sell work, run work as desires.and receive 
payment well worth while 
Signed 
Signed ///J^U<X4^ 
MawnG Neff 
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Marlin J. Grant (#4581) 
James C. Jenkins (#1658) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
130 South Main, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone: (435) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
BRANSON G. NEFF, ; 
Plaintiff, " 
vs. 
MARVIN G. NEFF ] 
Defendants. ) 
i MARVIN'S MEMORANDUM IN 
) SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY 
) OF JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY 
) FEES AND COSTS (ASPEN 
1 SPRINGS/ABCO) 
Civil No. 030100275 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
COMES NOW, Defendant, by and through counsel Olson & Hoggan, P.C, and submits 
the following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Entry of Judgment for Attorney Fees and 
Costs in relation to the Contract/Buyout involving Aspen Springs, disproportionate payments to 
family, contract enforcement and fraud pursuant to Rule 73 and Rule 54 of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court previously bifurcated this lawsuit to separate the general Aspen 
Springs/ABCO claims in the Buyout from the Manila Ranch claims. This memorandum 
concerns the Aspen Springs/ABCO Buyout claims. Branson Neff ("Branson") filed a 
Complaint, as amended, against Marvin Neff ("Marvin") containing 17 different primary 
causes of action. Branson sought general damages from Marvin of over $3 million in addition 
to punitive damages. Notwithstanding Banson's numerous claims and excessively litigious 
nature, Marvin was 100% successful in defending against Branson's contract rescission claims. 
In addition, this Court dismissed on the merits prior to trial numerous claims asserted by 
Branson, and then the jury only awarded Branson nominal damages on a single contract claim 
for $9,000.00. Marvin was successful in defending against lost development claims 
($425,068.00), Branson's request for one-half (V2) of the equipment ($425,068.00), wages 
claimed ($425,068.00 +), salary continuation claim ($210,822.00), quiet title claim to 4.12 
acres ($250,000.00), bonding claims, claims of slander of title ($425,068.00+), breach of 
fiduciary duty ($425,068.00), $24,000.00 to remodel, $27,574.00 on Buy/Sell policy and 
Health Insurance ($4,861.00) claims. Accordingly, Marvin is the prevailing party for 
defending or avoiding an adverse judgment. He is entitled to his attorney fees and costs on his 
enforcement of the contract. Marvin is also entitled to fees for successfully defending against 
the slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Marvin has separated his attorney fees 
on these issues from the breach of contract issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Marvin Neff received a successful ruling on several of the pretrial summary 
judgment motions. Branson brought 17 causes of action in his Amended Complaint. 
The dollar amounts attached to and awarded for each claim is discussed immediately 
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below. Many of the facts and damages claimed by Branson overlap between his various 
claims. Marvin prevailed on the following pretrial claims: 
1. Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty Claims (including the related claims of constructive trust, money had and received, and 
disproportionate family payments) was granted. See this Court's January 9, 2007 
Memorandum Decision. Branson claimed damages of $975,000.00. 
2. Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Fraud, Fraudulent 
Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims regarding Aspen Springs (including the 
related claims of constructive trust, money had and received, and disproportionate family 
payments) was granted. See this Court's January 9, 2007 Memorandum Decision. Branson 
claimed damages of $975,000.00. 
3. Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Lost Corporate 
Opportunity claim regarding Aspen Springs (this claim was based on fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duty theories) was granted. See this Court's January 9, 2007 Memorandum Decision. 
Branson claimed damages of $975,000.00. 
4. Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Fraud, Fraudulent 
Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure Claims on ABCO's value was granted. See this 
Court's January 9, 2007 Memorandum Decision. Branson claimed damages of $623,000.00. 
5. Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's other Fraud, Fraudulent 
Concealment, Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims was granted. See this Court's January 9, 2007 
Memorandum Decision. Branson claimed damages any where from $63,000.00 to 
$623,000.00. 
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6. Marvin's Motion for Summary Judgment on Branson's Misrepresentation 
claims was granted. See this Court's January 9, 2007 Memorandum Decision. Branson 
claimed damages of $975,000.00. 
7. Branson's Motion to Void the Contract, stating it was an Agreement to Agree, 
was denied. See ruling dated July 6, 2006. Branson claimed damages between $623,000.00 to 
$3,552,496.00. 
8. Branson's Claim that there was No Contract Due to a Failure of Condition 
precedent was denied. Branson claimed damages of $623,000.00 to $3,552,496.00. 
9. Branson's Claim that there was No Contract since there was No Meeting of the 
Minds was denied. Branson claimed damages of $623,000.00 to $3,552,496.00. 
10. Branson's Claim that there was Fraud in the Inducement to Sign the Contract 
was denied. Plaintiff claimed damages of $623,000.00 to $3,552,496.00. 
11. Branson's complete attempt to Rescind the Contract for fraud, material 
misrepresentation, mistake, failure to perform, incomplete contract, failure and condition 
precedent, and every other claim was also denied. Branson claimed damages of $623,000.00 to 
$3,552,496.00. 
12. Branson's attempt to obtain Declaratory Relief on the Salary Continuation Plan 
was denied. Plaintiff claimed damages of $210,822.00. 
13. Branson was required by the Court to submit proof of his Prima Facie Case 
Regarding Punitive Damages; however the Court determined that Marvin had already 
submitted enough financial discovery. Plaintiff claimed treble damages under the tort claims, 
all of which were dismissed either pre-trial or during the trial. 
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14. Marvin filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Branson's Expert Witnesses and 
Appraisals regarding damages all calculated after December 13, 1999, and the Court granted 
Marvin's request and denied Branson the ability to bring in expert witnesses on values that had 
nothing to do with the contract. Plaintiff claimed damages of $3,552,496.00. 
15. Branson's attempt to bring in Extrinsic and Parole Evidence to Set Aside the 
Contract was denied and the court limited parole evidence merely to explain ambiguous terms 
regarding the contract, finding the contract was partially integrated. (January 9, 2007 decision.) 
16. Branson's claims for Malicious Prosecution and Civil Contempt were denied. 
See this Court's January 9,2007 Memorandum Decision. 
17. Branson voluntarily dismissed his claim for conversion, because it was based on 
the same facts as in the fraud type claims. 
After addressing the foregoing claims prior to trial, the Court allowed Branson to try the 
following claims before the jury: 
1. Branson's Salary Continuation Plan claim in the context he could have worked 
ten years for ABCO under paragraph 9 of the contract. Branson sought $210,822.00 in present 
value damages, or $112,500.00 for ten years, or about $131,00.00 in cash surrender value, but 
was awarded nothing. 
2. Branson's claim to health insurance until 65 under paragraph 3 of the contract 
with gap coverage for six months. Branson sought $3,600.00 plus $1,261.00 in interest 
($4,861.00) but was awarded nothing. 
3. Branson's claim to one-half of the equipment of ABCO under paragraph 4 of the 
contract for loss of use. Branson sought $250,000.00 plus interest of $175,068.00 (total 
$425,068.00); however, Branson was awarded nothing. 
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4. Branson's quiet title claim to 4.19 acres behind Marvin's house under paragraph 
6 of the contract, Branson sought $250,000.00 plus interest of $175,068.00 (total $425,068.00) 
but was awarded nothing. 
5. Branson's claim that he lost the ability to work or use his home and farm to 
bond with as well as the Guardian insurance policy under paragraph 6 of the contract and his 
inability to work Big Sky construction jobs. Branson sought over $250,000.00 plus interest of 
$175,068.00 (total of $425,068.00); however, Branson was awarded nothing. 
6. Branson's claim that he lost profits when he could not build a subdivision on his 
farm property or bond under the claim of slander of title or under paragraph 6 of the contract. 
Branson sought over $250,000.00 in lost sales (less $55,200) or $194,800.00, plus $180,000.00 
in lost building profits (total of $374,800.00); however, Branson was awarded nothing and the 
claim was treated as unmeritorious. 
7. Branson's claim for Marvin's nonpayment of $16,230.00 for the buy/sell policy 
plus interest of $11344.00 (total of $27,574.00) under paragraph 8 of the contract. Branson 
was awarded nothing. 
8. Branson's claim that he was entitled to one-half of the profits from the Buck and 
Bawiew jobs under paragraph 7 of the contract. Marvin was granted a directed verdict and 
Branson was awarded nothing. 
9. Branson's claim for breach of fiduciary duty for failure to wind up the division 
of the partnership timely and various claims in relation thereto. Branson was awarded zero 
damages and the Judge held this claim as unmeritorious. 
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10. Branson's claim for breach of contract in the performance of paragraph 4 the 
contract. Branson sought $8,200.00 for the missing tractor blades and $5,742.00 in interest 
(total of $ 13,942.00). We believe the jury awarded Branson $9,000.00 related to this claim. 
11. Branson's parole evidence claim for damages to repair the farm and remodel the 
rental home for over $24,000.00. Branson was awarded nothing. 
12. Branson's claim for assault and battery. Branson sought $1.00; and Branson 
was only awarded $1.00 (this is not a compensable attorney fee claim). 
13. Branson dismissed his claims for defamation/false light/invasion of privacy at 
trial when he realized Marvin would call a witness who would corroborate the truth behind 
Branson's actions. 
14. Branson's claim for farm payments and Westco accounting under paragraph 5 of 
the contract. Branson had been paid and Branson was awarded nothing. 
I. MARVIN IS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THE ASPEN SPRINGS/ABCO 
PORTION OF THIS BIFURCATED LAWSUIT 
A. Award of attorney fees based on the Contract Buyout documents. This Court 
has already ruled that the Buyout documents and employment agreement in this case had 
specific provisions awarding attorney fees to the non defaulting party, or non-breaching party, 
or the prevailing party. The language of the Stock Redemption Agreement of December 20, 
1999 paragraph 9.11 contract specifically states: 
"The parties agree that should either party default in or be in 
breach of any of the covenants, or agreements or representations, 
or warranties herein contained, the non defaulting party, or the non 
breaching party (or in the event litigation was commenced, the 
prevailing party) shall be entitled to all costs and expenses, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees and expert witness' (whether 
an action has been commenced or not) which may arise or accrue 
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from enforcing any of the terms of this agreement or terminating 
this agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or 
by applicable law (before or after judgment).5' 
Notice, this includes enforcing any terms of the agreement (i.e. before trial). 
In Mountain States Broadcasting Company v. Neale, 116 P.2d 643 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) the Court set forth the ground rules for determining who is the prevailing party. The 
Court, in simple cases, used the "net judgment" rule and in complex cases, the "flexible and 
reasonable approach": 
"Typically, determining the prevailing for purposes of awarding 
fees and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues Defendant for money 
damages; if Plaintiff is awarded a judgment, Plaintiff has 
prevailed, and if Defendant successfully defends and avoids an 
adverse judgment. Defendant has prevailed. However, this simple 
analysis cannot be employed here because both Plaintiff and 
Defendant obtained some monetary relief against the other. A 
review of the relevant case law convinces us that under the 
provision at issue, there can be only one prevailing party even 
though both Plaintiff and Defendant are awarded some damages 
on claims arising from the same transaction.... We hold that in 
the present circumstances the party in whose favor the "net" 
judgment is entered must be considered the prevailing party and 
is entitled to an award of it's fees." Id. at \ 648. {emphasis 
added) 
In addition, Mountain States held in footnote number 7 the following: 
"The determination of a prevailing party becomes even more 
complicated in cases involving multiple claims and parties; the 
granting of non monetary relief to one or more parties; and where 
the ultimate award of money damages does not adequately 
represent the actual success of the parties under the peculiar 
posture of the case. These cases demonstrate the need for a 
flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases 
who actually is the prevailing party." (Emphasis added). 
The case of Branson Neff v. Marvin Neff involves multiple claims and parties. Marvin 
Neff successfully defended against and avoided adverse judgments in hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. Marvin was granted non-monetary relief in several of the pretrial summary judgment 
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motions or defenses during the jury trial. If you added up all the damages avoided, Marvin 
would prevail under a net judgment rule. Marvin Neff s ultimate award of $1.00 breach of 
contract damages, which is all he asked for, does not adequately represent the actual success of 
Marvin Neff under the particular posture of the ABCO/Aspen Springs case. For that reason, 
this Court should rule Marvin prevailed under either the net judgment rule or under the 
"flexible and reasoned" approach. 
A flexible and reasonable approach to determine who is actually the prevailing party 
was flushed out in the case of R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook 2002 UT 11 at 1f25, 40 P.3d 1119 
(Utah 2002) as well as J. Pochynokco., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, 116 P.3d 353 (2005); 
A.K.R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270 (2004). The 
appropriate consideration in determining the prevailing party under the reasonable and flexible 
approach include: 
1. Looking at the contractual language; 
2. Considering the number of claims, counterclaims and cross 
claims etc; 
3. Considering the importance of the claims relative to each other; 
4. Considering the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in 
connection with the various claims. R. T. Nielson Co., at 
125. 
The Court already considered these same factors when it looked at Branson's request 
for attorney fees under breach of contract. The Court found that the contractual language 
already allows the prevailing party to be awarded attorney fees. The Court found that both 
parties had brought numerous claims under the Complaint and Counterclaim. The Court 
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specifically stated that many of Branson's claims were brought unmeritoriously and he so ruled 
and gave an example of that of fraud. The Court found "After all the time spent litigating that 
issue, the Plaintiff was unable to show any evidence to support the claim of fraud" in trying to 
set the contract aside or seeking one-half QA) of Aspen Springs value. Regarding the third 
element, the Court already held that much of the focus of the Plaintiffs lawsuit was on fraud, 
allegations of fraud, breach of contract, protective orders, assault claims and property. The 
Court held that the property issues were basically worthless. Most of the property was junk and 
pure unadulterated garbage. The Judge specifically held that those claims by Branson were 
unmeritorious. The breach of fiduciary duty and slander of title claim were also ruled as 
unmeritorious. Branson suffered no damages, there were no damages presented, there was no 
evidence competently received in support of any damages. The Court stated "Frankly I think 
his (Branson's) claim for slander of title damages, if made at all, was entirely unmeritorious". 
When the Court looked at the importance of the claims, the number of the claims and the dollar 
amounts that were awarded in connection therewith, the Court basically found under the 
"reasoned and flexible approach" that Branson was not the prevailing party and awarded him 
no attorney fees. I might add that under the Mountain States decision there can be only one 
prevailing party, and since Branson was not the prevailing party, Marvin Neff must be, at lease 
on all the pretrial recession attempts by Branson. 
Branson asserted at least fourteen different claims at trial, seeking a combined total of 
$1,931,204.00 in damages, and Branson only received $9,000.00 in contract breach related 
damages. The Court has ruled that neither party will be awarded attorney fees on the contract 
breach claims, but has yet to rule or even consider the enforcement of the contract prior to trial 
and Marvin's successful avoidance of adverse judgment on several issues. Moreover, as for 
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issues of contract, Marvin prevailed by directed verdict at trial on 4 of the 9 contract issues and 
by jury verdict on four (4) or more contract issues. Thus Marvin prevailed at trial on eight (8) 
out of nine (9) contract claims by defending and enforcing the contract. 
With respect to Marvin's five simple counterclaims, the most important of which was 
the breach of contract claim, the jury found that Branson had breached the contract with Marvin 
and awarded Marvin 100% of the damages sought. The Court has ruled that neither party will 
be awarded attorney fees on the breach of contract issues. However, Marvin's main focus was 
not on breach of the contract, but only to defend against and avoid Branson's claims to set the 
contract aside. Marvin proved he had performed the contract. 
When looking at the case as a whole, Branson asked for over $3,500,000.00 in damages 
related to this litigation; however, the jury only awarded him a total of $9,001.00 in damages. 
Since Marvin prevailed on all pretrial issues, prevailed on all but one contract issue during trial 
(either by directed verdict or verdict), and was awarded everything he asked for on his breach 
of contract claim and assault claim, this Court should determine that Marvin is the prevailing 
party under either the flexible approach on net judgment rule on the contract rescission claims 
in enforcing the contract and in avoiding an adverse judgment. 
II. MARVIN IS ENTITLED TO HIS PRETRIAL ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
IN THE ASPEN SPRINGS/ABCO PORTION OF THIS BIFURCATED 
LAWSUIT 
Pretrial Contract Enforcement 
This Court has already determined that the contracts at issue in this case are valid and 
enforceable. Moreover, since the parties to this litigation have acknowledged during this 
litigation that the contracts are subject to an attorney fees provision, an award of attorney fees 
to the prevailing party for enforcing the contract is proper. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 
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2004 UT 85, ^[23. Consequently, as the prevailing party with respect to validating, upholding 
and enforcing the contract, Marvin is entitled to his attorney fees and costs. 
Branson has argued vigorously to rescind, set aside, or undue the contract under several 
complicated theories. Consequently, Marvin had to strenuously defend his position that the 
contracts were valid and enforceable. As previously mentioned, this Court determined that the 
contracts were in fact valid and enforceable, and the parties subsequently acknowledged that 
the prevailing party is allowed to recover his attorney fees pursuant to the contracts. Id. Utah 
law provides that when a party has to defend against a claim for contract rescission, such a 
defense is litigation to enforce the contract; and if a party mounts a successful defense of the 
contract, he is entitled to attorney fees and costs as provided in the contract. Bilanzich v. 
Lonetti, 2005 UT App 522, f3; Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, f 17. Note the majority, if 
not all of Branson's claims, related to setting the contract aside for fraud, fraudulent 
inducement, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, no meeting of the minds, 
unenforceable agreement to agree, parole evidence, condition precedent, duress, or for other 
reasons. Marvin successfully defended against each claim and should be awarded attorney fees 
to enforce the contract. 
In addition to his attorney fees related to motions for summary judgment on the contract 
enforcement issue, Marvin is entitled to his litigation costs that would be included under a 
regular Rule 54(d) cost award as well as those litigation expenses not normally included under 
a regular Rule 54(d) cost award. Chase at %LQ\ Utah R. Civ? P. 54(d). The contract states 
Marvin is entitled to all costs and expenses, including expert witness costs. 
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III. MARVIN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES TO SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND 
AGAINST BRANSON'S TORT CLAIMS OF SLANDER OF TITLE AND 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
The Reciprocal Statute on attorney fees § 78-27-56.5 allows Marvin to an award of fees 
to successfully defend the slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims. The statute on 
reciprocal attorney fees, § 78-27-56.5 states: 
"A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the 
provisions allow at least one party to recover attorney fees." 
Although this reciprocal application is for written contracts, it should by analogy 
likewise apply in breach of Fiduciary Duty and Slander of Title claims (i.e. torts). The Court 
has already said Branson's breach of fiduciary duty claim sounds in contract breach and the 
slander of title claim was for failing to timely sign contract deeds. Both parties have already 
agreed, by jury instructions and case law, that attorney fees are awardable for slander of title 
and breach of fiduciary duty. When Marvin successfully defends against these tort claims and 
avoids adverse judgment, he should be treated as the prevailing party. Defendants should 
receive all their costs and fees to successfully defend and avoid Branson's claims for judgment. 
See generally, Crowly v. Black, 2007 Utah App. 245; 582 Utah Adv. Rpt. 6; 2007 Utah App. 
Lexis 247. Marvin prevailed on the slander of title defense with a Judgment N.O.V. The jury 
awarded no damages on the breach of fiduciary duty claim so Marvin successfully defended as 
the Court has already held. 
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IV. MARVIN HAS PROPERLY APPLIED FOR HIS ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS. 
Marvin considers the Court's previous Order awarding neither party attorney fees on 
contract breach claims improper sine Marvin had not yet filed a request and no evidence was 
before the court. Nonetheless, Marvin is now filing a request on non-breach issues. 
In Utah, an attorney fee application must reasonably allocate time incurred between 
compensable and non-compensable claims. Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 
109, f l5 . Unlike Branson's application for attorney fees, Marvin is not arguing that he is 
entitled to attorney fees for assault, Bowen cross claim, protective orders, restraining orders, or 
other non-compensable claims. Nor is Marvin arguing that Brown entitles him to all of his 
attorney fees that are indirectly related to compensable claims that are tangentially linked to the 
contract claims upon which Marvin prevailed. Rather, Marvin is seeking attorney fees and 
costs for the clearly compensable contract enforcement claims, including successfully 
defending against Branson's contract rescission attempts, and defense of slander of title and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
As required, Marvin has submitted in the accompanying Attorney Fee Affidavit, in 
sufficient detail, his attorney fees and costs related to the compensable claims upon which he 
prevailed. Marvin has reviewed the billing records and eliminated any fees and costs related to 
non-compensable claims or work and separated the Manila Ranch case and Travis Bowen cross 
claim entirely out. For instance, Marvin never included any fees for general discovery, 
protective orders, assault, the trial for breach of contract, or other non-compensable claims. 
With respect to the reasonableness of the attorney fees and costs, the factors enumerated 
in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985) are helpful to the Court's determination. 
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The Cabrera court stated that court may consider, among other factors, the difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the 
number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and 
experience of the attorneys involved. Id; see also Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 , 893 
(Utah 1996). 
Marvin's fees are reasonable. While the claims in the litigation were complex and 
convoluted, Branson's unrelenting litigious nature and persistence that the contract was void 
for fraud made the litigation even more difficult. Marvin was efficient and reasonable in the 
presentation of the case by voluntarily limiting his claims and issues and engaging in litigation 
only when forced to defend himself from Branson's numerous unsuccessful and unmeritorious 
positions. Marvin tried to eliminate several of Branson's claims using the statute of limitations 
or other pre-trial motions. In a demonstration of reasonableness, Marvin's attorney's hourly 
rate is significantly less that Branson's attorney's hourly rate. Moreover, the aggregate time 
spent by Marvin's attorney on the case is significantly less than the time Branson's attorney 
spent on the case. With respect to experience and expertise, Marvin's attorneys have been 
litigating for nearly 22 to 30 years, respectively. Marvin had set forth several settlement offers 
to Branson prior to trial that exceeded the jury verdict by thousands of dollars. Marvin tried to 
work this out without litigation but was left without a choice. To let Branson financially 
destroy his brother through years of litigation on unmeritorious claims is unjust. Marvin is 
entitled to a significant attorney fee award to send a message this litigation needs to end. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Marvin respectfully requests that the Court award him 
$$300,592.50 in attorney fees and $56,474.86 in costs associated with the aforementioned 
compensable claims. Marvin also requests that the Court make specific findings of fact to 
support the award of attorney fees and costs. 
DATED this _ _ ^ day of November, 2007. 
OLSON & HOGGAN P.C. 
~^m 
Marlin J. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this d\0 day of November, 2007, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MARVIN MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS (ASPEN 
SPRINGS/ABCO, postage prepaid, to the following: 
James E. Magleby 
Magleby & Greenwood, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
C:\MyFi\cs\FlLESNMJG\neff.aspeii springs.memorandum in supportattorney fees 9-1-07.doc 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
BRANSON NEFF, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARVIN G. NEFF, et al, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARLIN J. GRANT 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS IN 
THE ABCO/ASPEN SPRINGS 
BUYOUT CASE 
Civil No. 030100275 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Box Elder ) 
COMES NOW, Marlin J. Grant, of Olson & Hoggan, P.C, being first duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and state the same to be true, 
except as to those matters of opinion, which I submit as an expert and believe the same to be true. 
2. I am a licensed and practicing attorney since 1985 in the State of Utah. I have 
practiced law primarily involving civil and criminal litigation for more than 22 years. My practice 
has been centered in Cache County, but I have practiced in many counties throughout the State, 
Martin J. Grant's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees 
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including having conducted a number of cases situated in Box Elder County, Weber County, Davis 
County, and Salt Lake County. I have tried numerous bench trials, many of them before Judge 
Gordon Low. 
3. The law firm of Olson & Hoggan, P.C. is an AV rated firm by Martindale Hubbell. 
4. I am the attorney of record in the above entitled case and have personal knowledge of 
the issues of this controversy. I have represented Marvin Neff and ABCO Construction Company for 
approximately eight (8) years, been a city attorney for Tremonton City, trying hundreds of cases 
involving petty theft, shoplifting, and various dishonest misdemeanors. I am also very familiar with 
trusts, wills, and probate matters, having drafted hundreds of wills and trusts for clients and trying 
several probate actions. 
5. Attorney fees in Box Elder and Cache Counties are customarily contracted for and 
charged on an hourly basis. Cases of contingency fee are only a small minority of those cases 
handled by attorneys in those counties. Hourly rates customarily charged by attorneys for cases in 
those counties for the period of time between February 2005 through August 2007 (when this lawsuit 
and counterclaim was filed) ranged from $100.00 to $200.00 per hour, with the average rate during 
that same period of time being between $125.00 to $150.00 per hour. However, fees charged and 
paid between $ 150.00 to $200.00 per hour for that same period of time were customarily for services 
rendered by attorneys with fifteen (15) or more years of experience, and who, through professional 
experience, have developed a high and outstanding professional reputation. 
6. Jim Jenkins and myself customarily charged $200.00 per hour during that time and 
David Larsen, an attorney of several years who is a member of our firm, charged $175.00 an hour. 
Kelly Smith, another attorney, charged $135.00 an hour, and our paralegals charged $35.00 an hour. 
Any initials of "cm," "mde," were paralegals. Our law clerks charged $65.00 an hour. Our legal 
associates charge approximately $125.00 an hour. These are the rates customarily charged in both 
locales of Cache County and Box Elder County and are needed in litigation trial work because much 
of the research, deposition reviews, and exhibit gathering, is done by paralegals, clerks or associates 
at a greatly reduced price for the benefit and efficiency of the case. 
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7. Branson Neff had told Marvin Neff as well as Mike Gale and others that he did not 
care how much he spent suing Marvin Neff and that one of his primary objectives was to financially 
destroy his brother for allegedly cheating him out of ABCO. 
8. Mike Gale specifically testified at trial that Branson Neff was jealous of Marvin, that 
he couldn't accept the fact that ABCO continued to make money without him, and that he was going 
to destroy Marvin Neff and ABCO. 
9. From the very beginning, Marvin Neff had to defend against several unmeritorious 
claims brought by Branson Neff (Branson filed over 17 claims against Marvin Neff, some of which 
overlapped one another). 
10. Marvin Neff tried to settle the case at the very first, informing Branson that there was 
a valid and binding contract signed by the parties that would be enforced and to just resolve any 
outstanding issues under the contract. Branson refused, claiming that the contract was merely an 
agreement to agree, was not binding, was void for fraud, and that he was going to set it aside and 
obtain one-half Q/i) of Aspen Springs as well as his rightful one-half QA) of the total value of ABCO 
as of the date of the lawsuit. 
11. To begin this procedure, Branson argued in Court before Judge Low that he needed 
the books opened on ABCO, that he felt there were two sets of books, that Marvin had been cooking 
the books and had embezzled money from him, and brought up the fact that Marvin Neff had 
obtained a $1 million life insurance policy paying a $20,000.00 premium in 1999 without his 
knowledge, which he considered outright fraud. 
12. The Court ordered the accounting, and the brothers paid over $20,000.00 a piece to 
James & Co. The James and Co. Report in Finding on Insurance Policies, Appendix D, page 25, 
Finding #C. 1 .A. had total premiums paid by ABCO of at least $ 193,261.00 for Branson Neff, and at 
least $127,140.00 for Marvin Neff. Thus, Branson actually outspent Marvin on life insurance 
premiums by over $66,121.00. Notice also in that very same Finding in paragraph C. 1 .B. and C. that 
Branson took $13,788.00 out of a cash surrender value policy and paid another premium on himself 
and let the policy lapse. Regarding Branson's alleged fraud claim that Marvin had embezzled a $1 
million life insurance, Finding CLE. specifically stated that in 1998 Marvin applied for a policy 
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with Guardian and received several different proposals, but in December of 1998 a policy was issued 
with a death benefit of $677,578.00 (not the million dollars claimed by Branson, and the annual 
premium was only $15,600.00 (not the $20,000.00 claimed by Branson). Again, even with this 
entire premium as paid on the policy included in the James Report, Branson still outspent Marvin 
$66,000.00 in insurance benefits taken from the company. 
13. I might also add from Appendix C of the James and Co. Report, page 28, paragraph F 
regarding the Salary Continuation Policy, the accountant specifically found that the Salary 
Continuation Policy remained with ABCO because Branson Neff did not fulfill his obligation of 
remaining in the employment of ABCO until retirement at age 67. Nonetheless, this Court knows 
that Branson continued to fight the Salary Continuation Policy all the way through the jury trial 
where they clearly issued a jury verdict that the Salary Continuation Plan was part of ABCO's assets, 
which had already been split between the brothers. Branson was not entitled to anything more, 
| exactly what Dan James found in the first place. I point this out to show Branson's litigious nature 
and unwillingness to accept findings that he now claims to rely upon. 
14. After the James and Co. Report came out, Judge Low stated that if we are only 
$ 18,000.00 apart, that Judge Low could see absolutely no reason why the two brothers were fighting 
over such a small amount. We agreed and would have paid that and more to settle the case, even 
though the Findings by Dan James left out over $57,000.00 Marvin paid personally to ABCO on the 
Aspen Springs claim. 
15. In fact, mediation was held with Paul Felt in October of 2004 (the James and Co., 
Report was issued February 12,2004) where Marvin Neff attempted to settle this entire claim out of 
Court. At this mediation, Marvin Neff offered to let Branson Neff have all of the Manila Ranch 
J Property, including Marvin's one-half (Yi) share, which we valued on October 4,2004 to be worth 
$100,000.00, plus 26 more acres that were worth about $50,000.00, fox a total of $150,000.00. 
Marvin also was willing to pay Branson's Salary Continuation benefits over the next ten (10) years at 
$10,000.00 a year, or $100,000.00. The Court first ruled Branson was not entitled to the Salary 
Continuation, then ruled regarding the Salary Continuation benefit during trial that if it indeed was 
not part of ABCO assets or the value in the buyout, then Branson would be awarded a portion of 
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those benefits, which the Court found to be approximately $ 10,000.00 each year over ten (10) years. 
Branson refused to settle on these numbers and instead sought a value of over $250,000.00 for lost 
wages and over $210,000.00 on the plan itself. Branson also countered in mediation asking for well 
over $800,000.00 to $900,000.00. 
16. I point this out because Branson was only awarded $9,000.00 from the jury on the 
entire case. Marvin Neff was willing to help his brother in any way he could, even though he never 
owed it to him, just to avoid further litigation. Branson continued to litigate over unmeritorious 
claims, rejecting all reasonable offers and running up attorney fees needlessly. 
17. Branson Neff turned Marvin Neff over to the Bishop and Stake President to be 
excommunicated during the lawsuit, claiming that Marvin Neff had stole his house and farm out 
from under him. Branson continued all the way through the trial to claim that Marvin Neff had 
stolen his house and farm seeking $425,000.00 plus in slander of title damages. This Court warned 
Branson Neff in the January 9,2007 Memorandum Decision that the slander of title claim was not 
supported by any damages, and could probably be dismissed but let Branson try to prove damages. 
Branson wasted the entire trial trying to prove slander of title damages, and the jury awarded zero 
damages, and the Court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Branson, failed to 
show any damages. 
18. This was consistent with Branson's litigious nature in view of unmeritorious claims 
and his desire to spend whatever it took to financially ruin Marvin Neff and ABCO. 
19. Branson Neff continued to use a shotgun approach, seeking any theory to avoid his 
arms length bargain with Marvin Neff on the buyout. 
20. Branson Neff sought millions of dollars in damages regarding Aspen Springs, and 
millions of dollars of damages on the value of ABCO, using theories of fraud, fraudulent 
concealment, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, breach of fiduciary duty and other 
similar misrepresentation type claims to convince the Court that he was entitled to have everything 
set aside and to start over from scratch. After more than four (4) years of litigating those issues, the 
Court held in the January 9, 2007 ruling, that after exercising patience with the parties' excessive 
briefing practice and an effort to properly sift through the materiality of the presentment of an 
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exuberant number of facts in light of the arguments proffered, that it was going to decide once and 
for all if Plaintiff had made any showing of fraud to support his claims. The Court ruled on page 9 
and 10 that Plaintiff had not substantiated any evidence of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. The 
Court waited for over four (4) years for Plaintiff to advance a legitimate argument on fraud, and since 
none existed, granted summary judgment. The Court also went on to hold that the Property 
Settlement Agreement, although vague in parts, was a partial integration given Defendant's receipt of 
significant benefits of the Agreement. The Court stated: 
"In harmony with previous Court decisions, the Court holds under the undisputed 
facts, that the Property Settlement Agreement was entered into after the parties 
discussed the overall worth of ABCO and coming to some resolution regarding a 
dissolution that Plaintiff would get the farm plus some cash incentives, and the 
Defendant would get the corporation's, business assets, minus some use and value 
given to Plaintiff." 
The Court further held in April 16,2007 decision that Branson's claims, which were largely founded 
on fraud were entirely unmeritorious. 
21. Because Marvin had to defend himself against Plaintiffs continual and repeated 
attack on all of these issues, the fees were reasonably and legitimately incurred to defend, uphold, 
and enforce the contract. 
22. Marvin filed a Motion for Summary Judgment early on in this case to uphold the 
binding nature of the contract and the Court was ultimately granted that Motion. Marvin tried to 
efficiently resolve this case by pairing down the relevant issues to what was truly just and legitimate 
for the jury. 
I 23. Marlin Grant has personally reviewed all of the Olson & Hoggan bills for attorney 
ifees relating solely to enforcing the contract documents in the Buyout case. 
24. Proving and defending the contracts enforceability was a very tedious and 
complicated process, because Branson continued to assert it was void for fraud. Branson thought of 
nearly every theory available to set the contract aside, and Marvin had to vigorously defend. 
25. Marvin successfully defended the contract and its enforcement. Marvin reduced the 
issues for trial, shortened the trial time greatly, and prevailed 100% on the pre-trial issues. 
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26. Marvin prevailed 100% on his breach of contract claim as noted in the jury verdict, 
but the Court granted no attorney fees for this. 
27. The total fees expended prior to trial to enforce the contract (in this very complicated 
case, which was made worse by Branson's recalcitrance and desire to financially destroy Marvin & 
ABCO) was $300,592.50. (See attorney fee worksheets attached). We eliminated all fees incurred 
during trial to avoid any argument on whether those were for the issue of breach of contract. 
28. The total costs incurred, including deposition fees, witness fees, expert witness fees, 
and counterclaim filing fees, totaled $56,474.86. 
29. The accounting records are kept by Olson & Hoggan in a normal course of business 
and are a true and accurate representation of the reasonable attorney fees and the reasonable costs 
expended in the Buyout case. (See print out attached) We have excluded all fees incurred on non-
compensable issues such as assault, protective orders, malicious prosecution defense, Travis Bowen 
issues, and others. 
30. The fees and costs listed were for the contract enforcement claims upon which Marvin 
was the prevailing party and which fees were necessarily incurred. 
DATED this "%b day of November, 2007. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
Marlin J. Grant's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees 
and Costs in the ABCO/Aspen Springs Buyout Case 
Branson Neff v. Marvin G. Nefif et. al 
Civil No. 0300100275 
Page 7 of 8 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Box Elder ) 
MARLIN J. GRANT, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: That he has read the 
foregoing Affidavit, knows and understands the contents thereof, and that the same are true of his 
own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and belief; and as to such believes 
them to be true. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ day of November, 2007 
NOTARYPUBUC 
ASHLEY BROOKE CREECH 
My Commission Expires 
10-16-20 T1 
130S Main Suite 200 
Logan, Utan 84321 
. mTSQFUTdB NOTARY PU 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this $ft* day of November, 2007,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARLIN J. GRANT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS IN THE ABCO/ASPEN SPRINGS BUYOUT CASE, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
James E. Magleby 
Magleby & Greenwood, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
C:\MyFiles\FILES\MJG\NEFF.AFFIDAVIT OF MARLIN IN SUPPORT OF ATTY FEES.aspen springs.doc 
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HOGGAN, P C 
NEYS AT LAW 
MAIN, SUITE 200 
BOX 525 
AH 84323-0525 
) 752-1551 
4TON OFFICE 
EAST MAIN 
BOX 115 
DN, UTAH 84337 
) 257-3885 
NEFF VS. NEFF 
N-4759.10 
EXHIBIT ON 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Total attorney fees incurred between October 2002 and February 28, 
2007: $410,889.00| 
Of the total attorney fees incurred in the entire case, the following 
attorney fees were attributable to items that were either noncompensable 
or unrelated to our current attorney fee request. 
a. Change of Venue Motion and Order, in November 2002 
and February 2003. $900.001 
b. General Discovery Requests and General Disclosures of $5,950.001 
c. Letters and meetings with Dan James, where motions 
regarding Dan James $9,281.501 
d. Salary Continuation arguments, since the Salary 
Continuation did not have an attorney fee clause. 
e. Lis Pendens. Marvin Neff s lis pendens argument 
somewhat related to the slander of title argument, and 
since Mr. Neff was awarded no damages thereon, attorney 
fees argued for were deleted. $3,427.50 
f. Mediation with Paul Felt on October 12 to October 19, 
2004 $1,800.00 
g. Manila Ranch portion of the case during the above time 
frame $15,378.50 
h. Assault and Battery Claim $2,570.00 
i. Involvement with Travis Bowen $2,956.00 
j . Protective Order Arguments $350.00 
k. Punitive Damage Responses $366.00 
1- Defense against Branson's Attorney Fee Claim $16,718.01 
m. Trial Attorney Fees $50,599.0( 
TOTAL: 
$110,296.50 
$410,889.00 
- $110,296.50 
$300.592.50 
3. All attorney fees attributable to either enforcing the contract, 
defending the contract, or prior to trial are: (See detail of 
attorney fees attached) $300,592.50 
4. Costs incurred to defend the contract: 
a. Payment to Dan James & Company for audit $20,691.04 
b. Payment to Brad Townsend of Norman & Townsend as 
an expert witness. $20,535.06 
c. Payment to Senior Judge Sawaya to sit as a Special 
Master during depositions. $ 1,962.501 
d. Deposition Fees 
1. Q&A Reporting $5,080.861 
2. Depomax Reporting* $2,888.281 
3. Q&A Reporting* $5,045.621 
e. Witness Fees* $181.50 
f. Cost of Filing Counterclaim* $90.00 
TOTAL COSTS: $56.474.86 
*Note that the total costs on above items through that date was $13,202.57 just on depositions, 
witnesses and Court costs and we left out all of the photo costs, faxes, Kinkos, and other research costs. 
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OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
88 WEST CENTER 
P.O. BOX 525 
LOGAN, UT 84323-0525 
Invoice submitted to: 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
1835SHWY89 
PERRY, UT 84302, 
February 28, 2007 
In Reference To: N-4759 
Professional Services 
BRANSON NEFF/N-4759.010 
11/4/2002- MJG Office visit. 
11/7/2002- MJG Phone call. 
11/8/2002 - MJG Review of file; visit with Marvin. 
J 11/11/2002 - MJG Drafting motion for change of Venue; drafting answer and 
•— office visit with Marv. 
11/12/2002 - MJG Phone calls and drafting counterclaim and answer changes. 
/ ^Q1 /14 /2002 - MJG Drafting motion to strike/t> fr^v/WVf ' 
11/15/2002- MJG Countercliam drafted. 
11/18/2002- MJG Phone call. 
11/25/2002 - MJG Drafting counterclaim and crossclaim matters. 
if 
/ 11/26/2002 - MJG Finalize counterclaim. 
/ft 
Hours Tax# _ 
4.00 
0.25 
4.00 
5.00 
3.00 
2.50 
1.50 
0.50 
2.00 
1.00 
2.60 
Amount 
600.00 
37.50 
600.00 
750.00 
450.00 
375.00 
225.00 
75.00 
300.00 
150.00 
169.00 12/20/2002 - JRG Legal research Parol evidence cases and integretion contract 
clauses; draft motion for summary judgment. 
12/23/2002 - JRG Legal research Summary Judgment memorandum. 5.20 338.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
1/17/2003-
1/20/2003 • 
1/21/2003 • 
1/22/2003 • 
1/23/2003 • 
1/24/2003 • 
Z^I/27/2003 
y /1/28/2003-
r \t 1/30/2003 • 
2/3/2003 • 
2/4/2003 -
MJG Review of file and placing items in organized fashion 
MJG Going over documents, initial disclosures 
MJG Office conference 
MJG Disclosure of witness and matters 
MJG Looking over documents 
MJG Phone calls and drafting initial disclosures 
MJG Drafting complaint and matters 
MJG Letter 
MJG Drafting complaint and matters 
MJG Finalize papers 
MJG Reviewed all disclosure documents and office visit with Marv 
MJG Finalizing discovery matters and letter on medical insurance 
MJG Review of disclosure letters 
MJG Phone call to Marv, review, and objections reviewed 
MJG Review of documents and matters 
MJG Letter to Marv on additional notes 
MJG Drafting reply to motion to appoint and matters 
MJG Finalize and reply 
MJG Finalize response on special master 
MJG Drafting order on change of venue, phone call to Marv 
MJG Office conference with Marv on case 
MJG Research on promissory and recession 
MJG Drafting Summary Judgment 
MJG Motion for Summary Judgment 
MJG Finalize affidavit and exhibits and Summary Judgment motion 
Hours Tax# 
1 00 
5 00 
100 
100 
100 
150 
150 
0 75 
1 00 
0 25 
125 
100 
1 50 
0 50 
0 50 
0 25 
4 00 
0 50 
1 00 
1 00 
2 00 
0 75 
3 00 
0 50 
1 50 
Page 2 
Amount 
150 00 
750 00 
150 00 
150 00 
150 00 
225 00 
225 00 
112 50 
150 00 
37 50 
187 50 
150 00 
225 00 
75 00 
75 00 
37 50 
600 00 
75 00 
150 00 
150 00 
300 00 
11250 
450 00 
75 00 
225 00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
I 4/3/2003 - MJG Drafts sent out and exhibits prepared. 
A. 4 
itf-
/9/2003 - MJG Drafting Summary Judgment and changes. 
^ r l__ 4/28/2003 - MJG Drafting written deposition on Richard Pett. 
4/29/2003- MJG Review. 
4/30/2003 - MJG Office conference. 
5/2/2003 - MJG Letter and matters. 
i*t-
/ 
5/12/2003 - MJG Review of interrogatories and request for production of 
documents. 
5/14/2003- MJG Phone call. 
5/20/2003 - MJG Office conference with Marv Neff on preparation for hearing. 
5/21/2003 - MJG Motion for protective order. 
5/27/2003 - MJG Hearing preparation, arguments and answers to discovery 
and letter to Magelby. 
y \ 5/29/2003 - MJG Review of records; drafting answers and interrogatories. 
6/2/2003 - MJG Office conference with Marv on several issues. 
6/3/2003 - MJG Review of order and letter. 
"6/4/2003 - MJG Drafting reply in support. 
- MJG Abco's audit report. 
6/16/2003 - MJG Phone calls and letters on accountant. 
V I 6/17/2003 - MJG Phone calls; review of reply and affidavit and matters on 
CPA's. 
6/18/2003 - MJG Review and thoughts. 
6/19/2003 - MJG Phone calls on accountants and issues. 
A r 6/20/2003- RML Researched accord satisfaction issues; drafted office 
memorandum to Marlin in re: of research. 
- RML Researched pension vesity issue for ABCO's salary plan. 
- MJG Office conference and matters. 
Hours 
0.50 
2.00 
1.00 
0.50 
1.00 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
2.00 
1.50 
2.50 
5.00 
3.00 
0.50 
2.50 
1.00 
0.75 
2.50 
0.50 
0.75 
5.67 
1 33 
4.00 
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Tax# Amount 
75.00 
300.00 
150.00 
75.00 
150.00 
75.00 
75.00 
75.00 
300.00 
225.00 
375.00 
750.00 
450.00 
75.00 
375.00 
150.00 
112.50 
375.00 
75.00 
112.50 
198.33 
46.67 
600.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
yf 
* « • 
6/23/2003 - MJG Subpoenas, Richard Pett and Dean Udy, and answers to 
<—v Interrogatories. 
6/24/2003 - MJG Visit in Salt Lake City with Bowens attorney. 
\ 6/25/2003 - RML Copied and highlighted cases for accord and satisfaction 
Hours 
2.00 
2.00 
1.00 
Tax# 
Page 4 
Amount 
300.00 
300.00 
35.00 
issues. 
i RML Researched and drafted memorandum to Marlin regarding ABCO/Neffs salary continuation agreement and contract 
issues. 
r- - MJG Reply and phone calls. 6/27/2003 - MJG Subpoenas on Udy and Pett. 6/30/2003 - MJG Review of insurances at Udy Group. 
- MJG Issues and facts to Gibbs. 
7/2/2003 - RML Research contract issue in regards of Neff V. Neff buy 
agreement dispute and fraud issue. 
- MJG Phone call. 
7/3/2003 - RML Research for Neff V. Neff buyout agreement. 
7/7/2003 - RML Researched issues for Neff V. Neff buyout agreement. 
7/8/2003 - RML Researched issues and began drafting reply memorandum in 
support of defendant's motion for Summary Judgment. 
- RML Researched issues and began drafting reply memorandum in 
support of defendant's motion for Summary Judgment. 
7/10/2003 - RML Researched issues and drafted reply memorandum in 
support of defendant's motion for Summary Judgment. 
7/11/2003 - RML Researched reccession issue and drafted reply 
memorandum in support of defendant's Summary Judgment 
motion. 
7/14/2003 - RML Researched issues and drafted reply memorandum. 
- MJG Phone calls. 
£/15/2003 - MJG Review of law and reply. 
7/18/2003 - RML Researched and prepared list of witnesses and facts for reply. 
2.17 
2.33 
75.83 
0.50 
0.50 
1.00 
0.50 
7.83 
0.25 
6.00 
8.00 
7.67 
2.83 
8.17 
75.00 
75.00 
150.00 
75.00 
274.17 
37.50 
210.00 
280.00 
268.33 
99.17 
285.83 
81.67 
5.17 
0.25 
0.50 
6.00 
180.83 
37.50 
75.00 
210.00 
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7/21/2003 - RML Researched facts and witnesses for reply. 
- MJG Review of Marv Neff statements. 
7/22/2003 - MJG Finalize discovery responses and phone call with Marv. 
8/6/2003 - MJG Looking over site. 
8/8/2003 - MJG Review with Marv Neff and all accountants issues. 
8/11/2003 - MJG Office conference and drafting letter to accountant. 
8/12/2003- MJG Finalize letter. 
- MJG Letter to James Magelby. 
8/18/2003 - MJG Responses reviewed, and letters reviewed. 
j 9/3/2003 - MJG Stipulation drafted and matters on accounting. 
9/5/2003- MJG Phone call. 
9/9/2003- MJG Letter to Magelby. 
\ 9/16/2003 - MJG Phone calls, CPA letter and matters. 
9/19/2003 - MJG Review of file, letter to Magelby, phone call with Marv and 
phone call to Magelby. 
10/3/2003 - KJS Conference with Marlin Grant; review of file; allegations by 2.90 319.00 
Branson; memorandum to Miles Jensen concerning 
insurance policies; review pleadings. 
10/6/2003 - MJG Office conference with Marv. 
10/8/2003- MJG Letter to auditor. 
10/15/2003 - MJG Letter to Don James and confidentiality. 
10/20/2003- MJG Phone call with Marv. 
10/21/2003- MJG Phone calls. 
10/23/2003 - MJG Review of accounting reports. 
10/24/2003 - MJG Review of accounting reports and drafting letter to Don 
James and motion to continue. 
10/27/2003 - MJG Finalize items on accounting to Don James. 1.00 150.00 
Hours Tax# 
0.67 
0.50 
0.75 
0.50 
2.50 
3.00 
0.25 
0.25 
1.00 
0.50 
0.25 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
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Amount 
23.33 
75.00 
112.50 
75.00 
375.00 
450.00 
37.50 
37.50 
150.00 
75.00 
37.50 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
3.00 
2.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
4.50 
450.00 
300.00 
75.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
675.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
> " , 
K 
0/28/2003 - MJG Hearing and argument; review of tape. 
11/6/2003 - MJG Phone call. 
11/12/2003- MJG Phone calls. 
11/19/2003- MJG Letter to Magelby. 
1/25/2003 - MJG Reply to discovery motion. 
11/26/2003 - MJG Review of discovery and reply. 
12/1/2003 - KJS Research; draft defendant's reply to motion to compel; 
research on questions to ask in Branson deposition. 
12/2/2003 - KJS Research; finished drafting questions to ask Branson during 
\ p his deposition. 
112/3/2003 - MJG Drafting; reply to discovery. 
1 12/10/2003 - MJG Visited with accountant and matters. 
12/23/2003- MJG Reply. 
1/13/2004- MJG Letter 
" \ 1/16/2004 - MJG Phone call with Dan James 
- MJG Letter; phone call 
1/21/2004 - MJG Review of letter; review of motion for dismissal of claims 
1/23/2004- MJG Matters 
I 1/27/2004 - MJG Letter to Dan James and Jim Budge; phone call to Mary 
1/28/2004 - MJG Work on Motion to Dismiss for Statute of Limitations; Note to 
Bank; reply and counter on Accounting items compelled 
1/30/2004 - MJG Letters; reviews; finalize documents 
r" 2/2/2004 - MJG Finalize letter to Dan James 
Hours Tax# 
3.50 
0.25 
0.50 
1.00 
0.50 
1.00 
2.40 
Page 6 
Amount 
525.00 
37.50 
75.00 
150.00 
75.00 
150.00 
264.00 
2/3/2004 • 
2/4/2004 • 
2/9/2004 • 
MJG Discussion on phone 
MJG Trip to Ogden; preparation and discussions 
MJG Letter to Richard 
2.00 220.00 
0.50 
4.00 
0.50 
0.25 
0.50 
1.00 
1.00 
0.50 
2.50 
4.00 
1.50 
0.50 
0.50 
5.00 
0.25 
75.00 
600.00 
75.00 
37.50 
75.00 
150.00 
150.00 
75.00 
375.00 
600.00 
225.00 
75.00 
75.00 
750.00 
37.50 
(kwf 
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/ 2 / 1 1 /2004 - M JG Phone calls; review of letters 
\ 2/18/2004 - MJG Phone calls; review; matters 
Hours 
0.50 
0.50 
4.00 
1.00 
2.50 
Tax# 
Page 7 
Amount 
75.00 
75.00 
600.00 
150.00 
375.00 
2/23 94 - MJG Preparation; review of accounting findings; argument in 
Court, office meeting 
3/1 /2004 - MJG List of Discovery 
3/2/2004 - MJG Phone call; finalize letter and discovery; review of Reply to 
Motion for Statute of Limitations 
3/3/2004 - KJS Memorandum from Marlin Grant; review pleadings and 3.20 352.00 
documents; work on research to object to Branson's Motion 
to Stay Proceedings (case law research - 56(f) Motion to 
Continue Discovery) 
3/4/2004 - KJS Telephone conference with Marlin Grant; draft Affidavits of 2.10 231.00 
Oleen Bunderson, Melanie Bingham and Michelle Huff; work 
on objection to Branson's Motion 
3/9/2004 - KJS Draft objection (response) to Branson's Motion and 3.20 352.00 
Memorandum to Stay; telephone conference with Marlin 
Grant; incorporate Branson's letter and Affidavits 
3/10/2004 - KJS Telephone conference with Marlin Grant; update response to 0.90 99.00 
Motion to Stay 
3/11/2004 - KJS Memorandum to Marlin Grant; finalized draft of Objection to 1.00 110.00 
Branson's Motion to Stay; updated case law research 
3/16/2004 - KJS Update response to Branson's Motion to Stay; memorandum 0.80 88.00 
from Marlin Grant; conference with Marlin Grant 
3/17/2004 - KJS Telephone conference with Ken Oakesen; finalize Affidavits 0.40 44.00 
of Melanie Bingham, Oleen Bunderson, and Michelle Huff 
3/18/2004 - MJG Letter and review 
3/19/2004 - MJG Letter to Jim Magelby and to Brad Townsend 
3/22/2004 - MJG Office visit on Marv's documents 
3/24/2004- MJG Review of letters 
3/25/2004 - KJS Research case law (Utah) dealing with valuation of goodwill 
in business divisions; conference with Marlin Grant 
1.00 
1.00 
2.50 
0.25 
3.20 
150.00 
150.00 
375.00 
37.50 
352.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
3/26/2004- KJS 
3/29/2004 -
A 1 4/2/2004 
Y 
MJG 
MJG 
KJS 
4/7/2004- KJS 
4/8/2004- KJS 
4/12/2004- KJS 
1^4/14/2004 • 
4/15/2004-
4/16/2004-
4/20/2004 • 
4/21/2004 • 
\ 
4/23/2004 -
5/10/2004-
5/11/2004-
6/2/2004 • 
6/4/2004 • 
/ V l 1/2004-
k. 
6/14/2004 
5/2004 -
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
KJS 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
KJS 
JAS 
JAS 
MJG 
Update Response to Branson's Motion to Stay; further 
research on goodwill valuation for business dissolutions 
Matters 
Matters with Branson 
Research on goodwill of construction business; 
memorandum to Marlin Grant 
Telephone conference with Ken Oakeson; search for 
information on Michelle Huff; telephone conference (leave 
message) for Michelle; review pleading documents 
Telephone conference with Ken Oakeson of ABCO; 
conference with Marlin Grant; telephone conference (leave 
message) with Michelle Huff 
Memorandum to Britta Berge; memorandum to Marlin Grant; 
update response 
Letters to Magelby 
Phone calls on property sale and lis pendens 
Research on Lis Pendens problems and phone calls 
Phone calls 
Telephone conference with Marlin Grant; update response; 
prepare exhibits; file responsive pleading 
Drafting Protective order and letter 
Phone call 
Phone call 
Phone call 
Review of Bonding around lis pendens 
Telephone conference with Marlin Grant; telephone 
conference with Julio Lopez 
Research business valuation 
Research goodwill valuation; draft memorandum 
Phone call to Brad Townsend and review of goodwill; also 
phone call with Larry Vaughn and attorney in California on 
the sale 
Hours 
2.00 
1.00 
0.50 
3.20 
Tax# 
Page 8 
Amount 
220.00 
150.00 
75.00 
352.00 
1.00 
0.40 
0.70 
110.00 
44.00 
77.00 
0.75 
0.50 
1.00 
0.50 
1.20 
1.50 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
1.00 
0.30 
2.00 
5.50 
1.00 
112.50 
75.00 
150.00 
75.00 
132.00 
225.00 
37.50 
37.50 
37.50 
150.00 
33.00 
130.00 
357.50 
150.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
/ 6/17/2004 - MJG Review of 7 page letter of Magelby, phone call 
6/29/2004 - MJG Letter to Magelby, phone call 
7/1/2004 - MJG Drafting three different letters and phone call to Marv Neff 
7/6/2004 - MJG Letter to Mabelby and review his declaration for judgement 
7/7/2004 - MJG Draft response to Jim Magelby 
7/12/2004 - MJG Review letter from Magelby 
7/13/2004- MJG Draft letter to Magelby 
7/14/2004 - MJG Letters, motions, and replies 
7/19/2004 - MJG Office visit regarding issues with brother 
7/20/2004 - MJG Review, letters, subpoenas, Quit Claim Deed, and matters 
7/22/2004 - MJG Letter on lis pendens 
7/27/2004 - MJG Letters, faxes, and responses 
8/2/2004 - MJG Review of matters 
V ' J 8/3/2004- MJG Phone calls with Marv on house and other problems 
8/4/2004- MJG Matters 
8/5/2004 - MJG Drafting motion to expedite and several phone calls 
8/6/2004 - MJG Phone calls, finalize motion to expunge the lis pendens, and 
drafting release and deed 
8/9/2004 - MJG Hearing, negotiations, and phone calls 
8/10/2004 - MJG Review stipulation and negotiations on lis pendens 
8/16/2004 - MJG Review and revision of stipulation and deeds 
8/17/2004 - MJG Notice of Bond and matters 
8/19/2004- MJG Office visit 
8/23/2004- MJG Phone calls 
8/24/2004 - MJG Letter on house - specific performance 
Hours 
0 50 
1 50 
2 50 
1 00 
0 25 
0 25 
2.00 
2.50 
1.00 
2.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0 25 
0 50 
100 
1 00 
3 00 
2 00 
2 00 
1 00 
0 50 
0 25 
0 25 
100 
Page 9 
Tax# Amount 
75 00 
225 00 
375 00 
150 00 
37 50 
37 50 
300 00 
375 00 
150 00 
300 00 
150 00 
150 00 
37 50 
75 00 
150 00 
150 00 
450 00 
300 00 
300 00 
150 00 
75 00 
37 50 
37 50 
150 00 
A ^ O / . i 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
) 9/9 
8/27/2004 • 
8/31/2004-
/2004 • 
9/13/2004-
9/16/2004-
9/17/2004-
9/20/2004 -
9/28/2004 -
9/29/2004 -
9/30/2004 -
10/1/2004-
10/6/2004-
10/7/2004-
10/8/2004-
C ^ / l 0/12/2004-
^ J 10/13/2004-
l 10/14/2004-
[10/19/2004. 
f 11/15/2004 -
11/18/2004-
11/22/2004-
12/3/2004-
MJG Review and advice on contract sale of house 
MJG Phone call 
MJG Phone call on house and Branson 
MJG Discussion with Marv Neff; review appraisal; draft letter to 
Brad Townsend; and draft notice to submit 
MJG Phone calls with Marv and phone calls with Brad Townsend 
MJG Review evaluations and appraisals 
KJS Review documents and pleadings for hearing; telephone 
conference with Leslie 
MJG Hearing and matters 
MJG Drafting statute of limitations argument 
MJG Research 
MJG Further research, drafting arguments, and preparation for 
hearing 
MJG Drafting affidavits; phone calls to Marv and office visit 
MJG Hearing, preparation and arguments 
MJG Review of motion to stay and rule 56 motion; affidavit of Jim 
Magleby and responses 
MJG Work on affidavit and motion 
MJG Phone calls and drafting response to Paul Felt 
MJG Drafted Paul Felt summary 
MJG Finalize brief to Paul Felt 
MJG Mediation 
MJG Review of matters and setting deposition 
MJG Reviewing evidence 
MJG Review of files, tax returns, and letter to Magelby 
MJG Review 
Page 10 
Hours Tax# Amount 
0.50 75.00 
0.25 37.50 
0.25 37.50 
1.75 262.50 
0.50 
3.00 
0.30 
2.00 
4.00 
2.00 
6.00 
6.00 
3.00 
2.00 
1.00 
1.50 
1.00 
0.50 
9.00 
1.00 
1.00 
2.00 
0.25 
75.00 
450.00 
33.00 
300.00 
€00.00 
300.00 
900.00 
900.00 
450.00 
300.00 
150.00 
225.00 
150.00 
75.00 
1,350.00 
150.00 
150.00 
300.00 
37.50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
12/6/2004- MJG Phone calls 
12/13/2004 - MJG Status review, letters drafted, amended counterclaim, file 
reviewed, office visit with Marv 
12/15/2004 - MJG Draft changes to counter claim Amendments, affidavit for 
sister and Marvin Neff, corrections to court letter and matter 
12/16/2004 - MJG Letters to sisters, affidavit, revocation and appointment, 
phone call and review issues 
12/22/2004 - MJG Phone calls with Pallesen, Ken and Marv and changes to 
Affidavit 
12/23/2004 - MJG Boyd Palleson Affidavit finalized, drafted documents and 
reviewed 
12/29/2004 - MJG Reviewing emails and counter-claim changes 
1/3/2005 - MJG Organized file, letter to Palleson, and phone call to Marvin 
1/4/2005- MJG Phone calls 
1/5/2005 - JCJ Calls with Leslie, review file indexes, initial review of 
pleadings 
1/6/2005 - JCJ Further review and outline of pleadings, preliminary planning 
- MJG Letter to James Magleby 
1/7/2005 - JCJ Conference with Marlin Grant and case planning 
1112/2005 - MJG Phone calls and Matters 
1/18/2005- MJG Edie Pallesen 
^1/19/2005 - JCJ Email exchange with Leslie 
1/21/2005 - KJS Consultation with Marlin Grant Review file documents, 
correspondence and pleadings Draft Motion and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Protective Order 
(re seeking to deny Branson's request for discovery of 
Marvin's stock accounts) 
1/25/2005 - MJG Amended Complaint, Letter, Phone Calls and Matters 
1/27/2005 - MJG Phone call with Marv on Branson's Tr^bk Attack/Assault, 
^ Phone Call on Scheduling and Review of Interrogatory by 
Bowen 
Page 11 
Hours Tax# Amount 
0 50 75 00 
3 00 450 00 
2 00 
3 00 
1 00 
1 50 
2 80 
4 00 
2 00 
300 00 
450 00 
150 00 
225 00 
1 00 
1 50 
0 25 
0 50 
1 00 
0 50 
150 00 
225 00 
37 50 
438 00 
788 00 
75 00 
263 00 
150 00 
75 00 
^*0$' 
308 00 
600 00 
300 00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
» H _ J / 2 8 / 2 0 0 5 " M J G A m e n d e d Complaint; Office Visit 
Hours 
1.00 
2.50 
0.50 
Tax# 
Page 12 
Amount 
•v "150.00 
375.00 
100.00 
263.00 
1/31/2005 - MJG Office visit; Review of Facts; Drafting Salary Continuation; 
Motion 
2/1/2005 - MJG Issues; Motion to Enter Amended Counterclaim 
2/2/2005 - JCJ Review and revise Motion to Amend pleadings and Amended 
Counterclaim, discussion with Marlin Grant 
- KJS Consultation with Marlin Grant. Begin preliminary work and 1.70 187.00 
research on Summary Judgment Motion (re: Salary 
Continuation Agreement). 
txtfft i/^^ " M J G A B C 0 vs- B r a n s o n ' s , t e m s ; Review of Boxes 
& /2/3/2005 - JCJ Complete review and revisions to Amended Counterclaim 
and Cross-claim 
- MJG Review of Second Box 
2/7/2005 - KJS Research on Summary Judgment Motion (re: Salary 
Continuation Agreement). 
- MJG Office visit on issues 
- MJG Review of Tax Returns; Cory Johnson Box and Issues 
2/8/2005 - KJS Reviewed Documents and Pleadings. Reviewed Attorney 
Marlin Grant's notes on Summary Judgment Motion. Work 
on Summary Judgment Motion. 
*rti f\r 
- MJG Review of Manila documents and other Letters 
2/9/2005 - MJG Manila Ranch Letters to Sunrise Title and Dale Dorius and 
Issues 
i r 2/10/2005 - MJG Review of Facts j^fr k5 2/11/2005 - JCJ Conference with Marlin Grant to discuss deposition 
J ^ *f\ preparations and case planning 
A^ *^  - MJG Deposition preparation 
2/14/2005 - MJG Court telephone conference with and amended depositions 
/ 2/15/2005 - MJG Deposition matters; phone call 
- LAB Telephone call with computer services re: software; pull Itrs 
from disclosures CD in preparation for depositions; organize 
in chronological order 
5.00 
4.00 
0.90 
1.00 
2.00 
0.60 
2.00 
2.00 
1.00 
2.00 
1.00 
3.00 
2.50 
1,000.00 
132.00 
800.00 
99.00 
200.00 
400.00 
66.00 
4oo.'o~cr 
, 400.00 
200.00 
117.00 
400.00 
200.00 
600.00 
87.50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
V! / 
b 
2/15/2005-
2/16/2005-
LAB Organize file and report status 
JCJ Case planning with Marlin Grant 
MJG Review of Bowen Letters; Deposition questions 
LAB Pull Itrs from disclosures CD in preparation for depositions; 
organize in chronological order 
2/17/2005 - MJG Depositions; Exhibits and reviewed all boxes 
- LAB Prepare exhibits for Branson Neff Deposition 
2/18/2005 - JCJ Review deposition exhibits and consult with Laura Boyd, 
case planning with Marlin Grant 
- MJG Deposition preparations 
- LAB Prepare exhibits for Branson Neff Deposition 
2/22/2005 - JCJ Work on deposition exhibits, conference with Marlin Grant 
review deposition strategy, work on relocating deposition, call 
to Leslie, review notices, calls to Skolnick, calls to court to 
schedule conference call, call to Sawaya, conference with 
Marlin Grant 
- MJG Deposition preparations 
- LAB Revise Deposition exhibit index and prepare additional 
deposition exhibits 
2/23/2005 - JCJ Review exhibit book, further case planning 
- MJG Depositions in Salt Lake City 
2/24/2005 - MJG Depositions in Salt Lake City 
2/25/2005 - MJG Depositions in Salt Lake City 
3/1/2005 - JCJ Case planning with Marlin Grant, review documents 
- MJG Phone calls 
3/3/2005 - JCJ Prepare for deposition, conference with Marv and Marlin 
Grant 
Page 13 
Hours Tax# Amount 
1.00 
4.50 
3.00 
8.00 
8.00 
3.00 
8.00 
35.00 
88.00 
900.00 
105.00 
1,600.00 
280.00 
132.00 
600.00 
280.00 
263.00 
8.00 
8.00 
11.00 
11.00 
10.00 
1.00 
0.25 
1,600.00 
280.00 
88.00 
2,200.00 
2,200.00 
2,000.00 
175.00 
50.00 
656.00 
MJG Deposition preparation 3.00 600.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
J/8/2005 
,v^l 3/9/2005 
'3/10/2005 
4^^ \ 3/11/2005 
3/14/2005-
3/16/2005-
3/23/2005 
3/30/2005 • 
3/31/2005-
4/1/2005 • 
4/5/2005 • 
/4/13/2005-
4/14/2005-
4/18/2005-
4/19/2005-
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
JCJ 
MJG 
JCJ 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
KJS 
/4/21/2005 -
/ 4/25/2005 -
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
Work on Answers to Interrogatories and Phone Calls 
Phone calls and issues 
Attend depositions in Salt Lake City 
Letter to Michael Skolnick 
Conference with Marlin Grant, research file records 
Attend depositions in Salt Lake City 
Call from Marlin Grant review findings and discuss case plan 
Attend depositions in Salt Lake City 
Phone calls, Review of Information on Gale 
Phone call and letter 
Letters 
Work on Affidavit of Mike Gale 
Letter to Jim Magleby & Gayle McKeachnie 
Letter on Federal matters, Fax and Letter to County Attorney, 
Letter on Manila Ranch 
Work on Attorney General Letter 
Work on Assignment of water shares and Phone Calls 
Letter to Merv Glines and Gayle McKeachnie, Request for 
Reconveyance, exhibit and review of Manila Ranch 
Phone call 
Review Notes and File Update Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Salary 
Continuation Plan) 
Work on Motion to Interplead, Affidavit and Order 
Revise Affidavit, Order and Motion to Interplead Funds, letter 
to Mike and Jim re depositions 
Phone call to Gayle McKeachnie 
Hours Tax# 
2 00 
0 50 
12 00 
1 00 
12 00 
10 00 
0 75 
0 50 
0 25 
0 50 
1 00 
0 75 
0 50 
1 00 
1 00 
0 25 
0 90 
Page 14 
Amount 
400 00 
100 00 
2,400 00 
200 00 
438 00 
2,400 00 
44 00 
2,000 00 
150 00 
100 00 
50 00 
100 00 
200 00 
150 00 
100 00 
200 00 
200 00 
50 00 
108 00 
4 00 
1 00 
0 25 
\ & 
800 00 
200 00 
50 00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
JlC 4/26/ „ /26/2005- MJG Phone call with Gayle 
^ 4/27/2005 - MJG Work on Letter & Stipulation on Manila Ranch 
\ 5/3/2005 - MJG Jim Magleby Letter and Change to Stipulation 
5/9/2005 - KJS Work on Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
- MJG Email and phone call 
5/13/2005- MJG Phone calls 
5/16/2005- MJG Depositions 
5/17/2005- MJG Depositions 
5/18/2005- MJG Depositions 
5/25/2005- MJG Letter to Jim Magleby 
5/26/2005- MJG Phone calls 
5/27/2005 - MJG Letter to Magleby and Fax 
5/31/2005 - KJS Work on on Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (re: Salary 
Continuation Plan). 
- MJG Deposition Review with law clerk 
6/6/2005 - CTB Review Deposition of Branson Neff and pull quotations 
6/13/2005- KJS Review Notes and File. Case law research for Summary 
Judgment (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Salary 
Continuation Plan). 
6/14/2005 - CTB Search Branson Neffs deposition for admissions 
6/15/2005- MJG Matters 
6/21/2005 - CTB Search Branson Neffs Deposition 
6/22/2005 - CTB Continue to search Branson Neffs deposition 
i^v | 6/23/2005- CTB Draft memorandum in opposition to Branson's motion to 
^ j \ ^ release funds 
Page 15 
Hours Tax# Amount 
0.25 
2.00 
0.50 
1.20 
0.50 
0.50 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
0.25 
0.25 
1.00 
0.90 
0.25 
4.60 
1.70 
50.00 
400.00 
132.00 
100.00 
100.00 
1,800.00 
1,800.00 
1,800.00 
50.00 
50.00 
200.00 
99.00 
50.00 
299.00 
187.00 
1.70 
0.25 
1.00 
2.10 
1.20 
110.50 
50.00 
65.00 
136.50 
78.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
M 
^ 
A . <• 
^ V 
J 
^4 
6/23/2005 -
^6/27/2005 -
\ 6/28/2005-
, 
' 6/29/2005-
7/5/2005 -
>.rj/6/2005-
-
7/7/2005 -
7/8/2005 -
7/20/2005 -
7/21/2005 -
7/22/2005 -
7/26/2005 -
7/27/2005 -
MJG 
CTB 
CTB 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
CTB 
MJG 
MJG 
CTB 
CTB 
7/28/2005 - CTB 
7/29/2005 
8/1/2005 
MJG 
CTB 
CTB 
Work on replies 
Draft Response to motion to release Manilla Ranch funds 
Draft Response to motion to release Manilla Ranch funds 
Work on Response on Manila Ranch money 
Matters on Manila Ranch 
Review of Depositions on Aspen Springs Argument 
Letter to Sunrise 
Review of Deposition on Aspen Springs 
Review of Deposists 
Telephone call 
Letter regarding various lawsuits and issue on Request for 
Reconveyance 
Draft Memorandum opposing return of farm equipment 
Reply to Equipment Motion 
Work on Aspen Springs and Statute of Limitations 
Review of Branson Neff s deposition 
Review Branson Neff s deposition and categorize; Review 
Branson Neff s Reply Memorandum re: farm equip, and 
Manilla ranch escrow; Review and research summary 
judgment and motion to dismiss 
Prepare and revise Affidavit of Marvin Neff re: Dale Dorius 
letter; Review and research summary judgment and motion 
to dismiss; 
Matters and Reply 
Finalize and fax Affidavit of Marvin Neff; Review and 
research summary judgment and motion to dismiss 
Review and research statute of limitations and discovery rule; 
and Research which party has the burden of proof of 
fiduciary duty 
Page 16 
Hours Tax# Amount 
1.00 
2.60 
1.10 
1.00 
0.25 
2.00 
0.25 
1.00 
1.00 
0.50 
1.00 
2.50 
0.50 
1.00 
1.90 
2.60 
3.25 
0.50 
4.00 
3.90 
200.00 
1 6 9 . 0 0 ^ 
71.50 '• 
200.00 
50.00 J 
400.00 / ^ 
200.00 
200.00 
100.00 
200.00 
162.50 
100.00 
200.00 
123.50 
169.00 
211.25 
100.00 
260.00 
253.50 
4.70 
5.10 
2.80 
12.00 
4.20 
10.00 
4.00 
305.50 
331.50 
182.00 
2,400.00 
273.00 
2,000.00 
260.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 17 
Hours Tax# Amount 
8/1/2005- MJG Affidavit and phone call 1.00 200.00 
8/2/2005 - CTB Research what constitutes a prima facie case for fraud; draft 4.00 260.00 
r . supplemental brief supporting dismissal; research whether 
^A* statutory discovery rule should be left for jury 
r 8/3/2005 - CTB Research and draft supplemental brief supporting dismissal 
8/4/2005 - CTB Draft supplemental brief supporting dismissal 
8/8/2005 - CTB Search Branson's deposition regarding Aspen Springs 
- MJG Depositions and travel time 
8/9/2005 - CTB Summary of Branson's deposition volume 5 and volume 1 
- MJG Deposition and travel time 
8/10/2005 - CTB Summary of Branson's deposition volume 1 and volume 2; 
and discussion of supplemental brief supporting summary 
judgment and revision of supplemental brief 
8/11/2005 - CTB Revision of supplemental brief and summarize Branson 2.00 130.00 
deposition volume 2 
8/12/2005 - CTB Summarize Branson deposition volume 2 and volume 3 
8/15/2005 - MJG Review of Affidavits 
8/18/2005- MJG Letters 
8/22/2005 - MJG Review of Depositions 
8/26/2005 - KJS Review Notes and File. Work on Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Salary 
Continuation Plan). 
- MJG Memorandum regarding Salary Continuation Plan 0.25 50.00 
8/27/2005 - KJS Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of 0.80 96.00 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan). 
8/29/2005 - KJS Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of 1.90 228.00 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan). Review 
Salary Continuation Agreement, notes from Richard Pett and 
Property Settlement Agreement. 
2.20 
2.00 
0.50 
1.50 
1.30 
143.00 
400.00 
100.00 
300.00 
156.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 18 
Hours Tax# 
3.00 
0.90 
1.50 
0.40 
Amount 
600.00 
108.00 
300.00 
48.00 
8/29/2005 - MJG Changes to Affidavit, items in Motion for Summary Judgment 
9/2/2005 - KJS Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan). 
- MJG Drafting Final Argument 
9/3/2005 - KJS Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan). 
I/5/2005 - KJS Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of 1.20 144.00 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan). 
9/7/2005 - MJG Organizing Arguments 
9/8/2005 - MJG Letter to Magleby on Bond 
9/9/2005 - KJS Work on Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment Regarding Salary Continuation Plan). 
- MJG Finalize the Statute of Limitations Argument 
9/12/2005 - KJS Memo to Attorney Marlin Grant. Work on Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding 
Salary Continuation Plan). 
MJG Phone call on Criminal Case and Finalize S/L Memo 
- MMW Review case with attorney concerning waiver, estoppel and 
merger issues; research Utah case law concerning issues. 
9/16/2005 - MJG Phone call on Federal ATF case 
9/19/2005 - MJG Oral Argument 
9/30/2005 - MJG Letter to Magleby 
10/5/2005 - MJG Jason Townsend Phone call and Letter 
10/13/2005 - KJS Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Review Branson 
Neffs Motion and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Begin work on 
Response. 
1.00 
0.50 
0.60 
1.00 
2.30 
200.00 
100.00 
72.00 
200.00 
276.00 
1.50 
0.90 
0.25 
2.00 
1.00 
0.75 
0.80 
300.00 
45.00 
50.00 
400.00 
200.00 
150.00 
96.00 
r\ 4 -4 nr~ n 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 1 
10/14/2005 - MJG Work on Salary Continuation Plan Summary Judgment 
10/15/2005 - KJS Memo Attorney Marlin Grant. Preliminary work on Opposition 
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
* / 
0/17/2005 - MJG Continue work on Salary Continuation 
10/18/2005 - MJG Continue work on Salary Continuation Motion 
10/19/2005 - MJG Continue work on Salary Continuation Argument and other 
issues 
Hours 
2.00 
1.40 
1.50 
2.00 
1.00 
Tax# _ Amount 
400.00 
154.00 
300.00 
400.00 
200.00 
- CM Discussion with Marlin Grant about Neff case and needed 
research; Discuss Neff case and my role in preparing 
research with Kelly; Reading motion for summary judgment 
and accompanying materials; Began researching contract 
issues: specific performance, recission, breach, partial 
performance; Review motion for summary judgment and 
depositions, photocopying motion for summary judgment; 
Read complaint, outlined allegations, reviewed motion for 
summary judgment. Researching contract issues raised in 
complaint and motion for partial summary judgment. 
Researching contract issues: ratification, recission, "meeting 
of the minds," - case law and statutes for response to motion 
for summary judgment; Case law research on ratification 
Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
Research - Brown's Shoe Fit case and other cases cited in 
motion for partial summary judgment. Also reviewed motion 
and outlined arguments for research memo. Continued 
research case law for: ratification, partial performance, 
meeting of the minds, right of first refusal, and agreement to 
agree. 
- KJS Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
10/24/2005 - MJG Phone call with Marvin 
- KJS Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
- CM Reading and review case law research. Drafting memo to 
Marlin Grant and Kelly Smith summarizing research and 
arguments; Researching case law for ratification, equitable 
estoppel, meeting of the minds, in other jurisdictions. 
6.40 416.00 
10/20/2005- CM 
KJS 
10/21/2005- CM 
4.60 
3.80 
4.50 
1.80 
0.75 
1.70 
8.10 
299.00 
456.00 
292.50 
216.00 
150.00 
204.00 
526.50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 20 
Hours Tax# Amount 
10/25/2005 - MJG Research on Brief, Reply Brief 
CM 
10/26/2005- KJS 
- CM 
Research - equitable estoppel, editing memo to Marlin Grant 
and Kelly Smith Adding case law citations to memorandum, 
Discuss further research for case with Marlin Grant, Filing 
research, reading Kelly's response to the motion for partial 
summary judgment, outlining arguments and preparing 
research, begin research, 
Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant Work on Opposition 
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Review complaint and cross complaint - revisit factual 
allegations, Research Utah Rules of Civil Procedure -
summary judgment, form of pleadings, amending pleadings, 
Spoke to James Jenkins about J Earl case he had in the 
80's concerning partial payment Researched partial payment 
and J Earl Ut Supreme Court case/partial performance, 
Research recission, offer/acceptance - case law - UT courts 
Reading research accumulated throughout the day 
CC Look up cases for Marlin Grant's review 
10/27/2005- KJS 
CM 
Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant Work on Opposition 
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Reviewing research on rescission/mutual mistake of fact, etc 
Reviewing Kelly Smith's draft for opposition to motion for 
partial summary judgement Drafting and Editing memo to 
Marlin Grant and Kelly Smith on rescission and mutual 
mistake research, Researching Offer and Acceptance, 
contract formation, substantial performance Reviewing 
research 
MJG Review of Depositions and Drafting Summary Judgment 
10/28/2005- KJS 
CM 
Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Further research on offer/acceptance, accord/satisfaction, 
equitable estoppel, and UCC offer and acceptance Reading 
research Drafting research memo on offer/acceptance 
common law and UCC provisions, Discussing appropriate 
citations (bluebooking) with Carrie, Drafting and editing 
memo on offer/acceptance, rejection, accord/satisfaction, 
equitable estoppel Revising memo - bluebooking Further 
research on estoppel 
6 00 
4 20 
1,200 00 
273 00 
160 
4 90 
192 00 
318 50 
0 20 
0 80 
6 70 
7 00 
96 00 
435 50 
5 00 
5 90 
8 50 
1 000 00 
708 00 
552 50 
r* -1 -* r\ r» 9** 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 21 
10/28/2005 - MJG Work on Summary Judgment 
10/31/2005 - KJS Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
- CM Editing and finalizing memo on offer/acceptance, 
accord/satisfaction, equitable estoppel. Reviewing rules on 
summary judgment. Shepardizing cited cases. Bluebooking 
citations. Filing research - cases- summary of memoranda for 
research file; Discussion with Marlin Grant about further need 
for research for response to motion for partial summary 
judgment: Specific performance, substantial performance, 
etc. Also, instructions to go to Hancey law office for R-2 
Contracts; Went over to Mark Hancey's law office - borrowed 
Restatement 2d of Contracts - researching and photocopying 
partial performance, substantial performance, uncertainty of 
terms; Reviewing research on partial/substantial 
performance, uncertainty of terms, etc. 
- MJG Matters 
Hours Tax# 
3.50 
0.70 
Amount 
700.00 
84.00 
11/1/2005- KJS 
- CM 
Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
Reading research on partial/substantial performance -
reading cases cited in opposing party's brief. Reviewing 
cases on agreement to agree/executory contracts. 
Researching executory contracts; Researching cases cited 
on rebuttal, brief discussion with Marlin about further 
research; Drafting and editing research memo on cases cited 
in opposing party's memorandum in support of motion for 
partial summary judgment and rebutting arguments in that. 
MJG Reading Travis Bowen's Deposition 
11/2/2005- KJS 
- CM 
Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
Researching executory contracts/binding 
agreements/earnest money agreements. Reading and 
reviewing research on partial/substantial performance; 
Drafting and editing research memo on executory 
contracts/earnest money agreements, and partial/substantial 
performance. Bluebooking memorandum; Organizing file, 
organizing case law, filing research and memorandum; 
Discussion with Carrie about Neff filing and case numbers. 
Finding and reviewing Share Redemption Agreement-'98. 
Researching merger doctrine and integration. Reviewing 
merger doctrine research. 
6.00 390.00 
2.00 
3.60 
6.80 
400.00 
216.00 
221.00 
1.50 
2.80 
5.60 
300.00 
168.00 
182.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
iX 
1/2/2005 - MJG Interpleader Order drafted and research 
11/3/2005 - KJS Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
- CM Researching merger doctrine, integration, and parole 
evidence rule - Reading research - outlining memo on 
merger, Brief discussion with Kelly Smith about needed 
research, merger doctrine, motion for summary judgment, 
Research on integration, parol evidence, verbal/oral 
modification of contracts Drafting research memo 
Research and Drafting Reply to Summary Judgment and 
work on Bnef 
Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Hours Tax# 
2 00 
190 
Page 22 
Amount 
400 00 
114 00 
MJG 
1/4/2005- KJS 
11/5/2005 - KJS Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment 
11/7/2005 - KJS Consultation with paralegal (Caitlan), update and work on 
Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
- CM Reading and editing Defendant's reply and objection to 
Branson Neffs motion for Summary Judgment, Discussion 
with Kelly about reviewing and editing our motion in reply to 
Branson's motion for partial summary judgment, 
- MJG Drafting Brief 
11/8/2005- KJS 
CM 
Further work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment 
Reading and editing Kelly Smith's additions to Defendant's 
reply and objection to the motion for partial summary 
judgment, Brief discussion with Marlin Grant about progress 
of reply and objection to Plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment 
MJG Facts and Brief 
11/9/2005- CM Review and revise draft of reply to motion for summary 
judgment, Brief discussion with Carrie concerning new draft 
of reply to motion for summary judgment and appropriate 
citations 
5 20 
5 50 
1 80 
2 00 
1 20 
4 60 
3 00 
1 20 
1 20 
3 00 
5 20 
169 00 
1,100 00 
108 00 
120 00 
72 00 
148 00 
600 00 
72 00 
39 00 
600 00 
169 00 
0" i n •) n 7 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 23 
11/9/2005- MJG Work on Brief 
ir 
11/10/2005- KJS 
V ^ 
Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Work on Opposition 
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Begin review of Branson Neff s Opposition to 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Salary 
Continuation Agreement. 
- MJG Work on Brief 
11/11/2005 - KJS Consultation with Caitlan. Work on Exhibits to go with the 
Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
- CM Final reply and objection to Branson's motion for partial 
summary judgment and review with Kelly Smith 
- MJG Draft another Statute of Limitation Argument 
11/12/2005 - KJS Further work on Exhibits to go with the Opposition 
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Update Partial Summary Judgment Memorandum. 
11/14/2005 - KJS Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant and Paralegal 
Caitlan. Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (and exhibits). 
- CM Review and revise memo replying and objecting to Branson's 
motion for partial summary judgment; review with attorney; 
11/15/2005 
MJG Brief; Visit with Marvin 
KJS Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (and exhibits). 
- CM Further review and revision to memo replying and objecting 
to Branson's motion for partial summary judgment 
- MJG Finalize Statute of Limitations 
11/16/2005 - KJS Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (and exhibits). Consultation with 
Attorney Marlin Grant and Caitlan. 
- CM Further review and revision of memo replying and objecting 
to Branson's motion for partial summary judgment; and 
review with Kelly Smith and Marlin Grant 
Hours Tax# Amount 
8.00 1,600.00 
1.30 78.00 
4.00 
3.60 
1.00 
2.00 
4.20 
3.90 
5.90 
3.50 
3.20 
5.80 
0.25 
3.40 
3.00 
800.00 
216.00 
32.50 
400.00 
252.00 
234.00 
191.00 
700.00 
192.00 
188.00 
50.00 
204.00 
97.50 
y-v .A -a v~* *«w , 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 24 
Hours Tax# Amount 
11/16/2005 - MJG Read Branson's Depositions vol. 1 & 2, Statute of Limitations 4.00 800.00 
and meeting of minds strategy 
11/17/2005 - KJS Work on Opposition Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for 2.90 174.00 
Partial Summary Judgment (and exhibits). 
- CM Compile Merger and Integration research, notations for Kelly 3.70 120.00 
Smith; continue to revise reply and objection to Branson's 
motion for partial summary judgment. 
- MJG Drafting Summary Judgment Facts and Brief 4.00 800.00 
11/18/2005 - KJS Work on Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Partial 4.60 276.00 
Summary Judgment on the Salary Continuation Agreement. 
- MDE Legal research regarding contract law - merger, prior 3.00 52.50 
inconsistent statements nullified, and fully integrated contract. 
- CM Further review and revision of memo replying and objecting 6.00 195.00 
to Branson's motion for partial summary judgment; review 
with attorney 
- MJG Research Branson Deposition and case planning. Drafting 2.50 500.00 
new Motion for Summary Judgment on Merger. 
11/19/2005 - KJS Work on draft of Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for 2.30 138.00 
Partial Summary Judgment on the Salary Continuation 
Agreement. 
11/21/2005 - KJS Work on and finalize draft of Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to 1.10 66.00 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Salary 
Continuation Agreement. 
MJG Manila Ranch & Estate Documents reviewed in Dale Dorius 3.00 600.00 
Deposition; Merger doctrine reviewed and partial summary 
judgment 
11/22/2005 - KJS Research and work for draft of Summary Judgment (re: 1.90 114.00 
Merger argument). 
- MJG Notice of Entry of Order; and Preparation for Dale's 5.25 1,050.00 
Deposition; Drafting Reply brief to Salary Continuation and 
Reply in Support of brief on Contract 
11/23/2005 - KJS Research and work for draft of Summary Judgment (re: 1.20 72.00 
Merger argument). 
MJG Dale Dorius Deposition and visit with Marvin; Two letters to 5.00 1,000.00 
A H \ Jim Magleby to get records and set depositions 
< < < > 
r* *t * / r n 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 
11/25/2005- KJS 
11/28/2005- KJS 
CM 
11/29/2005- KJS 
1/30/2005-
12/1/2005 
12/2/2005 
12/3/2005-
MJG 
KJS 
MJG 
KJS 
MJG 
KJS 
MJG 
KJS 
12/5/2005- KJS 
12/6/2005-
MJG 
KJS 
12/7/2005- KJS 
Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment 
(re: Merger argument). 
Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment 
(re: Merger argument). 
Research and final editing of Memorandum replying and 
objecting to Branson's motion for partial summary judgment. 
Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment 
(re: Merger argument). 
Letter to Magleby, finalize Briefs 
Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment 
(re: Merger argument). 
Finalize Briefs 
Work on Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment 
(re: Merger argument). 
Finalize Salary Continuation Objection; Reply in Support 
Work on Motion and Memorandum for Motion in Limine to 
Exclude all Prior Inconsistent Statements (re: Merger 
argument). 
Merger Argument 
Work on Motion and Memorandum for Motion in Limine to 
Exclude all Prior Inconsistent Statements (re: Merger 
argument). Memo to Attorney Marlin Grant. 
Work on Motion and Memorandum for Motion in Limine to 
Exclude all Prior Inconsistent Statements (re: Merger 
argument). Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant. 
Merger Argument and Deposition Pages Cited 
Work on Final Draft of Motion in Limine to Exclude all Prior 
Inconsistent Statements Regarding the Settlement 
Agreement and for Partial Summary Judgment based on the 
Doctrine of Merger and Integration. 
Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Finalize Motion in 
Limine to Exclude all Prior Inconsistent Statements 
Regarding the Settlement Agreement and for Partial 
Summary Judgment based on the Doctrine of Merger and 
Integration. 
Hours Tax# 
2.80 168.00 
3.90 
7.10 
2.10 
1.90 
1.00 
1.90 
0.90 
234.00 
230.00 
126.00 
2.00 
1.30 
3.00 
2.30 
3.00 
1.90 
2.00 
2.80 
400.00 
78.00 
600.00 
276.00 
600.00 
228.00 
400.00 
336.00 
228.00 
200.00 
228.00 
108.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
12/7/2005- MJG Merger Argument 
6 12/8/2005-
CM Reading depositions of Marvin Neff. Making notes, outlining 
topics to summarize. 
KJS Review Motion to Compel from Branson. Begin work on 
Response to Motion to Compel. 
Hours Tax# 
1.00 
4.80 
Page 26 
Amount 
200.00 
312.00 
l* ifC 
- MJG Merger Argument 
- CM Continue reading depositions, outlining and summarizing 
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in 
depositions. 
12/9/2005 - KJS Review Motion to Compel from Branson. Work on Response 
to Motion to Compel. 
- MJG Finalize Merger Argument 
s i J A I 12/ 
r 
- CM Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition 
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in 
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I 
10/2005 - KJS Work on Response to Motion to Compel. 
12/12/2005- KJS Work on Response to Motion to Compel. Review deposition 
_ transcripts and summaries. 
- MJG Statute of Limitations Case and Notice to Submit 
« / & 
- CM Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition 
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in 
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I 
2/13/2005 - KJS Work on Response to Motion to Compel. Review deposition 
transcripts and summaries. 
- MJG Finalize Matters, Second Notice to Submit 
- CM Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition 
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in 
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I 
12/14/2005 - MJG Telephone conference on Schedule; Letter to Dale Dorius 
- CM Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition 
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in 
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I 
1.80 
1.50 
6.90 
2.90 
0.90 
1.50 
7.20 
1.80 
1.60 
2.00 
6.70 
300.00 
468.00 
( 216.00 
V 192.00 
400.00 
435.50 
1.00 
7.20 
0.50 
6.10 
200.00 
468.00 
100.00 
396.50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 
Hours Tax# 
12/15/2005 - CM Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition 5.80 377.00 
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in 
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I 
12/16/2005- KJS Work on Response to Motion to Compel. Review deposition 1.40 168.00 
transcripts and summaries. 
- CM Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition 0.80 52.00 
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in 
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I 
J 12/17/2005- KJS Work on deposition transcripts and summaries for Travis 1.80 216.00 
L_^_ Bowen deposition. Work on Response to Motion to Compel. 
12/19/2005 - KJS Work on deposition transcripts and summaries for Travis 0.80 96.00 
Bowen deposition. Work on Response to Motion to Compel. 
c MJG Depositions set up; phone call with David Carter; review of 1.50 300.00 Judge Low's decision; phone call to Marvin 
1.00 
0.80 
7.00 
200.00 
96.00 
455.00 
12/20/2005 - KJS Review Memorandum Decision (re: statute of limitation). 0.70 84.00 
Work on Response to Motion to Compel. 
- CM Continue outlining and summarizing Marvin Neff deposition 2.60 169.00 
Volume I. Cross-referencing items and citations in 
depositions. Editing and revising summary of Vol. I 
- MJG Finish Affidavits and Reply 
12/21/2005 - KJS Work on Objection to Motion to Compel. 
- CM Final revisions and editing of Summary of Marvin's 
deposition. Formatting Summary. Create and edit Summary 
TOC. 
12/22/2005 - KJS Work on Objection to Motion to Compel. Consultation with 5.60 672.00 
Attorney Marlin Grant (re: status of current motions, case, 
etc.). 
- MJG Draft Order on Statute of Limitations and Objection to 4.00 800.00 
Complaint and Deposition 
12/23/2005 - KJS Work on Objection to Motion to Compel. Memo to Attorney 3.90 468.00 
Marlin Grant. Review Branson Neff depositions for evidence 
to use in Motion to Compel. 
- MJG Work on Findings and Order 1.00 200.00 
f l U o e o 
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12/27/2005- KJS 
SjTg 12/28/2005- KJS 
^ - MJG 
12/31/2005- KJS 
1/2/2006- KJS 
1/3/2006- MJG 
1/4/2Q06'- MJG 
1/5/2006- MJG 
- CM 
1/6/2006- MJG 
1/9/2006- MJG 
1/10/2006- KJS 
1/11/2006- MJG 
- CM 
1/12/2006- KJS 
- MJG 
- CM 
Continue review of Branson Neff depositions for evidence to 
use in Motion to Compel. Begin work on Motion to Compel. 
Work on Motion to Compel. 
Phone call and Letters to Magleby 
Work on Motion to Compel. 
Work on Motion to Compel. Review deposition transcripts of 
Plaintiff Branson Neff. 
Review of Dale Dorius matters, Phone Call to Dale and 
Motion to Strike Dale's Deposition; Review of all depositions 
set 
Phone calls; Review of Dale Dorius File; Preparation of Alice 
Neff for depositions and various matters 
Mike Gale - phone calls, letter and affidavit; Review of new 
scheduling order; Review of Dale Dorius information and 
exhibits for deposition 
Outline and summarize inconsistencies and hurtful 
statements in Marvin Neff deposition Vol I. Read Vol. II 
Dale Dorius Deposition; Review of box that Alice brought in 
Reviewed water records, reviewed Magleby's arguments; 
phone call to Marvin 
Further review of deposition transcripts of Plaintiff Branson 
Neff (re: Motion to Compel - documents Branson has failed to 
produce). 
Review of all various Motions by Branson and legal research 
letter to Magleby; Review of Orders 
Reading Marvin Dep. V-ll, outline deposition 
Review documents from Attorney Magleby. (re: Compel 
Motions). Review transcripts from Marvin and Branson's 
depositions. 
Draft Notice to Submit re: Salary Cont., Reply Supporting 
Motion 
Reading Marvin Dep. V-ll, continue outlining and 
summarizing. 
Hours 
2.50 
0.70 
2.00 
1.80 
1.10 
Tax# 
Page 28 
Amount 
300.00 
84.00 
400.00 
216.00 
61.00 
1.50 
7.00 
2.50 
7.40 
2.25 
3.00 
1.40 
4.00 
1.30 
1.50 
1.50 
3.00 
300.00 
1,400.00 
500.00 
240.00 
450.00 
600.00 
77.00 
800.00 
42.00 
82.50 
300.00 
97.50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
1/13/2006- KJS 
1/14/2006 • 
CM 
KJS 
1/16/2006- KJS 
- CM 
- MJG 
1/17/2006-
-
-
1/18/2006-
KJS 
CM 
MJG 
KJS 
CM 
Final Review of transcripts from Branson's depositions. 
Review documents produced by Branson. Memo to 
File/Attorney Marlin Grant. Conference with Attorney Grant. 
Reading Marvin Dep. V-lll, outlining and summarizing 
Review file. Prepare notes for upcoming depositions. Memo 
to file. 
Conference with Attorney Grant (re: most recent pleadings 
from Attorney Magleby). Review documents from Attorney 
Magleby. Review Second Amended Complaint and compare 
with Initial Complaint. Begin work on Answer/Opposition to 
Second Amended Complaint. 
Reading Marvin Dep. V-lll, outlining, summarizing, and 
identifying harmful statements and inconsistencies. 
Finalize Reply; Notice to Submit; discussions on case with 
Kelly; Deposition Preparation 
Review Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum for 
Reconsideration. Begin Research on Opposition to Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
Reading Marvin Dep. V-IV, reading and outlining 
Deposition preparation 
Research on Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration. 
Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. 
Reading Marvin Dep. V-IV, outlining, summarizing and 
identifying harmful statements and inconsistencies. 
Hours 
3.40 
4.00 
1.30 
Tax# 
Page 29 
Amount 
187.00 
130.00 
71.50 
4.50 
7.00 
6.70 
247.50 
227.00 
6.00 
3.90 
7.60 
5.00 
3.70 
1,200.00 
214.50 
247.00 
1,000.00 
203.50 
217.00 
MJG Deposition of Richard Pett, Con Roper and Review of 8.00 1,600.00 
1/19/2006-
-
-
1/20/2006 -
KJS 
CM 
MJG 
KJS 
Documents 
Research on Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration. 
Drafting list and summary of all inconsistencies, harmful 
statements, and lapses in memory in all 4 volumes of 
Marvin's deposition. 
Drafting Reply upholding the findings 
Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Work on Opposition 
to Motion for Reconsideration. 
3.30 
7.80 
4.00 
2.90 
181.50 
253.00 
800.00 
159.50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
1/20/2006 - CM Creating list of possible issues of inquiry for Branson and 
Sandra Neff 
- MJG Drafting Reply in Support of Motion in Limine 
1/21/2006 - KJS Work on draft of Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration. 
1/23/2006 - KJS Work on draft of Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration. 
- MJG Drafting Reply to Motion in Limine 
1/24/2006 - KJS Work on draft of Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration. 
- MJG Finalize Reply to Reconsideration 
1/25/2006 - KJS Review updated draft of Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration. Work on Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration (re: payment to children argument). 
Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant. 
- MJG Reviewed Manila Ranch and Estate File in Salt Lake City; 5.00 1,000.00 
and Finalized Motion and Notice to Submit 
\ 1/26/2006 - KJS Finalize work on Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration 3.50 210.00 
(re: payment to children argument). Memo to Attorney Marlin 
Hours Tax# 
7.60 
5.00 
4.20 
3.80 
1.50 
1.30 
2.00 
2.50 
Page 30 
Amount 
247.00 
1,000.00 
231.00 
228.00 
300.00 
78.00 
400.00 
150.00 
sfiKV - MJG Drafting Reply to Reconsideration Motion, Notice to Submit, 3 2.00 400.00 
new depositions dates and various matters 
1/27/2006 - MJG Reply to Motion to Reconsider; Exhibits on Accounts and 
Deposition Preparation 
1/30/2006 - MJG Finalized Reply to Motion to Reconsider; Exhibit for 
Deposition i , 
1/31/2006 - MJG Dale Dorius and Don Johnston Deposition Preparation 
5.00 
3.00 
1.50 
1.00 
1.25 
1.35 
1,000.00 
600.00 
300.00 
200.00 
250.00 
162.00 
2/1/2006 - MJG Phone call to Richard Pett, Review of Don Johnston Issues 
2/2/2006 - MJG Letter to Magleby and prepare Exhibits for Depositions 
2/3/2006 - KJS Finalize Motion to Compel and Memorandum in Support 
thereof. Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant. Review 
Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Third Motion to Compel. 
- MJG Depositions in Brigham City - Dale Dorius and Don Johnston 8.00 1,600.00 
ft 7 • 9 Q e: 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
^Us 
2/8/2006 - MJG 
2/9/2006- MJG 
- MDE 
2/10/2006- MJG 
2/13/2006- MJG 
$Ek 
Preparation for Branson's Deposition, Review of all materials 
in bank accounts, Subpoena 
Preparation for Branson Neff deposition; and advise 
regarding liquidation damages 
Research case law to find cases regarding contract law & 
litigated damages - owner delay. 
Deposition preparation for Ken Oakeson and visit 
Draft Chris Bowen Affidavit and Preparations for Branson's 
Deposition 
2/14/2006 - MJG Deposition - Branson Neff 
Deposition - Ken Oakeson 
Letter to Marvin Neff regarding retention matters 
Reviewed letters of Mike Gale and Richard Pett 
2/15/2006- MJG 
2/16/2006- MJG 
2/22/2006- MJG 
2/24/2006 - MJG 
2/27/2006- CM 
2/28/2006- CM 
3/1/2006- KJS 
f^/ V CM 
- MJG 
3/2/2006- KJS 
- CM 
Deposition preparation 
Reading Marvin Neff Deposition IV: outlining, summarizing, 
and identifying harmful statements and inconsistencies. 
Reading Marvin Neff Deposition V-IV, reading and outlining 
Reviewed incoming documents from Attorney Magleby (re: 
Memorandum in Opposition to Marvin Neffs Motion to 
Compel Discovery and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion to Quash Subpoena Upon Mountain West Bank, or in 
the Alternative, Motion for Protective Order). 
Reading Marvin Dep. V-IV, outlining, summarizing and 
identifying harmful statements and inconsistencies; 
Discussion with Marlin as to reply to their response to our 
motion to compel discovery. Reading their response and 
exhibits, as well as our motion to compel. Outlining replies to 
Branson's motion and reply memorandum. 
Exhibit on Amount Branson Stole - $98,000; Letter to Magleby 
Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 
Discovery. 
Reading pleadings on Motion to compel, motion to quash, 
and opposition to Marvin's motion to compel. Compiling 
relevant documents from files for responses. Reviewing 
interrogatories and requests for documents. 
Page 31 
Hours Tax# Amount 
4.00 800.00 
4.00 
1.35 
3.80 
3.00 
0.45 
2.10 
800.00 
47.25 
2.00 
5.00 
8.50 
6.00 
1.00 
0.50 
1.00 
3.95 
3.80 
0.55 
400.00 
1,000.00 
1,700.00 
1,200.00 
200.00 
100.00 
200.00 
256.75 
247.00 
66.00 
247.00 
600.00 
54.00 
136.50 
CONSTRUCTION Page 32 
Hours Tax# Amount 
3/2/2006- MJG Letter to Jim Magleby 0.25 50.00 
3/3/2006 - KJS Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 0.85 102.00 
Discovery - update with statements from Branson's 
Deposition Testimony. 
- CM Reviewing all correspondence from Marlin to Magelby, 3.10 201.50 
looking for requests for discovery and other items. Reviewing 
files and pleadings. 
- MJG Letter to Magleby; Second Set of Discovery Drafted 1.00 200.00 
3/4/2006 - KJS Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 0.65 78.00 
Discovery. 
3/6/2006 - KJS Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 0.35 42.00 
Discovery. 
- CM Searching correspondence, copying relevant documents for 2.50 162.50 
exhibits. Brief discussion with Carrie Crossland as to 
discovery documents and files. Outline arguments for reply to 
opposition to motion to compel. 
3/7/2006 - KJS Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 0.40 48.00 
Discovery. 
3/9/2006 - KJS Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 0.45 54.00 
Discovery. 
3/10/2006 - KJS Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 0.20 24.00 
Discovery. 
3/13/2006 - KJS Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 0.75 90.00 
Discovery. 
- CM Reading documents, drafting response to motion to compel 2.75 178.75 
opposition, researching URCP on discovery. Outlining 
arguments in response. 
3/14/2006 - KJS Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 0.30 36.00 
Discovery. 
- CM Searching files and Depositions for Ardell Rae reference, 2.85 185.25 
researching timeliness and motions to compel, drafting 
response to opposition to motion to compel. 
3/15/2006 - CM Drafting and editing reply to opposition to motion to compel, 3.25 211.25 
brief discussion with KJS, searching correspondence files for 
additional correspondence relating to discovery. 
r\ 4 < c\ n r*\ 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 33 
Hours Tax# Amount 
3/15/2006 - MJG Drafting Order on Salary Continuation 
3/16/2006 - KJS Work on Reply to Branson's Opposition to Motion to Compel 
Discovery. 
- CM Reading pleadings: subpoena duces tecum, correspondence 
relating to subpoena, motion to quash subpoena. 
- MJG Deposition preparation 
3/17/2006 - CM Research and read cases cited in motion. Research federal 
and Utah rules of civil procedure and discovery. Outline 
arguments for memorandum in opposition to motion to quash 
subpoena. 
- MJG Deposition of Stev^-R^cker in Salt Lake City 
3/20/2006- CM 
3/21/2006- CM 
Research Utah statutes, state and federal case law: motion 
to quash subpoena, privacy, relevancy, financial affairs, 
overly broad, undue burden statute of limitations, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Draft memorandum in opposition of 
motion to quash subpoena. 
Final editing of memorandum in opposition of motion to 
quash subpoena. Shepardize cases. Final research. Brief 
discussion with Carrie Crossland as to oral 
arguments/hearing, and motion to compel exhibits. 
- MJG Depositions 
^ 3/22/2006 - CM Read Branson's pleadings on damages, punitive damages, 
v /
 and motion to compel. Research cases cited by Branson and 
shepardize. 
- MJG Reply to Motion to Compel 
3/23/2006- CM Researching punitive damages, defendant's financial 
condition, relative wealth, factors in determining, proving 
claims. Shepardizing cases. 
MJG Letter to Magleby, Reviewed Judge's Decision, Review 
Motion to Quash 
X3/24/2006- CM Reading research on punitive damages. Additional 
researching of: defendant's wealth, discovery, confidentiality; 
Rule 26(c). Drafting and editing research memo to Marlin 
Grant. 
1.00 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
3.40 
6.00 
3.50 
1.80 
1.50 
2.75 
200.00 
120.00 
97.50 
400.00 
221.00 
1,200.00 
227.50 
117.00 
7.50 
0.50 
0.25 
2.35 
1,500.00 
32.50 
50.00 
152.75 
300.00 
178.75 
Hours Tax# 
0.25 
7.25 
Page 34 
Amount 
50.00 
1,450.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
3/27/2006 - MJG Phone calls regarding Depositions 
3/28/2006 - MJG Deposition of Marvin Neff, letters and discovery; and draft 
letter to Jim Magleby 
3/30/2006 - CM Brief research with Carrie Crossland of damages, division of 0.20 13.00 
assets, and partnership dissolution. 
- MJG Research on Damages and Response to Orders 
3/31/2006 - KJS Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant (re: trial strategy). 
- MDE Research issue regarding Fair Market Value; emailed 
attorney. 
- MJG Reply to Support Judge Low's Order 
4/1/2006- KJS Work on trial memo. Review notes from Paralegal and 
current filings. 
4/3/2006 - MDE Research issue regarding awarding attorney fees and costs 
- MJG Reply on Motion to Compel and matters 
4/4/2006 - MDE Research issue regarding ratification of contract (fraud); and 
draft note to attorney. 
- MJG Review of cases on damages, fraud and rescission 
4/5/2006 - MJG Deposition - Alice Neff 
4/7/2006 - MJG Draft Motion to Reconsider 
4/10/2006 - MDE Meet with attorney; shepardized cases dealing with fraud 
(waived; not received timely); and emailed attorney. 
- MJG Motion to Reconsider research and drafting 
4/11/2006 - MDE Research; review cases; and draft note to attorney. 
4/12/2006 - CM Research damages, partnership/corporate dissolution, 
buyout, fair market value. 
4/14/2006 - CM Summarizing depositions, additional research: damages, 2.50 162.50 
timing, trial court discretion, buyout, going concern, fair 
market value. 
4/15/2006 - CM Damages research; shepardizing and reading cases. Drafting 0.85 55.25 
memo. 
1.00 
0.15 
1.30 
1.00 
0.70 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
1.00 
4.00 
1.50 
0.30 
3.00 
2.00 
3.50 
200.00 
18.00 
45.50 
200.00 
84.00 
70.00 
600.00 
35.00 
200.00 
800.00 
300.00 
10.50 
600.00 
70.00 
227.50 
011269 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 35 
Hours Tax# Amount 
4/17/2006 - CM Damages research: going concern, duplicative damages, 3.50 227.50 
date of sale, benefit of the bargain, rescission, measure of 
damages. Reading research 
4/18/2006 - CM Final research case law and statutes: partnership 3.20 208.00 
interests/dissolution, securities, date of damages. 
Shepardize cited cases. Revise and edit memo 
- MJG Damages reviewed; Letter to Steve Racker; Phone Calls to 1.50 300.00 
Marvin 
4/19/2006 - MJG Review of Steve Racker letter and fax back; talked to Marvin, 0.75 150.00 
reviewed damages case law 
4/21/2006 - KJS Work on trial memo. Research new bills regarding discovery 1.00 120.00 
of wealth against a defendant. Memo to Attorney Marlin 
Grant. 
4/25/2006 - MJG Review two new motions by Magleby - Review notes and 
values; Letter to Magleby on Stipulation 
4/26/2006 - MJG Reading Marv's Deposition, Josh Foukas, Sandra's 
Deposition, gathering facts and information to reply to 
Magleby's Supplemental Motion 
4/27/2006 - MJG Draft Reply and Objection and various matters 
4/28/2006 - MJG Draft Objection to Interpleader order changes; Finalize Reply 
and matters 
5/8/2006 - MJG Review of Emails and matters 
5/9/2006 - CM Summarizing Depositions 
5/10/2006- CM Summarizing Depositions 
5/11/2006 - KJS Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant (re: Case Strategy 
and upcoming depositions). Consultation with Paralegal. 
- MJG Preparation for Hearing, Hearing with Judge Low, Visit with 
Marvin, Phone call to Mike Skolnick 
- CM Summarize depositions, discussion with Marlin Grant, 
research Utah: fraud, misrepresentation. 
5/12/2006 - KJS Research regarding Expert Witness (re: expert to testify 
regarding Business Dissolution and/or Business Buy-Out 
agreements). Memo to File. 
- CM Reading Branson's depositions and pleadings: looking for 3.20 208.00 
accusations of fraud/misrepresentation and rebuttal 
statements by Branson. 
3.50 
6.00 
3.00 
2.00 
0.25 
2.50 
2.90 
0.40 
6.00 
3.00 
0.70 
700.00 
1,200.00 
600.00 
400.00 
50.00 
162.50 
188.50 
48.00 
1,200.00 
195.00 
84.00 
CONSTRUCTION Page 36 
Hours Tax# Amount 
5/13/2006- KJS Reviewed current pending motions. Trial preparation. 0.50 60.00 
Reviewed notes from Paralegal. 
- CM Reading Branson's depositions, reviewing file and exhibits: 1.00 65.00 
looking for accusations of fraud/misrepresentation and 
rebuttal statements by Branson. 
5/15/2006 - CM Reading Branson's depositions and pleadings: looking for 3.20 208.00 
accusations of fraud/misrepresentation and rebuttal 
statements by Branson. 
5/16/2006- MJG Letter 0.25 50.00 
- CM Reading Branson's depositions and pleadings: looking for 3.00 195.00 
accusations of fraud/misrepresentation and rebuttal 
statements by Branson. 
5/17/2006 - CM Reading depositions, outlining potential arguments and 3.40 221.00 
factual support for rebuttal of Branson's prima facie showing 
of fraud/misrepresentation. 
5/18/2006 - CM Summarizing depositions 
5/19/2006 - CM Reading depositions, reviewing pleadings, drafting rebuttal. 
5/20/2006- CM Editing rebuttal. 
5/22/2006- MJG Letter to Magleby 
5/25/2006 - JCJ Conference with Marlin and planning 
5/26/2006 - MJG Phone call 
5/27/2006 - KJS Review updated versions of Deposition Summaries. 
Research and Work on Case and Trial Strategy. Update File 
Notes. 
5/29/2006 - KJS Reviewed current Depositions. Continue work on Case and 0.70 84.00 
Trial Strategy. Update File. 
5/30/2006 - JCJ Review emailed response from Marv, conference with Marlin 150.00 
Grant, file review and preparation and planning for deposition 
- CM Research Utah Statutes and Case law: punitive damages, 3.00 195.00 
fraud, misrepresentation, assault/battery, dismissal, causes 
of action. Read Assault/battery file, pleadings, testimony. 
- GKW Reading Branson's motion for discovery of personal wealth, 2.50 162.50 
Research on issue of prima facie case for punitive damages, 
preparation of research memo on same. Review of motion to 
determine case law relied on, downloaded cases used in 
3.25 
3.30 
1.00 
1.00 
0.25 
1.10 
211.25 
214.50 
65.00 
200.00 
80.00 
50.00 
132.00 
0 1 4 n n <« 
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Hours Tax# Amount 
motion. 
5/31/2006 - MJG Letter for subpoena information; Review of prima facie 3.25 650.00 
punitive damages claim; and review of bank records 
- CM Research Utah Statutes and Case law, ALR, Am Jur: statute 3.40 221.00 
of limitations, dismissal/causes of action, relevancy, barred 
actions, willful/malicious conduct, factual basis. Review file 
and pleadings. 
6/1/2006 - GKW Research whether plaintiff can use facts of claims that are 0.50 32.50 
time barred for the purpose of establishing prima facie case, 
relevance issue 
- CM Review file and pleadings: memorandum decision, order on 3.50 227.50 
3rd motion to compel, Branson Depositions Exhibits. 
Research Utah Rules of Evidence: Relevance, prejudice, 
hearsay, admissibility. Edit draft of rebuttal. 
- JCJ Partial review of records and planning 250.00 
6/2/2006 - GKW Research related to motion for summary judgment on fraud 0.60 39.00 
and malicious prosecution claims. 
Research Utah statutes and case law: retroactive 3.40 221.00 
applicability, discretion, admissibility, prima facie, fraud, 
malicious prosecution. Read Assault/P.O. violation file: 
pleadings, affidavits, statements. 
Further review of records and deposition planning 200.00 
Read research. Additional research Utah statutes and case 3.50 227.50 
law: elements of breach of duty, slander of title, defamation, 
invasion of privacy/false light. Add reply to Assault/Malicious 
prosecution, defamation, false light/invasion of privacy. 
Reviewed Plaintiffs Submission of Evidence Supporting 0.70 84.00 
Punitive Damages Claims. Work on Response. 
Revise draft of reply to Branson's Submission. Add reply to 4.00 260.00 
factual allegations, breach of duty, fraud, conversion. Review 
Branson's depositions and Cade Smoot's deposition. 
Bluebook citations. 
Review appraisals and letter 0.50 100 00 
- CM 
- JCJ 
6/3/2006- CM 
6/5/2006- KJS 
- CM 
- MJG 
6/6/2006 - KJS Work on Plaintiffs Submission of Evidence Supporting 0.80 96.00 
Punitive Damages Claims. Work on Response. 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
6/6/2006 - GKW Review notes in file, began drafting Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Page 38 
Hours Tax# Amount 
1 00 65 00 
- CM 
- MJG 
6/7/2006- MDE 
- GKW 
- CM 
- MJG 
- JCJ 
6/8/2006- MDE 
- CM 
- MJG 
- JCJ 
6/9/2006- CM 
- JCJ 
6/10/2006- KJS 
Edit draft of reply to Branson's Submission Additional 
research 
Review of Reply, drafting additional responses and reviews 
Review documents, draft questions for Expert Witness, draft 
exhibit chart, make copy of exhibits used in John K Morris 
Expert Witness Report and organize into a binder, and meet 
with attorney 
Continue drafting and researching Motion for Summary 
Judgment, researching factual issues 
Revise draft of reply to Branson's Submission Additional 
research - prima facie purposes, burden of proof Read and 
compare cases cited in Submission 
Draft questions for deposition, review of Morns' report 
Further deposition preparation 
Copy documents and organize into a binder, and meet with 
attorney 
Revise draft of reply to Branson's Submission Additional 
research - punitive damages, willful and malicious, malice 
Read Bingham and S Neff depositions Brief discussion with 
Marlin Grant 
Letter to Jim Magleby 
Deposition preparation, consultation with Marlin, case 
planning, call to Marv, call from Magleby, call Magleby, 
further review of records and outline of questions 
Revise reply to Branson's Submission Review pleadings and 
research Additional research - discovery, punitive damages, 
admissibility, prejudice, URE Read Johnston deposition 
Compile and copy exhibits Final editing 
Final preparation, travel, consultations with Marv, deposition 
of John Morris 
Reviewed current Deposition transcripts Work on Trial 
notes 
3 40 
4 00 
4 20 
1 50 
3 50 
2 00 
1 00 
3 50 
0 50 
4 70 
0 70 
22100 
800 00 
147 00 
97 50 
227 50 
400 00 
100 00 
35 00 
227 50 
100 00 
1,500 00 
305 50 
2,000 00 
84 00 
n 4 >\ r\ n <** 
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Hours Tax# Amount 
1 00 
3 50 
4 00 
0 70 
100 
3 40 
35 00 
227 50 
800 00 
84 00 
65 00 
221 00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
6/12/2006 - MDE Revise motion for summary judgment 
- CM Further revisions of Reply to Submission Read depositions 
Additional factual responses Compile and copy additional 
exhibits 
- MJG Brief research, review, draft and finalize 
6/13/2006 - KJS Reviewed Current Pleadings, Motions and Responses 
Worked on Trial Notes Update File 
- GKW Continue to revise motion for summary judgment 
- CM Final editing of Reply to Submission Update with Marlin 
Grant's revisions Add additional rebuttal of factual 
allegations Compile and copy 
6/14/2006 - CM Final editing of Reply to Submission Update with Marlin 3 00 195 00 
Grant's revisions Add additional rebuttal of factual 
allegations Compile and copy 
- MJG Draft final brief 
6/15/2006 - JCJ Review memorandum regarding punitive damages and 
discovery, case planning 
6/16/2006 - MJG Finalize Motion 
6/17/2006 - KJS Reviewed Motion notes from Caitlin and Gabe Updated Trial 
Notes 
6/19/2006 - GKW Research whether plaintiff can use facts of claims that are 0 50 32 50 
time barred for the purpose of establishing prima facie case, 
relevance issue 
- MJG Discussion with James Jenkins 0 50 100 00 
- JCJ Case planning, conference with Marlin Grant 200 00 
6/20/2006- KJS Conference with paralegals Caitlin and Gabe concerning 1 10 132 00 
pending motions and reply's Consultation with Attorney Jim 
Jenkins (re Current motions) Updated Trial Notes 
- GKW Research related to motion for summary judgment on fraud 0 50 32 50 
and malicious prosecution claims 
1 00 
0 50 
0 70 
200 00 
350 00 
100 00 
84 00 
- MJG Letter and oral argument 0 50 100 00 
0 70 
2 50 
4 00 
2 00 
45 50 
162 50 
140 00 
130 00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 40 
Hours Tax# Amount 
6/20/2006 - JCJ Review and revise Request for hearing re punitive damage 100 00 
discovery, draft Notice of Appearance 
6/21/2006 - KJS Conference with Caitlin concerning trial preparation and 1 00 120 00 
pending motions and replies Updated Trial Notes 
- GKW Edit motion for summary judgment 
6/22/2006 - GKW Continue to revise motion for summary judgment 
6/23/2006 - MDE Review research, and start to write an additional memo 
- GKW Continue drafting and researching motion for Summary 
Judgment, researching factual issues 
- JCJ Call from Attorney White, review and calendar hearing, 300 00 
review deposition transcript, call to White regarding hearing 
schedule 
6/24/2006 - KJS Work on Trial notes Update file notes 
6/26/2006 - GKW Edit motion for summary judgment 
6/27/2006 - CM Meeting with Marlin Grant and James Jenkins - trial 
preparation and strategy 
- GKW Research, continue editing motion for summary judgment 
- MJG Trial strategy, procedures and things to do reviewed with Jim 
Jenkins and Caitlin 
- JCJ Case planning session with Marlin Grant and Caitlin Mitchel 
6/28/2006 - KJS Conference with Paralegal (re update on current pending 
motions, trial preparations) Trial preparation 
- GKW Continue editing motion for Summary Judgment 
- MJG Review of brief on summary judgment for fraud and expert 
witness Jeff Thorne 
6/29/2006 - MJG Expert opinions and matters, summary judgment on fraud 
- JCJ Review draft expert opinion, research rule 26 requirements, 
revise draft, review Plaintiffs Submission regarding punitive 
damages 
6/30/2006 - JCJ Further study of Plaintiffs Submission memorandum, 2 00 350 00 
research and case planning 
0 60 
0 50 
1 50 
2 00 
4 00 
0 35 
1 00 
3 00 
2 00 
72 00 
32 50 
97 50 
130 00 
800 00 
650 00 
42 00 
65 00 
600 00 
400 00 
200 00 
n i ^ nnv: 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 41 
Hours Taxfl 
1.00 
3.20 
1.00 
6.80 
2.60 
I Amount 
200.00 
384.00 
200.00 
442.00 
169.00 
800.00 
7/3/2006 - MJG Read expert opinion of Huff 
7/5/2006 - KJS Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins and Paralegal (re: 
work on Trial Brief). Trial preparation. 
- MJG Work on Summary Judgment 
- CM Work on pre-trial brief. Reviewing files; read all motions filed 
by Marvin. 
- GKW Continue drafting Memorandum for summary judgment 
r - JCJ Conference with Marlin Grant, review expert report of Thome, review of expert report of William S. Huff for Bowen, case planning, call Skolnick, in-file memorandum, further evaluation of Plaintiffs Submission re punitive discovery and 
planning for hearing, consideration of supplemental 
memorandum, conference with Caitlin Mitchel and Kelly 
Smith 
7/6/2006 - KJS Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins and Paralegal (re: 1.20 144.00 
work on Trial Brief). Trial preparation. 
- MJG Letter to Magleby 0.50 100.00 
- CM Work on pre-trial brief. Reviewing files; all notices to submit 7.20 468.00 
for decision and replies. Searching 
- GKW Organized legal research box, researched fraud, fiduciary 8.40 546.00 
duty; edited motion for summary judgment 
7/7/2006 - CM Work on pre-trial brief. Reviewing files; reading all Court 7.00 455.00 
Orders and Memorandum Decisions. 
- GKW Continue research, etc. 2.00 130.00 
- JCJ Review tapes of 5/11/06 hearing, case planning, conference 1,100.00 
with Marlin Grant, draft stipulated scheduling order, calls to 
Magelby and Skolnick to set attorney conference, call from 
Skolnick 
7/8/2006 - JCJ Review 7/6/06 Memorandum Decision denying Plaintiffs 88.00 
Motion Summary Judgment 
7/10/2006 - KJS Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins and Paralegal (re: 0.90 108.00 
work on Trial Brief). Reviewed Memorandum Decision from 
Judge Low. Trial preparation. 
- CM Cross Referencing Court docket with Pleadings Index and 6.80 442.00 
files. Creating pleadings chart of comparisons. Reading and 
summarizing Memorandum Decision 7/6/06. 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
A 
Page 42 
Hours Tax# Amount 
5 70 
8 20 
1 50 
7 30 
3 00 
1 50 
6 70 
370 50 
533 00 
97 50 
474 50 
50 00 
195 00 
180 00 
435 50 
- f 
;A 7/10/2006- GKW Review Depositions and expert opinion from Bowen 
A/0 7/11/2006 - CM Editing pleading chart Cross Referencing Court docket with 
- L \ r Pleadings Index and files Search for deeds and abstracts for 
O real property at issue in this suit 
- GKW Factual research into depositions and letters of Branson Neff 
7/12/2006- CM Reviewing all dispositive pleadings Create charts of 
dispositive pleadings by subject area 
- JCJ Review Notice and Request for Summary Judgment hearing 
7/13/2006 - CM Draft summary of dispositive pleadings 
7/15/2006 - KJS Work on Trial Brief Trial preparation 
7/17/2006- CM Draft dispositive pleadings summary of SJ Motion SOL, and 
Motion in Limine and SJ Motion Merger and Integration 
Review related pleadings 
7/18/2006 - CM Research URCP - timing Discuss Branson's objection to 8 40 546 00 
Marv's expert witness Draft dispositive pleadings summary 
of Summary Judgment Motion Binding Effect, and Summary 
Judgment Motion Salary Continuation Agreement Review 
related pleadings 
- GKW Edited motion for summary judgment 
- JCJ Status review, research issues of damages 
7/19/2006 - KJS Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant (re Status of Case 
and Trial Preparations) Trial Preparations 
- MJG Review of decision and drafting response to Jeff Thome's 
testimony 
- CM Review pleadings and draft dispositive pleadings summary 5 60 364 00 
section on Manila Ranch, and initial Motion for Summary 
Judgment Research expert testimony, expert opinion, 
qualifications UREs 701, 702, 703 
- GKW Edited motion for summary judgment 3 20 208 00 
7/20/2006 - MJG Notice to Submit for Reconsideration, and Drafting Order on 2 25 450 00 
Partial Summary Judgment and review of remaining issues, 
phone call to Marvin 
- CM Research Utah bifurcated standard for admission of expert 7 90 513 50 
testimony, draft memorandum in opposition to Branson's 
Motion to Exclude 
1 90 
1 80 
2 00 
123 50 
150 00 
216 00 
400 00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 43 
Hours Tax# Amount 
7/20/2006 - JCJ Research limitation of actions and the discovery rule 450.00 
regarding fraud, probate and real estate causes, review 
proposed Order on Partial Summary Judgment, revise draft, 
D discussion with Marlin Grant, draft order to clarify 
I K Memorandum Decision of March 31, 2006 
^ 7/21/2006 - MJG Drafting motion to clarify the court's order 1.50 300.00 
- CM Read all cases cited by Branson in Motion to Exclude and 5.90 383.50 
cases cited by Utah State Bar annual convention section on 
Expert Testimony. Outline additional arguments for memo 
objecting to Branson's Motion to Exclude. 
- GKW Edited Motion for Summary Judgment 
- JCJ Discussion and file search regarding March Memorandum 
Decisions 
7/22/2006 - KJS Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation. 
7/24/2006 - GKW Factual research, edited motion for summary judgment 
7/25/2006 - MJG Letter to Marv; changes and drafting motion to support 
- CM Additional research: FRE 702, 703, 704; URE 703, 704; case 
law - ultimate issue, expert opinion, conclusions of law. Final 
revisions to Memo objecting to Branson's Motion. 
7/26/2006 - CM Reviewing pleadings, researching deeds and plat map 1.00 65.00 
information for ABCO properties. 
- GKW Edited Motion for Summary Judgment 
7/27/2006 - MJG Brief regarding Clarification on Order and Memorandum 
- CM Draft dispositive pleadings summary of accounting, special 
master pleadings. Review related pleadings. Create 
Discovery pleadings chart. 
7/28/2006 - KJS Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins (re: Trial Preparation). 0.80 96.00 
Work on Trial Brief. Update File. 
- CM Review pleadings. Edit dispositive pleadings summary of 7.70 500.50 
accounting. Draft summary of unresolved issues. Revise 
format of summary as memo and draft introduction to 
summary. 
7/29/2006- KJS Trial Preparation. Work on Trial Brief. Update File. 1.50 180.00 
1.90 
1.70 
1.00 
2.00 
7.20 
123.50 
80.00 
204.00 
65.00 
400.00 
468.00 
6.00 
1.50 
5.30 
390.00 
300.00 
344.50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
7/29/2006 -
7/30/2006 -
7/31/2006-
CM 
CM 
CM 
1/ 
y> ct» J 8/1/2006- CM 
Revise dispositive pleadings summary. Update summary and 
dispositive pleadings chart with newly filed pleadings from 
docket. 
Revise dispositive pleadings summary memo. 
Draft dispositive pleadings summary of discovery pleadings 
in general. Review discovery pleadings and documents 
provided in response to discovery requests. Call District 
Court, request copies of missing Orders. 
Editing dispositive pleadings chart. Revise dispositive 
pleadings summary of discovery issues. 
Hours Tax# 
2.10 
1.70 
7.40 
Page 44 
Amount 
136.50 
110.50 
481.00 
- GKW Revise Memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment 
File Motion to Clarify 
Continue revising Memorandum in support of motion for 
summary judgment 
Edit dispositive pleadings summary of discovery pleadings in 
general. Review discovery pleadings and documents 
provided in response to discovery requests. 
Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation. 
Revise dispositive pleadings chart. Cross check chart with 
revised summary memo and updated court docket. 
- GKW Divide memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment into two parts, and rewrite motions and over length 
memorandum application. 
-
8/2/2006 -
8/4/2006 -
8/5/2006 -
_ 
MJG 
GKW 
CM 
KJS 
CM 
8/6/2006- CM 
8/7/2006 - CM 
Update dispositive pleadings summary memorandum, edit 
section on unresolved issues and subject charts. 
Draft section on protective orders for dispositive pleadings 
summary memorandum, create chart of general discovery 
pleadings. Reading related pleadings. 
GKW Edit memorandums 
8/8/2006- CM Reading missing pleadings from court. Update summary with 
orders obtained from clerk of court. Create charts for subject 
pleadings files. File research. Final revisions of dispositive 
pleadings chart and summary memorandum. Brief discussion 
with Miles Jensen. 
6.20 
1.30 
1.00 
1.90 
7.00 
2.20 
2.00 
9.80 
2.10 
7.10 
0.20 
10.20 
403.00 
84.50 
200.00 
123.50 
455.00 
297.00 
130.00 
637.00 
136.50 
461.50 
13.00 
663.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 45 
Hours Tax# Amount 
8/8/2006 - GKW Edit memoranda, prepare affidavit of Marvin Neff 0.80 52.00 
- MJG Review of summary judgment motion with Gabe; review with 2.00 400.00 
Caitlin all of status and deposition information 
8/10/2006 - GKW Edit memorandum for summary judgment, conference with 7.50 487.50 
Marlin Grant, deposition research for quotations 
£ 
8/11/2006 - GKW Edit Memorandum in support of motion for summary 1.00 65.00 
judgment. 
8/12/2006- KJS Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation. Reviewed updated 1.90 256.50 
Pleadings. 
- GKW Edit both Memorandums in support of motions for summary 1.40 91.00 
judgment. 
8/14/2006 - GKW Edit memorandums for summary judgment, factual research 1.50 97.50 
8/15/2006 - GKW Changes to motion for summary judgment, memoranda, and 3.00 195.00 
affidavit 
8/16/2006 - KJS Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant. Conference with 0.90 121.50 
Paralegal. Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation. 
- GKW Edit Memorandum in support of motion for summary 4.00 260.00 
judgment. 
8/17/2006 - GKW Edit Memorandum in support of motion for summary 2.20 143.00 
judgment. 
- MJG Review phone calls, discussions with paralegals 
8/18/2006 - GKW Finalize Neff summary judgment docs 
8/19/2006 - KJS Trial preparation. Reviewed Paralegal notes and documents 
(re: Trial Brief). 
8/21/2006 - MJG Review motion for summary judgment on fraud 
8/22/2006 - MDE Review depositions summaries already started; and prepare 
to continue to draft depositions summaries regarding 
Branson Neff. 
- JRP Legal research for Motion in Limine. 
- MJG Finalize two motions for summary judgment 
8/24/2006 - MJG Motion for summary judgment; drafting reply 
1.00 
1.00 
1.10 
1.50 
1.00 
1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
200.00 
65.00 
148.50 
300 00 
35.00 
75.00 
400.00 
400.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
8/25/2006- MJG 
- JCJ 
8/28/2006- JRP 
- MJG 
- JCJ 
8/29/2006- JRP 
- MJG 
- JCJ 
0jrV°£ 
8/31/2006- JRP 
- MJG 
9/1/2006- JRP 
9/5/2006 - MJG 
- MDE 
9/6/2006- MJG 
- JRP 
- MDE 
9/7/2006- MJG 
- JRP 
- MDE 
9/8/2006- MJG 
Motion for contempt; finish motion for summary judgment on 
fraud and malicious prosecution; motion and reply in support 
of clarification; hearing preparation; phone calls and issues 
Review file records, case planning and preparation for 
hearing, conference with Marlin Grant 
Legal research 
Preparation for argument 
Hearing preparation, draft hearing agenda, call to Marlin 
Grant, email to Leslie 
Prepare Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe 
Leverich. 
Oral Argument 
Further hearing preparation, hearing regarding punitive 
damages and status, conference with Marv, work on 
proposed Amended Scheduling Order and preliminary 
Pretrial Order, review motion and memoranda regarding 
Thorne report, draft Request to Submit for Decision 
Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe Leverich; 
legal research. 
Letter to Jim Magleby 
Draft Motion in Limine 
Reading Travis Bowen's Responses 
Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
Review of Motion in Limine and cases 
Legal research 
Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
Review Case Law 
Legal research; and Draft Motion in Limine. 
Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
Phone call and Items 
/f***' x 
Page 46 
Hours Tax# Amount 
5.00 1,000.00 
750.00 
0.50 
1.00 
37.50 
200.00 
450.00 
0.80 
3.50 
3.00 
60.00 
700.00 
950.00 
225.00 
1.00 
0.20 
1.00 
5.40 
1.00 
3.30 
3.90 
1.00 
1.40 
2.10 
0.50 
200.00 
15.00 
200.00 
189.00 
200.00 
247.50 
136.50 
200.00 
105.00 
73.50 
100.00 
011231 
r 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
9/8/2006 - MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
9/11/2006 - JRP Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Joe Leverich's Valuations. 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
9/12/2006- MJG Letter to Magleby 
- JRP Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe Leverich. 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
9/13/2006 - MJG Review of Magieby's Reply and Statute of Limitations and 
Clarification as well as ratification and election of remedies 
issues 
- JRP Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe Leverich. 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
- JCJ Read breach of contract issues 
9/14/2006- MJG Drafting Reply 
- JRP Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuations of Joe Leverich. 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
9/15/2006 - MJG Reply - Finished Facts 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
9/18/2006 - MJG Reviewed Subpoena and Finalized Reply 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
9/19/2006 - JRP Prepare James Motion in Limine. 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff. 
- JCJ Hearing on Bowen Summary Judgment motions, argue misc 
matters regarding restraining order and discovery, 
conference with Marv and Marlin Grant and advise, planning 
- MJG Court hearing and discussion with Marvin; review of part of 
discovery 
9/20/2006 - JRP Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Page 47 
Hours Tax# Amount 
1.00 
1.60 
1.00 
0.25 
0.30 
3.20 
0.50 
0.30 
4.40 
2.00 
4.30 
5.30 
1.00 
5.40 
2.00 
4.20 
0.10 
4.40 
35.00 
120.00 
35.00 
50.00 
22.50 
112.00 
100.00 
22.50 
154.00 
100.00 
400.00 
322.50 
185.50 
200.00 
189.00 
400.00 
147.00 
7.50 
154.00 
500.00 
3.50 
0.20 
700.00 
25.00 
1 
Hours Tax# 
4 60 
7 00 
Page 48 
Amount 
161 00 
1,400 00 
V 
4 50 
170 
1 00 
1 50 
157 50 
212 50 
200 00 
202 50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
9/20/2006 - MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff 
- MJG Reply, reading Objection, review of expert report and other 
matters 
9/21/2006 - JRP Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary 7 20 900 00 
Judgment 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff 
9/22/2006 - JRP Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
- MJG Reply on Fraud Motion by Magleby reviewed 
9/23/2006 - KJS Reviewed Recent Pleadings Work on Trial Brief Trial 
preparation Update File 
9/25/2006 - JRP Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Summary 2 60 325 00 
Judgment, and Draft Motion in Limine to Exclude Valuation of 
James & Co 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Branson Neff 
- MJG Motion in Limine Drafted 
9/26/2006 - MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Marvin Neff 
- MJG Motion in Limine 
9/27/2006 - JRP Draft and revise Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Kyle Smoot, Cade 
Smoot, Connard O Roper, Richard V Peet, and Sandra C 
Neff 
9/28/2006 - KJS Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant (re status of current 0 30 40 50 
pleadings) Trial Preparation 
- JRP Draft and Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence, and Revise 2 00 250 00 
and Finalize Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Summary 
Judgment 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Sandra C Neff, and 4 60 161 00 
Alice Neff 
- MJG Reply on Motion to Reconsider, Election of Remedy and 7 00 1,400 00 
Integration, and Finalize Reply Motion on Malicious 
Prosecution/Slander and Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert 
Testimony 
3 00 
1 50 
4 80 
1 50 
6 30 
7 60 
105 00 
300 00 
168 00 
300 00 
787 50 
266 00 
01109^ 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 49 
Hours Tax# Amount 
8^ 
10/10/2006- MJG Reply 
1.00 
0.90 
0.10 
200.00 
121.50 
12.50 
9/29/2006 - MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Alice Neff, and Ken 4.90 171.50 
Oakeson. 
- MJG Finalize Reply 
9/30/2006 - KJS Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation. Update File. 
10/2/2006 - JRP Phone call with Marvin concerning a response to Plaintiffs 
Opposition to Motion Regarding Violation of Civil Protective 
Order. 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Melanee Bingham, 2.30 80.50 
Van Bingham, Don Johnston, and Maurice W. Carter. 
10/3/2006 - MJG Letter on Submission 
/7<1<£4-A/1 £ _ - MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Maurice W. Carter, 
and Steven M. Racker. 
10/4/2006 - MJG Reply on Statute of Limitations 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding Travis Bowen. 
10/5/2006 - MJG Finalize Reply and Office Visit with Marv 
- JCJ Review damage disclosures from Magleby 
0.50 
5.20 
2.00 
7.10 
2.50 
4.00 
100.00 
182.00 
400.00 
248.50 
500.00 
100.00 
140.00 Q,I/\^J - MDE Continue to draft deposition summaries regarding Travis 
Bowen. 
10/6/2006 - JRP Prepare Reply to Opposition to Marvin G. Neffs Motion 1.10 137.50 
Regarding Violation of Civil Protective Order. 
- MDE Draft deposition summaries regarding John K. Morris. 
10/9/2006 - MJG Reply on Fraud Motion 
- JCJ Review memorandum decision from Court 
- JRP Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Violations of Civil 
Protective Order; legal research. 
6.00 
5.00 
5.80 
2.00 
2.60 
210.00 
1,000.00 
50.00 
725.00 
400.00 
325.00 - JRP Legal research; and revise Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding 
Fraud, etc... 
- MDE Meet with John; and find pages of deposition's referenced in 1.40 49.00 
Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Fraudulent 
\ 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 50 
Hours Tax# Amount 
Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims. 
10/11/2006- MJG Papers 1.00 200.00 
- JRP Revise Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion 0.60 75.00 
for Summary Judgment Regarding Fraud, etc. 
- MDE Continue to look for pages of deposition's referenced in 0.90 31.50 
Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Fraudulent 
Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure claims; meet 
with John; and meet with attorney. 
10/12/2006- MJG Finalize Reply 1.00 200.00 
- MDE Locate pages in Branson's deposition where he talks about 3.40 119.00 
Marvin wanting to be bought out for the price Branson was 
s asking for; look for other deposition pages; and revise 
^ i Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Fraudulent 
' Concealment and Fraudulent Nondisclosure Claims. 
10/13/2006- MJG Finalize and file Reply 
10/17/2006- MJG Jury Instructions 
10/20/2006- MJG Trial Preparations 
- JRP Prepare Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
in Limine to Exclude Evidence 
10/23/2006 - MJG Preparation for Trial - Exhibits on Value of ABCO, Farr West, 4.00 800.00 
Lincoln, Farm etc. 
- JRP Legal research; draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to 2.60 325.00 
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence 
10/24/2006 - JRP Draft Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion in 2.70 337.50 
Limine to Exclude Evidence; Draft Proposed Jury Instructions. 
10/25/2006 - MJG Review of Deeds and Chain of Title for Trial 
\ ^)P^^ " J R P L e g a l r e s e a r c h > draft/prepare Proposed Jury Instructions. 
] 10/27/2006 - MJG Trip to Salt Lake City and meeting with Skolnick and 
i QQ-^IS Townsend; Letter to Townsend 
Qtf** - MJG Work on Exhibits 0.50 100.00 
0.50 
1.00 
3.00 
1.00 
100.00 
200.00 
600.00 
125.00 
1.00 
0.80 
5.50 
200.00 
100.00 
1,100.00 
(111235 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 51 
Hours Tax# Amount 
10/27/2006 - JCJ Review memo from Marlin Grant, review notes and memo to 50 00 
Marlin Grant 
- JRP Legal research, Draft Proposed Jury Instructions 
10/30/2006 - MJG Exhibits and Instructions to Brad Townsend Pretrial Order 
10/31/2006 - MJG Order on Jeff Thorne Items 
- JRP Draft Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research 
11/1/2006 - JRP Draft Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research 
- MJG Pretrial Order 
- JCJ Review memorandum decision regarding Thorne, discuss 
with Marlin Grant and file memo 
11/2/2006 - JRP Draft Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research 
11/3/2006 - JRP Draft Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research 
- MJG Exhibits and title 
11/6/2006 - JRP Revise Proposed Jury Instructions 
- MJG Exhibits 
11/8/2006 - MJG Jury Instructions 
11/9/2006 - JRP Revise Proposed Jury Instructions 
- MJG Jury Instructions on contract acceptance, etc , review of 
complaint and counter complaint and answers 
11/10/2006 - MJG Drafting letter and getting all exhibits to Jeff Thorne 
11/13/2006 - MJG Preparation for Oral Argument, and Letter to Jeff Thorne and 
call with Mike Skolnick 
11 /14/2006 - JRP Legal research 
- MJG Preparation for Oral Argument 
11/15/2006 - JRP Review documents at courthouse 
- JCJ Hearing on pending motions, discussion with Miles Jensen 
and Marlin Grant 
150 
4 00 
0 50 
2 50 
140 
0 25 
4 60 
2 20 
1 00 
1 70 
0 50 
1 00 
5 70 
2 50 
3 00 
3 50 
160 
6 00 
0 80 
2 00 
187 50 
800 00 
100 00 
312 50 
175 00 
50 00 
80 00 
575 00 
275 00 
200 00 
212 50 
100 00 
200 00 
712 50 
500 00 
600 00 
700 00 
200 00 
1,200 00 
100 00 
350 00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
1 
^ 
y* x 
11/15/2006-
11/20/2006-
11/21/2006-
-
11/22/2006-
/ 
11/27/2006-
11/28/2006-
11/29/2006-
11/30/2006 -
-
12/1/2006-
12/5/2006-
12/6/2006-
-
12/7/2006-
-
-
12/8/2006-
12/11/2006-
MJG 
MJG 
MDE 
MJG 
JRP 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
JCJ 
MJG 
MJG 
MJG 
JCJ 
MJG 
KJS 
MJG 
MJG 
MDE 
MDE 
Oral Argument Hearing and preparation 
Review of Depositions 
Assist attorney 
Drafting opening statement and oral argument 
Legal research 
Oral Argument Preparation 
Preparation for Trial 
Preparation and Oral Argument 
Trial preparation 
Attend continued oral arguments, discussion with Marv and 
Marlin Grant 
Oral Argument and Preparation 
Jury Instructions read and changed 
Witnesses listed, Deposition preparation and damages 
claims on John Brough, letter to Brad Townsend and various 
matters 
Conference and planning with Marlin Grant 
Writing Opening Statement; preparation for Deposition of 
John Brough, phone calls to Marvin; Review of letters and 
exhibits 
Work on Trial Brief. Trial preparation. 
Preparation for deposition of John Brough; work on trial 
preparation and opening statement; review of exhibits on 
values 
Travel to Salt Lake City and deposition of John Brough 
Meet with attorney; review Deposition Exhibits; and draft 
chart. 
Scan Deposition Exhibit no. 381 on to disk and the computer; 
and double check exhibits. 
Hours Tax# 
8.00 
1.50 
2.40 
2.00 
2.50 
1.00 
3.00 
2.00 
2.50 
3.50 
2.00 
3.00 
6.50 
2.20 
8.00 
5.50 
1.50 
Page 52 
Amount 
1,600.00 
300.00 
84.00 
400.00 
312.50 
200.00 
600.00 
400.00 
500.00 
450.00 
700.00 
400.00 
600.00 
70.00 
1,300.00 
297.00 
1,600.00 
1,100.00 
52.50 
0.30 10.50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
12/11/2006 - MJG Prepare for trial, witnesses and exhibits reviewed and tabbed 
12/12/2006 - KJS Work on Trial Brief Conference with Paralegal Caitlin 
Mitchell Trial preparation 
- JCJ Settlement discussion with Marlin Grant 
- MJG Trial preparations, deposition and John Brough items, Brad 
Townsend report and damages 
- JRP Review documents 
12/13/2006 - KJS Work on Trial Brief Trial preparation 
- JRP Legal research 
12/14/2006 - MDE Review file, and start draft index 
- MJG Branson's Testimony and questions written 
^12/15/2006 
i 
12/16/2006-
12/18/2006-
12/19/2006-
12/20/2006-
KJS Work on Trial Brief and Exhibits with Paralegal Trial 
preparation 
JCJ Review and edit opening statement, case planning, review 
witness list summary 
MDE Continue to review file, continue to draft index and put 
together binder by topic regarding depositions 
MJG Branson's testimony and questions 
KJS Work on Trial Brief and Exhibits Trial preparation 
MJG Branson's and Travis Bowen's Testimony 
JRP Draft Reply to Supplemental Memorandum 
KJS Work on Trial Brief and Exhibits Trial preparation 
Consultation with Paralegal Update File 
JRP Draft Reply to Supplemental Memorandum 
KJS Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant and Paralegal Work 
on Exhibits Trial preparation Update File 
JCJ Discussion and planning with Marlin Grant, discussion with 
Melissa Elizarde regarding witness trial book preparation 
Hours 
6 00 
1 80 
7 00 
0 20 
0 90 
140 
2 20 
2 00 
1 90 
Page 53 
Tax# Amount 
1,200 00 
243 00 
50 00 
1,400 00 
25 00 
121 50 
175 00 
77 00 
400 00 
256 50 
5 00 
200 00 
175 00 
2 00 
1 20 
1 00 
1 50 
1 90 
1 50 
2 20 
400 00 
162 00 
200 00 
187 50 
256 50 
187 50 
297 00 
150 00 
sk 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 54 
Hours Tax# Amount 
12/20/2006 - MDE Meet with attorney James Jenkins, meet with attorney Marlin 3 60 126 00 
Grant, and start to draft Witness binder and summaries 
- MJG Trial preparation 4 00 800 00 
- JRP Draft Reply to Supplemental Memorandum 2 30 287 50 
12/21/2006 - KJS Trial preparation Worked on and began Review of Opening 2 50 337 50 
Statement Update File 
- MDE Meet with attorney James Jenkins, continue to draft Witness 7 40 259 00 
binder and summaries 
JL 4 00 
2 30 
7 50 
1 80 
800 00 
310 50 
262 50 
243 00 
- MJG Damage calculations on Brad Townsend review 
12/22/2006 - KJS Trial preparation Worked on Opening Statement Update 
File 
- MDE Continue to draft Witness binder and summaries 
12/23/2006 - KJS Trial preparation Worked on Opening Statement Update 
File 
12/26/2006 - MDE Meet with attorney, continue to review file, continue to draft 2 30 80 50 
index and put together binder by topic regarding depositions 
- MJG Trial Preparation 4 00 800 00 
12/27/2006 - KJS Trial preparation Conference with Paralegal Worked on 1 80 243 00 
Opening Statement Update File 
- MDE Meet with attorney, continue to review file, continue to draft 7 50 262 50 
index and put together binder by topic regarding depositions 
- MJG Trial Preparation 6 00 1,200 00 
12/28/2006 - KJS Trial preparation Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant 0 90 121 50 
Update File 
- MDE Meet with attorney, continue to review file, continue to draft 8 10 283 50 
index and put together binder by topic regarding depositions 
- MJG Trial Preparations 
12/29/2006- KJS Trial preparation Review Opening Statement Update File 
- MDE Meet with attorney, continue to review file, continue to draft 
index and put together binder by topic regarding depositions 
7 00 
0 70 
5 90 
1,400 00 
94 50 
206 50 
m 1 i o n 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 55 
Hours Tax# Amount 
12/29/2006- MJG Trial preparation and exhibits 4.00 800.00 
1/2/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; call Ken at ABCO; 6.90 241.50 
continue to review file; prepare Deposition Summary 
regarding Reed Price; continue to draft indexes and put 
together binders. 
- JCJ Trial preparation and planning, review witness information 450.00 
and records 
- MJG Trial Preparations 8.00 1,600.00 
1/3/2007 - JRP Trial preparation work; legal research; review evidentiary 1.20 150.00 
n / - exhibits. 3^ - MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; continue to review file; 0.60 21.00 
continue to draft indexes and put together binders. 
- JCJ Discussion with Marlin Grant regarding pending motions, trial 100.00 
preparation and preliminary ruling, case planning 
- MJG Trial Preparation 7.00 1,400.00 
1/4/2007 - KJS Work with Paralegal on Exhibits and Summaries. Trial 2.30 310.50 
preparation. Update File. 
- JRP Trial preparation work; legal research; review evidentiary 4.50 562.50 
exhibits. 
- MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; continue to review file; 5.10 178.50 
continue to draft indexes and put together binders. 
- JCJ Discussion with Marlin Grant regarding settlement, review 100.00 
amended trial notice, discussion with Marlin Grant regarding 
trial issues and preparation 
- MJG Office visit and review of facts 7.00 1,400.00 
1/5/2007 - KJS Conference with Paralegal Caitlin regarding trial preparation 3.50 472.50 
and Witness Exhibits. Trial Preparation. Worked on 
Summaries and Witness Exhibits. Update File 
- JRP Trial preparation work; review evidentiary exhibits; legal 1.90 237.50 
research. 
- MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; continue to review file; 3.80 133.00 
continue to draft indexes and put together binders. 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION-^ Page 56 
(Jfi JP^P Hours Tax# Amount 
1/5/2007 - MJG Jury Instructions, Opening Statements, New Subpoenas, 5 00 1,000 00 
letter to Magleby and various matters 
1/6/2007- KJS Trial Preparation Worked on Summaries and Witness 2 50 337 50 
Exhibits Update File 
1/8/2007- KJS Trial Preparation Further Work on Summaries and Witness 2 70 364 50 
Exhibits Update File 
- JRP Legal research 1 90 237 50 
- MDE Meet with attorney, assist attorney, continue to review file, 5 80 203 00 
continue to draft indexes and put together binders 
- JCJ Review memo regarding exhibit organization, review file 40 00 
memo from Court 
1/9/2007- KJS Trial Preparation Updated Summaries and Witness Exhibits 2 20 297 00 
and worked on Witness Outlines Update File 
- JRP Legal research, trial preparation work, review evidentiary 2 10 262 50 
exhibits 
- JCJ Case planning, discussion with Marlin Grant 
- MJG Trial Preparation 
1/10/2007 - KJS Trial Preparation Consultation with Attorney Marlin Grant 
Updated Summaries and Witness Exhibits and worked on 
Witness Outlines Update File 
- JRP Revise Proposed Jury Instructions, legal research trial 6 60 825 00 
preparation work 
- MDE Meet with attorney, assist attorney, continue to review file, 5 70 199 50 
continue to draft indexes and put together binders 
- JCJ Review memorandum decision, planning conference with 650 00 
Marlin Grant, review file records 
- MJG Trial Preparation 10 00 2,000 00 
1/11/2007 - KJS Trial Preparation for Witnesses (re Travis Bowen, Ken 1 80 243 00 
Oakeson, Dale Dorius, Don Johnson, Melanee Bingham, 
Reed Price, Kyle Smoot, Cade Smoot, Alice Neff and Steve 
Rake) Update File 
- JRP Legal research, trial preparation work, Draft Motion in Limine 4 70 587 50 
regarding Slander of Title, Draft Motion in Limine regarding 
10 00 
1 90 
100 00 
2,000 00 
256 50 
ABCO CONSTRUCTS 
yM^ 
J£2Kp^ 
1/11/2007 - MDE Continue to review documents; and continue to draft index. 
- JCJ Review case law of slander of title, conference with Marlin 
Grant and outline motion to dismiss, revise draft Summary 
Judgment Order 
- MJG Trial Preparation; Motions 
1/12/2007 - KJS Trial Preparation for Witnesses (re: Travis Bowen, Ken 
Oakeson, Melanee Bingham, Reed Price, Cade Smoot and 
Alice Neff). Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant. Trial 
Preparation. Update File. 
- JRP Legal research; Draft Motion in Limine regarding Battery; 
Draft Motion in Limine regarding Slander of Title; Draft 
additional Proposed Jury Instructions; Draft Motion in Limine 
regarding Guardian Policy 
- MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; meet with attorney Kelly 
Smith; continue to review documents; and continue to draft 
index. 
- JCJ Review and revise Motion in Limine/ Slander, revise motion 
in limine re assault, review motion to dismiss, review motion 
to bifurcate attorneys fees, consultation with Marlin Grant, 
email from Kelly Smith, email to Kelly Smith 
- MJG Trial Preparation; letter to Jeff Shields and Luann Adams; 
Motions 
Hours Tax# 
3.30 
10.00 
3.60 
Page 57 
Amount 
115.50 
200.00 
2,000.00 
486.00 
1/13/2007- KJS 
1/15/2007- KJS 
Trial Preparation for Witnesses (re: Travis Bowen, Ken 
Oakeson, Melanee Bingham, Reed Price, Cade Smoot and 
Alice Neff - summaries and exhibits). Email to Attorney Jim 
Jenkins. Trial Preparation. Update File. 
Conferences with Attorney Jim Jenkins (re: Trial Preparation 
for Witnesses). Worked on summaries and questions for 
Witnesses (re: Travis Bowen). Conference with Attorney 
Marlin Grant. Trial Preparation. Update File. 
DWL Respond to Motions in Limine 
JRP Review Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instruction; trial preparation 
work; legal research. 
MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; meet with attorney Kelly 
Smith; meet with attorney Jonathan Palmer; continue to 
review documents; continue to draft indexes; and draft index 
of jury instructions prepared by both sides. 
3.90 
7.70 
10.00 
2.60 
5.60 
7.90 
4.10 
4.00 
487.50 
269.50 
400.00 
2,000.00 
351.00 
756.00 
1,382.50 
512.50 
140.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION^-^ Page 58 
Hours Tax# Amount 
V aK 
12.00 
3.60 
11.40 
3.30 
2,400.00 
486.00 
1,995.00 
412.50 
1/15/2007 - JCJ Review witness list, jury instructions, and motions and 350.00 
memoranda for bifurcation and in limine from Magleby, 
review Plaintiffs Special Verdict Form, work on revisions to 
opening statement, work on voir dire 
- MJG Trial Preparation 
1/16/2007- KJS Conferences with Paralegal. Worked on summaries and 
questions for Witnesses (re: Travis Bowen). Conference with 
Attorney Marlin Grant. Trial Preparation. Update File. 
- DWL Respond to Motions in Limine 
- JRP Legal research; Draft Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Jury 
Instructions. 
- MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorney; continue to review 5.60 196.00 
documents; and continue to draft indexes. 
- JCJ Call to request jury list, review jury list and distribute for 120.00 
comment 
- MJG Trial Preparation 12.00 2,400.00 
1/17/2007 - KJS Conferences with Attorney Jim Jenkins and Marlin Grant. 2.30 310.50 
Reviewed Jury List. Worked on summaries and questions for 
Witnesses (re: Ken Oakeson). Trial Preparation. Update File. 
- JRP Draft Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions; 3.50 437.50 
legal research. 
- MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorneys; continue to review 1.20 42.00 
documents; and continue to draft indexes. 
- MPJ Review and revision of Opening Statement. 
- JCJ Review email from Leslie and jury list comments from 
attorneys, conference with Marlin Grant, work on voir dire, 
work on witness preparation and opening statement 
- MJG Trial Preparation; Motions and responses 
1/18/2007 - KJS Conferences with Attorney Marlin Grant. Reviewed Jury List. 
Worked on summaries and questions for Witnesses (re: Ken 
Oakeson and Dale Dorius). Trial Preparation. Update File. 
- JRP Draft Special Jury Verdict; legal research. 5.00 625.00 
0.50 
12.00 
3.10 
87.50 
600.00 
2,400.00 
418.50 
r\ *\ 4 r\ r\ c\ 
0.70 
8.70 
9.20 
87.50 
304.50 
150.00 
1,242.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 59 
s~ v.V) v/W]^ Hours Tax# Amount 
J
 ^1/18/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney; assist attorneys; continue to review 4.40 154.00 
documents; and continue to draft indexes. 
- JCJ Conference with Martin Grant regarding recent rulings and 350.00 
trial preparation, further preparation of voir dire 
- MJG Trial Preparation 12.00 2,400.00 
1/19/2007 - KJS Trial Preparation. Conferences with Attorney Jim Jenkins. 2.90 391.50 
Reviewed Jury List. Worked on summaries and questions for 
Witnesses. Conferences with Attorney Marlin Grant. Update 
File. 
- JRP Draft Special Jury Verdict Form; legal research. 
- MDE Continue to prepare for trial. 
- JCJ Further trial preparation, discussions with Marlin Grant 
1/20/2007 - KJS Trial Preparation. Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins and 
Attorney Marlin Grant. Drafted Witness Summaries for 
Witnesses Luann Adams, Larry Blanchard, Travis Bowen, 
Melanee Bingham, Wallace Bowen, Maurice Carter, John 
Brough, Chris Brown, Oleen Bunderson, Mike Gale, Curtis 
Hansen, Sharlene Hansen, Reed Price, Richard Pett, Edie 
Pallesen, Boyd Pallesen, Kevin Noyes, Devon Smith, Ardell 
Reay, Steve Racker, Don Johnston, Brad Morris, Alice Neff, 
Branson Neff, Marvin Neff, Jill Perry and Newell Norman. 
Update File. 
- JCJ Further trial preparation, discussions with Kelly Smith 150.00 
regarding witness preparation, discussions with Marlin Grant 
regarding trial strategy 
- MJG Trial Preparation 
1/22/2007 - KJS Trial Preparation. Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins. 
Reviewed Jury List. Worked on summaries and questions for 
Witnesses. Update File. 
- DWL Exhibit preparation 
- MDE Continue to prepare for trial. 
- JCJ Additional preparation for jury selection and trial preparations, 
discussions with Marlin Grant 
10.00 
2.20 
0.90 
8.00 
2,000.00 
297.00 
157.50 
280.00 
150.00 
- MJG Trial Preparation 12.00 2,400.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 60 
Hours Tax# Amount 
1/23/2007- KJS Trial Preparation and Trial Work Worked on Updated 190 256 50 
Summaries and Questions for Witnesses Update File 
- JCJ Final trial preparation, travel, jury selection and 2,100 00 
commencement of trial and consultation with client 
- MJG Trial 12 00 2,400 00 
1/24/2007- KJS Trial Preparation and Trial Work Worked on Updated 3 90 526 50 
Summaries and Questions for New Witnesses Conferences 
with Attorneys Jim Jenkins and Marlin Grant Research (re 
Case Law regarding Lost Profits) Update File 
- JCJ Continuation of trial, work on damages issues and planning, 2,200 00 
outline motion to strike damage evidence 
- MJG Trial 12 00 2,400 00 
1/25/2007 - KJS Conferences with Attorneys Jim Jenkins and Marlin Grant 3 30 445 50 
Research (re Utah Case Law Research) Trial Work 
Worked on Updated Summaries and Questions for Plaintiff 
Witnesses Telephone Conferences with Witness Oleen 
Bunderson Update Witness Information for Oleen 
Bunderson Memo to Marlin Update File 
- JCJ Review research and further work on damage issue, travel 2,300 00 
and trial, further planning and review of supplemental 
research, discussion with Jeff Adair 
- MJG Trial 
1/26/2007 - KJS Conferences with Attorneys Jim Jenkins and Marlin Grant 
Trial Work Worked on Updated Summaries and Questions 
for Plaintiff Witnesses Update File 
- JRP Review incoming pleadings 
- JCJ Trial 
- MJG Trial 
1/27/2007 - KJS Trial Work Worked on Updated Summaries for Witnesses 
Update File 
- JCJ Planning and trial preparation 
- MJG Trial Preparation 
12 00 
2 50 
0 20 
12 00 
2 10 
2 00 
2,400 00 
337 50 
25 00 
1,800 00 
2,400 00 
283 50 
200 00 
400 00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
r29/2007 - KJS Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant. Trial Work. Worked 
on Updated Summaries for Expert Witnesses. Update File. 
- MJG Conference with Marlin Grant, review outline regarding 
Johnston testimony, call Johnston, conference with Marlin 
Grant, prepare cross examination for Johnston 
- MJG Trial 
1/30/2007 - KJS Trial Work. Worked on Witness Summaries and Exhibits for 
Witnesses: Jeff Thorne, Brad Townsend, Juan Trujillo, Dean 
Udy, Russell Walker, Larry Whitaker, Kent Wiggings and 
Andy Yeates. Conference with Attorney Marlin Grant. 
Update Binders. 
- JCJ Trial preparation, Johnston preparation, email to Leslie, 
travel, trial, research at Recorder's office, planning regarding 
directed verdict 
- MJG Trial 
1/31/2007 - JCJ Planning and research in preparation for directed verdict, 
conference with Marlin Grant, continued trial, case planning 
and conference with Marlin Grant, review jury instructions 
and verdicts 
- MJG Trial 
2/1/2007- KJS Reviewed File. Conference with Attorney Jim Jenkins. Trial 
Work. Work on Jury Instructions. 
- MJG Trial 
- JCJ Trial and jury instruction preparation, trial, planning, work on 
impeachment issue 
2/2/2007- MJG Trial 
- JCJ Planning and trial preparation, conference with Marlin Grant, 
continued trial 
2/3/2007 - JCJ Case planning; research jnov motion and other post verdict 
options 
2/5/2007- MJG Trial 
- JCJ Review trial book, discussion with Marlin Grant, trial and 
verdict 
Page 61 
Hours Tax# Amount 
1.70 229.50 
650.00 
12.00 
2.10 
13.00 
13.00 
1.20 
13.00 
15.00 
12.00 
2,400.00 
283.50 
2,100.00 
2,600.00 
2,250.00 
2,600.00 
162.00 
2,600.00 
2,600.00 
3,000.00 
3,150.00 
400.00 
2,400.00 
2,000.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
2/6/2007- MJG Trial 
^ fa° 
JCJ Planning regarding post-trial matters, discussion with Marlin 
Grant 
2/7/2007 - DWL Meet with Marlin Grant re recovering attorneys fees 
- MJG Post Trial 
\Jr - JCJ Discussion with Marlin Grant, conference call with Marv, 
planning conference with Marlin Grant 
2/8/2007 - DWL Research recovery of attorneys fees 
- JCJ Call to Magleby 
2/9/2007 - MJG Attorney fee issues/org files 
- JCJ Call from Magleby, review rules and case planning, 
discussion with Marlin Grant 
2/12/2007- JRP Legal research 
- DWL Attorney's fees research 
2/13/2007 - DWL Review Plaintiffs memorandum for attorney fees, Research 
cited case law, Meet with Marlin Grant 
- JCJ Case planning, research attorney fee issues and jnov, 
discussion with Ken Oakeson, email to Magleby, emails from 
Magleby and his secretary, review memorandum regarding 
Branson's motion for judgment and attorney fees, review 
researched cases, case planning, discussion with Marlin 
Grant 
Page 62 
Hours Tax# Amount 
3 00 
0 30 
1.00 
1 20 
1 00 
0 40 
310 
2 90 
600 00 
100 00 
52 50 
200 00 
200 00 
210 00 
50 00 
200 00 
100 00 
50 00 
542 50 
507 50 
2/14/2007- DWL Discuss with Marlin Grant - Opposition Memorandum to 
Branson's Motion for Attorneys Fees, prepare Memorandum 
MJG Draft motion <J js| ov/ 
2/15/2007 
JCJ Call to Magleby, further case planning 
DWL Prepare Opposition Memorandum to Branson's Motion for 
Attorneys Fees 
MJG Finalize motion 
JCJ Further planning and case evaluation regarding pending 
motion for fees, review emails from Magleby, call Bethany at 
Magleby's, discussions with David Larsen, review additional 
research and draft response, outline and draft motion for 
continuance 
3 50 
3 00 
6 50 
1 00 
800 00 
612 50 
600 00 
150 00 
1,137 50 
200 00 
700 00 
n 1 •* nnn 
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Hours Tax# Amount 
2/16/2007- MJG Draft reply 3 00 600 00 
- JCJ Revise motion, memorandum and affidavit for extension, 650 00 
review emails from Magleby, revise draft response to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Fees, call from Bethany regarding 
missing exhibits and mailing 
2/17/2007 - JCJ Revise and email stipulation to Magleby, case planning 200 00 
2/19/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney, finalize Motion for Extension of Time, 1 20 42 00 
finalize Affidavit of James C Jenkins, draft and finalize Order 
granting Motion for extension of time, and revise 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Judgment Notwithstanding 
- JCJ Review delivery message, email to Magleby, revise and final 1,100 00 
Motion and Affidavit for extension, draft Order, revise and 
final Order, review and revise Marlm Grant' s draft 
memorandum for jnov, further review of records and 
evaluation of Plaintiffs motion for fees, outline response 
issues, research case law 
2/20/2007 - MJG Final motion and draft notes to file 4 00 800 00 
- MJG Conference with Marlm Grant, email to Magleby, call to 550 00 
Bethany, review email from Bethany, final extension 
pleadings and file, email to Bethany, email to Marlm Grant, 
call from clerk, further research and planning, 
2/21/2007 - MJG Finalize motion and review memorandum regarding fees 2 50 500 00 
- JCJ Further research and planning regarding response to motion 700 00 
for attorney fees, review revised draft of motion jnov 
2/22/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney, and review Branson's depositions 0 20 7 00 
regarding 3 million damages 
- MJG Finalize Motion, Statement of Facts regarding Attorney Fees 5 00 1,000 00 
- JCJ Revise draft of memorandum from Marlm Grant re jnov 100 00 
2/23/2007 - MJG Response on atty fees and drafting objection 4 00 800 00 
- JCJ Further revision to jnov memorandum, additional research of 600 00 
issues regarding damages, slander, fiduciary duty, call to 
Marlm Grant 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
2/24/2007- JCJ Redrafyno\gnej] 
memorandum 
2/26/2007 - MJG Response 
ium, redraft attorney fee response 
- JCJ ffeview revised draft of inov mpm9, discussion with Marlin 
Grant regarding attorney fee claims, email to Leslie 
2/27/2007- DWL Draft attorney fees memo 
- MJG Motion on attorney fees 
- JCJ Discussion with Marlin Grant and emails and calls to Leslie, 
review and revise most recent draft of opposition memo 
regarding attorneys fees, review research, planning 
2/28/2007 - MDE Meet with attorney, and review file 
- DWL Research case law related to attorney fee recovery, Draft 
attorney fees memo in opposition to motion for attorney fees 
- MJG Finalize response 
- JCJ Review and revise memorandum, review email and draft from 
David Larsen 
SUBTOTAL 
For professional services rendered 
Additional Charges 
BRANSON NEFF/N-4759 010 
11/27/2002 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions 
12/6/2002 - MJG Costs advanced for filing fee to file counterclaim 
8/4/2003 - MJG Costs advanced to Picture Perfect re color copies 
1/1/2004 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions 
Page 64 
Hours Tax# Amount 
Qty/Pnce 
41 
1 00 
1 
90 00 
1 
28 30 
12 
1 00 
300 00 
1 00 
1 50 
1 00 
2 50 
6 20 
1 00 
[ 2856 99 
2856 99 
200 00 
120 00 
262 50 
200 00 
875 00 
87 50 
1,085 00 
200 00 
350 00 
410,889 66] 
$410,889 66 
41 00 
; 9 0 0 0AV 
28 30 
12 00 
*~v -e ^ r\ r\ r> 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
4/1/2004 - MJG Photocopies 
4/30/2004 - MJG Photocopies 
5/1/2004 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions 
5/11/2004- MJG Photocopies 
7/31/2004 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions 
8/16/2004- MJG Costs advanced to UPS 
8/18/2004 - MJG Costs advanced to Box Elder County Recorder to release lis 
pendens 
8/31/2004- MJG Photocopies 
MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions 
MJG Care costs 
- MJG Costs advanced Box Elder County Recorder to record 
Release of Lis Pendens 
9/13/2004- MJG Photocopies 
1/21/2005- MJG Photocopies 
2/1/2005 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions 
2/2/2005- MJG Photocopies 
4/30/2005 - MJG Photocopies 
MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions 
Qty/Price Tax# 
3889 
0 05 
65 
0 10 
2 
100 
652 
010 
15 
100 
1 
11 50 
1 
20 00 
137 
010 
2 
1 00 
1 
40 00 
1 
20 00 
794 
0 05 
301 
0 10 
13 
1 00 
3500 
0 10 
366 
0 10 
20 
100 
Page 65 
Amount 
194 45 
6 50 
2 00 
65 20 
15 00 
11 50 
20 00 
13 70 
2 00 
40 00 
20 00 
39 70 
30 10 
13 00 
350 00 
36 60 
20 00 
& 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
5/31/2005- MJG Photocopies. 
6/30/2005 - MJG Photocopies. 
7/31/2005 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions. 
- MJG Photocopies. 
9/1/2005 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for transcript copies 
9/30/2005 - MJG Photocopies. 
10/31/2005- MJG Photocopies. 
11/30/2005- MJG Photocopies. 
12/1/2005 - MJG Costs advanced to Kinko's for litigation document printing 
12/2/2005 - MJG Costs advanced to U.S. Postal Service for shipping costs 
12/22/2005 - MJG Costs advanced to Magleby & Greenwood for copy fees 
12/30/2005- MJG Photocopies. 
<^ 1/18/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Maurice Carter, Con Roper, and Richard 
,kp/*9 [ ^ Pett for witness fees 
y ^ 1/26/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to SLC Corp for parking fee 
- MJG Costs advanced to Steve Huggins for process service fee 
1/31/2006- MJG Photocopies. 
- MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions. 
Qtv/Price Tax# 
171 
0.10 
324 
0.10 
1 
12.00 
150 
0.10 
1 
329.65 
372 
0.10 
292 
0.10 
145 
0.10 
1 
170.16 
1 
9.22 
1 
136.00 
2824 
0.10 
1 
55.50 
1 
10.00 
1 
25.00 
5937 
0.10 
11 
1.00 
Page 66 
Amount 
17.10 
32.40 
12.00 
15.00 
329.65 
37.20 
29.20 
14.50 
170.16 
9.22 
136.00 
282.40 
55.50 
10.00 
25.00 
593.70 
11.00 
n 11 o n 1 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
,&**"> Y^ 
Bf 
2/3/200§ - MJG Costs advanced to Don Johnston and Dale Dorius for 
deposition fees 
2/28/2006 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions. 
- MJG Photocopies. 
A I 3/1/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services 
- MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for services regarding 
Dorius and Branson depositions 
3/2/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for services regarding 
Oakeson deposition 
3/15/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services 
3/27/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services 
3/31/2006 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions. 
MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services 
5/31/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Washington Mutual Bank for copies and 
research 
- MJG Photocopies. 
6/15/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Kinko's for copies and binding services 
- MJG Costs advanced to Kinko's for copies 
6/16/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Postmaster for certified mailing 
6/26/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Q&A Reporting for deposition services 
6/29/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to First District Court for copy of video tape 
Page 67 
Qty/Price Tax# Amount 
2 
18.50 
17 
1.00 
2412 
0.10 
1 
768.40 
1 
1,309.36 
1 
468.75 
1 
1,046.05 
1 
193.00 
30 
1.00 
1 
393.10 
1 
108.60 
156 
0.10 
1 
191.15 
1 
331.53 
1 
14.43 
1 
472.35 
1 
15.00 
37.00 
17.00 
241.20 
768.40 
1,309.36 
468.75 
/ 1,046.05. 
ft,U 
193.00 
30.00 
393.10 
108.60 
15.60 
191.15 
331.53 
14.43 
472.35 
15.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
6/30/2006 - MJG Photocopies. 
7/6/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to First District Court for copy of video tape 
8/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Mann, Hadfield & Thorne for attorney fees 
regarding opinion 
Qty/Price 
764 
0.10 
1 
15.00 
Tax# 
Page 68 
Amount 
76.40 
15.00 
7/31/2006- MJG Photocopies. 
1 
606.25 
140 
0.10 
606.25 
14.00 
- MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions. 5 
1.00 
5.00 
8/31/2006 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions. 15 
1.00 
15.00 
9/30/2006 - MJG Photocopies. 137 
0.10 
13.70 
10/23/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Salt Lake County Recorder for recording 1 
fee 26.00 
26.00 
10/30/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Weber County Recorder for copy fee 
10/31/2006- MJG Photocopies. 
11/10/2006- MJG Photocopies. 
11/13/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to U.S. Postal Service for mailing 
11/15/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Kipp & Christian for copy fees 
11/17/2006 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions. 
- MJG Costs advanced to First District Court for certified copies 
\/(j? 12/7/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to John Brough & Associates for deposition 
services 
12/14/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Phillips Hansen for plat 
1 
13.00 
88 
0.10 
115 
0.10 
1 
4.05 
1 
04.99 
40 
1.00 
1 
5.00 
1 
95.00 
1 
2.00 
13.00 
8.80 
11.50 
4.05 
204.99 
40.00 
5.00 
495.00 
2.00 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
12/20/2006 - MJG Costs advanced to Depomax for deposition services 
12/31/2006 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions. 
- MJG Photocopies. 
1/12/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Kinko's to laminate and copy plat maps 
1/19/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Staples for supplies - trial 
1/22/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Staples for supplies for Trial 
1 /23/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Mann. Hadf ield, & Thome for expert fee 
- MJG Costs advanced to First District Court for audio CD 
1/25/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Box Elder County Geographicals for 
custom maps 
1/31/2007 - MJG Costs advanced for fax transmissions. 
- MJG Photocopies. 
f<: 2/12/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Melanie Bingham, Wallace Bowen, Ken 
£/C' Oakesen, Richard Pett, and Sharlene Hansen for witness 
fees 
2/22/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Kinko's for copies 
2/23/2007 - MJG Costs advanced to Lexis Nexis for research fees 
Page 
Qty/Price Tax# Amount 
1 
616.01 
33 
1.00 
108 
0.10 
1 
6.14 
1 
151.30 
1 
139.92 
1 
202.08 
1 
13.00 
1 
350.00 
120 
1.00 
9561 
0.10 
1 
126.00 
616.01 
33.00 
10.80 
86.14 
151.30 
139.92 
202.08 
13.00 
350.00 
120.00 
956.10 
126.00 
1 90.93 
90.93 
1 268.00 
268.00 
SUBTOTAL: [ 13,202.57] 
Total costs 
8/31/2002 Invoice No. 19353 
9/30/2002 Invoice No. 19810 
10/23/2002 Payment - thank you 
19353 
19810 
$13,202.57 
$515.00 
$487.50 
($515.00) 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
10/30/2002 Payment - thank you 
10/31/2002 Invoice No 20431 20431 
11/18/2002 Payment - refund on service fee to Box Elder County Auditor 
11/30/2002 Invoice No 21775 21775 
12/23/2002 Payment - thank you 
12/31/2002 Invoice No 10721 
1/22/2003 Payment - thank you 
1/31/2003 Invoice No 11208 
2/5/2003 Payment - thank you 
2/25/2003 Payment - thank you 
2/28/2003 Invoice No 11514 
3/5/2003 Payment - thank you 
3/28/2003 Payment - thank you 
3/31/2003 Invoice No 12418 
4/30/2003 Invoice No 13120 
5/31/2003 Invoice No 13612 
6/17/2003 Payment - thank you 
6/30/2003 Invoice No 14552 
7/15/2003 Payment - thank you 
7/31/2003 Invoice No 14958 
8/15/2003 Payment - thank you 
8/31/2003 Invoice No 15399 
9/17/2003 Payment - thank you 
9/30/2003 Invoice No 15976 
10/24/2003 Payment - thank you 
10/31/2003 Invoice No 16679 
11/21/2003 Payment - thank you 
11/30/2003 Invoice No 17583 
12/31/2003 Invoice No 17992 
1/5/2004 Payment - thank you 
1/28/2004 Payment - thank you 
1/30/2004 Payment - thank you 
1/31/2004 Invoice No 18598 
2/29/2004 Invoice No 19416 
3/25/2004 Payment - thank you 
3/31/2004 Invoice No 19827 
4/9/2004 Payment - thank you 
4/28/2004 Payment - thank you 
4/30/2004 Invoice No 20698 
5/6/2004 Payment - thank you 
5/31/2004 Invoice No 21738 
6/30/2004 Payment - thank you 
6/30/2004 Invoice No 22197 
7/21/2004 Payment - thank you 
7/22/2004 Payment - thank you 
7/31/2004 Invoice No 23256 
8/27/2004 Payment - thank you 
8/31/2004 Invoice No 23963 
9/30/2004 Payment - thank you 
9/30/2004 Invoice No 24604 
10/6/2004 Payment - thank you 
10/28/2004 Payment - thank you 
10721 
11208 
11514 
12418 
13120 
13612 
14552 
14958 
15399 
15976 
16679 
17583 
17992 
18598 
19416 
19827 
20698 
21738 
22197 
23256 
23963 
24604 
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Amount 
($487 50) 
$307 00 
($13 00) 
$5,085 00 
($307 00) 
$4,196 39 
($137 00) 
$5,279 06 
($5,085 00) 
($4,195 00) 
$2,374 50 
($5,236 00) 
($2,374 50) 
$6,152 50 
$2,470 00 
$3,164 53 
($2,470 00) 
$5,188 53 
($3,112 50) 
$2,754 05 
($5,188 53) 
$8,691 35 
($2,700 83) 
$5,118 57 
($13,706 80) 
$4,840 06 
($4,829 00) 
$2,952 22 
$2,311 03 
($2,940 50) 
($41 20) 
($2,257 00) 
$3,807 94 
$4,298 48 
($3,773 50) 
$5,402 39 
($4,248 50) 
($6,152 50) 
$2,195 28 
($5,347 50) 
$1,320 33 
($2,192 95) 
$3,042 00 
($1,320 33) 
($194 45) 
$3,003 71 
($3,039 70) 
$3,784 22 
($3,000 50) 
$5,024 85 
($39 70) 
($3,749 50) 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
Amount 
10/31/2004 Invoice No 25189 
11/1/2004 Payment - thank you 
11/30/2004 Payment - thank you 
11/30/2004 Invoice No 25863 
12/31/2004 Invoice No 26552 
1/12/2005 Payment - thank you 
1/31/2005 Invoice No 27298 
2/28/2005 Payment - thank you 
2/28/2005 Invoice No 27857 
3/31/2005 Invoice No 28906 
4/30/2005 Invoice No 29324 
5/13/2005 Payment - thank you as of 4/19/05 
5/16/2005 Payment - thank you 
5/31/2005 Invoice No 30125 
6/30/2005 Invoice No 30817 
7/31/2005 Invoice No 31324 
8/31/2005 Invoice No 32180 
9/19/2005 Payment - thank you 
9/30/2005 Invoice No 33107 
10/24/2005 Payment - thank you 
10/31/2005 Payment - thank you 
10/31/2005 Invoice No 33795 
11/3/2005 Payment - thank you 
11/30/2005 Invoice No 34271 
12/6/2005 Payment - thank you - Magleby & Greenwood 
12/14/2005 Payment - thank you 
12/28/2005 Payment - thank you 
12/31/2005 Invoice No 34873 
1/10/2006 Payment - thank you 
1/24/2006 Payment - thank you 
1/31/2006 Courtesy discount per Marlin Grant 
1/31/2006 Invoice No 35695 
2/28/2006 Invoice No 36234 
3/30/2006 Payment - thank you 
3/31/2006 Invoice No 37209 
4/30/2006 Invoice No 37836 
5/19/2006 Payment - thank you 
5/22/2006 Payment - thank you 
5/31/2006 Invoice No 38711 
6/30/2006 Invoice No 39874 
7/10/2006 Payment - thank you 
8/31/2006 Invoice No 41285 
9/5/2006 Payment - thank you 
9/19/2006 Payment - thank you 
9/30/2006 Invoice No 42282 
10/5/2006 Payment - thank you 
10/11/2006 Payment - thank you 
10/31/2006 Invoice No 42802 
11/21/2006 Payment - thank you 
11/30/2006 invoice No 43958 
12/31/2006 Invoice No 44625 
1/5/2007 Payment - thank you 
25189 
25863 
26552 
27298 
27857 
28906 
29324 
30125 
30817 
31324 
32180 
33107 
33795 
34271 
34873 
35695 
36234 
37209 
37836 
38711 
39874 
41285 
42282 
42802 
43958 
44625 
$5,184 15 
($5,022 50) 
($5,183 15) 
$2,078 40 
$3,801 33 
($2,078 40) 
$4,441 90 
($4,441 90) 
$18,838 35 
$10,379 91 
$4,426 75 
($3,800 00) 
($29,150 20) 
$7,700 66 
$2,751 29 
$2,808 35 
$8,846 99 
($11,938 03) 
$4,816 00 
($2,713 60) 
($2,703 25) 
$12,158 83 
($8,718 50) 
$20,679 18 
($170 16) 
($12,078 70) 
($4,767 44) 
$17,111 30 
($184 50) 
($20,634 50) 
($4,132 75) 
$20,138 44 
$13,734 54 
($15,995 45) 
$14,301 09 
$9,727 46 
($13,630 20) 
($14,150 36) 
$7,010 99 
$20,097 87 
($480 42) 
$36,666 74 
($33,849 75) 
($20,097 87) 
$15,173 28 
($18,846 75) 
($17,354 53) 
$16,977 98 
($16,972 13) 
$12,981 28 
$23,753 08 
($12,486 75) 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION Page 72 
Amount 
1/31/2007 Invoice No. 45263 45263 $85,663.14 
2/1/2007 Payment - thank you ($23,618.31) 
2/28/2007 Credit interest charges per Marlin Grant ($881.54) 
Total balance due $101,278.64 
New balance of Default $0.00 
Exhibit G 
Travis Bowen 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0637 
Dear Travis, 
I need your help in executing the buy-out with my brother, Marvin. All we do is 
fight and I am asking that you be a mediator for us. 
Let me first give you some history so that you get a feel for where I am coming 
from. Back in about 1990, we were doing a project for the LDS church in Centerville. 
We hauled a lot of dirt off the project to different places. One place we hauled dirt was 
just west of the Centerville off ramp. These people would not pay us. Marvin asked what 
we should do. I told him to put a lien on the property. Marvin later approached me and 
said he thought we ought to buy the place. 
I told him I thought the people were crooks and that the way they were building 
the storage units on the place was so poor that we could never get financing for it. He 
then came up with the idea that we could finance the place by mortgaging our houses. We 
had taken a hit for $360,000.00 (the figure was provided by Marvin, I don't really know if 
this is the con*ect figure). All I know was that we were in trouble and I was out working 
my butt off trying to pinch every buck I could out of every job. I thought Marvin was 
doing the same. 
Marvin was now working on the storage rental units at Centerville and on the 
Centerville chapel. I thought that he was doing everything for the Company as I was. 
One day I saw some time cards in the office for work at Centerville and Marvin had 
crossed out Centerville and allocated the work to other projects. I asked the secretary 
about this and she responded that Marv said I knew all ibout it and agreed. 
I thought perhaps Marv must be trying to bury the cost of Centerville storage units 
in other projects. At the time I though this project was being done for ABCO and I would 
benefit from it, so I did not pursue the matter. ABCO men and equipment were doing the 
project and it was being financed by ABCO. 
Later on I found that Marvin has mortgaged his house to buy more ground and 
expand the project and upon inquiring about the status of the project, Marv informed me 
that this is his personal project and I am not part of it. He had secured a lawyer with 
whom I did not have a personal relationship so I would not know and set up his own 
program. We argued about this. Marvin had let the ABCO projects go while he worked 
on what is now known as Aspen Springs units for his own personal benefit at a time when 
we were spread pretty thin and ABCO was in financial difficulty to the point that we had 
to mortgage the farm to provide us with working capital. Now Marv was jeopardizing 
ABCO to work on his own project. All this time I thought it was to the benefit of ABCO. 
I went to see Lynn Larsen, ABCO contract attorney. He told me that Marv had a 
fiduciary responsibility to ABCO and that by using ABCO resources and his time, he being 
paid by ABCO to do the project it should be an ABCO project. At this time the project 
was not completed and I had two options- sue Marv and put a lien on the project, which 
would create a situation where it would probably kill the project and split up ABCO, or let 
it go. At the time I thought Marv would eventually make some settlement with me. I did 
not want a fight and I let it go. (In retrospect I should not have, but I thought I was doing 
the best thing for everyone.) 
Marv claims that he paid ABCO for all the work at Aspen Springs, but I don't 
believe it and he won't produce the books to prove it. 
About two years ago I was making a check out from the Westco account, which is 
our farm account, and I noticed that some checks had been made out to Marvin's kids. 
Now this was not unusual because we had paid our kids each year and the accountant 
would tell us how much and Marv and I would agree on the amount and Marv would 
write the checks. My kids because they were older and could justify more with the IRS 
were usually given more than Marv's kids. But each family was to ultimately get equal 
amounts. Marv was spread thin because he has more kids. 
I asked Marv what the deal was, how come he was paying his kids and not mine. 
He said he was just making up for difference the kids had been paid in the past. I 
accepted this answer and never worried about it. Later, I had occasion to get into Westco 
check book and found that upon checking out the check written to Marv's kids they had 
now been given more than my kids had in total by thousands of dollars. I again asked 
Marv what the deal was and demanded that he give me an accounting. Alice provided a 
printout that showed Marv had written checks to his kids without discussing it with me for 
the amount of $63,000.00 more that my kids had received. 
I told Marv this was not right, this was called in the real world embezzlement. He 
told me he did not feel the least bit guilty because he deserved more than me because he 
was worth more than me. 
This resulted in a big argument. I told him I wanted an audit. A few days later, I 
told Marv to write a check to each of my kids for $22,000.00. He said he would not for 
the company could not afford it and he had figured up where I had taken $210,000.00 
more than he from the company. I told him I had never written a check from the 
company that did not go to legitimate company expenses. He went on to tell me that the 
insurance on our vehicles had cost so much more because I had boys and he had girls; that 
my health and retirement insurance cost so much more because I was older, etc. I told 
him that these were not partnership related items, but ABCO employee related. I told him 
I wanted an audit. He told me to quit being so "pissy" and we could work it out. 
I called Davis and Bott and asked if they would come and audit ABCO and 
Westco. They said they would not come unless Marvin agreed. Marv would not agree. 
I told Marv a divided house could not stand and that I did not like coming to work 
and being mad and not being able to trust him and under these circumstances it would be 
better if he were to buy me out. 
We argued over what the outfit was worth. We argued over Aspen Springs. Marv 
would not agree and claimed he was not making any money on it. I told him I just wanted 
my fair share of the ground. I told him the ground was worth $80,000.00 per acre. He 
claimed it wasn't worth $10,000.00 per acre. I got my figures from the neighbors of 
Aspen Springs. 
I had Lee Rasmussen run an appraisal on the Company and Marvin said he (Lee) 
did not know anything and would not accept what Lee said. I had you look it over also. 
Marv did not agree with that. I told him OK I would figure it out and he could figure it 
out and we could work from there. You will find enclosed the copies of rough drafts of 
our settlement. 
The following are items that need to be handled: 
1. $52,000.00 payment due March 21,2000. 
2. $16,000.00 due last January. 
3. Salary continuation. This was not what Marv and I thought it would be when 
we looked closely at the program. Marv thought that maybe he would discontinue this. I 
told him if he decided to discontinue the plan, I would not hold him to paying me because 
without the other employees participating in the plan it would be impossible to make it 
pay. However, if he decided to continue the plan, he could pay me out in two ways. 1) 
$10,000.00 plus for ten years, or 2) wait until I turn 67 and he could pay me $25,000.00 
for 10 years. I should at least get the $10,000.00 per year because that much I helped 
participating and pay for. I heard from the employees that Marv was keeping the plan and 
called Richard Pett from Equitable to make certain. Marv had not discontinued the plan. 
When Marv found out I had called Richard, Marv cussed him out and told him I wasn't 
part of the company and he could not talk to me. It appears that Marvin is trying to cheat 
me out of my salary continuation plan. 
This is not part of the split, but part of my salary as an employee of ABCO. 
Marvin has his salary continuation plan in place for him as do the other key employees. I 
want what is due me, nothing more, but nothing less. 
4. My total salary was not paid to me for 1999. Over the past years, ABCO has 
paid me my monthly check plus $4,000.00 for IRA and $4,400.00 to pay for my Condo 
plus our taxes. Lee Rasmussen always paid enough in quarterly taxes to pay for taxes and 
recover $4,400.00 plus a little more back in taxes so I could use the $4,400.00 to pay 
towards the condo. 
This year I went down to pick up my taxes the day they were finished, which was 
also the day they were due, and found that I was not receiving money for the IRA or my 
$4,400.00. Within an hour I had to dig up $10,000.00 to send with my tax returns. Marv 
claims he does not owe this to me. He is trying to cheat me. I received less in 
compensation from ABCO in 1999 than I did in 1989. This is not right. ABCO owes me 
my total compensation for 1999. 
5. I understand that ABCO has terminated paying my Guardian insurance 
premium, but has not signed the policy over to me. This needs to be taken care of. No 
one is paying the policy at this time. 
6. Marv is supposed to pay my Medicaid insurance until I am 65 years old. He 
claims that the premiums are costing more that he anticipated. This needs to be checked 
out. 
7. Marv has a court order on me so I can't call him, or go to the office or shop. 
This has killed our agreement that I can have access to shop and office and to the 
equipment. I left all my tools, including hand tools with the company because I thought I 
would have access to them at all times. Just last week I needed to repair a water line at 
the farm. I could not go to the shop an get my pipe vise and dies. Those tools I have had 
since before ABCO. Now I can't access my tools. I think Marv is wrong in creating this 
situation and has breached our sell out agreement by so doing. 
I had arranged not to go anywhere for the Memorial weekend so I could wrap up 
what I had to do for ABCO, but I could not go to the office nor did I have access to the 
paper work I needed. 
Marvin is not going to let this agreement with the equipment work. Since he is not 
willing to make it work, he should pay me $250,000.00 for the equipment and tools. If 
Marvin does not want to do this, I will split them with him down to the last wrench, chair, 
computer and piece of paper. 
8. Marv agreed to pay for fixing up our rental units at the farm with the stipulation 
that I would not "go wild". Upon sending some bills for the "fixup" to the office, they 
were sent back indicating that ABCO was not responsible for these bills. I talked to Marv 
and told him that I knew that over the last seven years the farm had created more revenue 
than he had paid on the mortgage and this extra money should go to the farm. 
Marv claimed this was not true. I asked him to provide the books to Westco to 
see if this was true or not. He has refused to do this. 
9. I told Marv I should have 1/2 of what ABCO made in 1999 since this year was 
not included in what ABCO was worth. He said ABCO would not even make 
$40,000.00. I told him if that is all we were going to make on the amount of work we had 
done, he had better change business. I figure we should have made about $400,000.00. I 
would like to see the books. 
On the 25th of April 2000 (the proceedings of this day are enclosed) I asked 
Marvin to have an audit or let me review the books on ABCO since 1988 and the books of 
Westco from the time we took out the last mortgage on the farm, which I believe was in 
1993. Marvin said nobody was going to see the books. 
After April 25th, things have changed. I have taken enough. I have turned my 
cheek twice and thought that I was doing the best for all concerned. I was wrong. 
1. Marv has taken advantage of me on Aspen Springs. 
2. Marv has misappropriated funds from ABCO to himself and his children. This 
is called embezzlement. 
3. Marv has created a situation where I don't have access to tools and/or 
equipment. 
4. Marv created a situation that caused me to be thrown in jail and is now costing 
me attorney fees. 
Bottom line - Marv must do the following: 
1. Marv pays me $52,000.00 and $16,000.00 plus immediately. 
2. Marv pays me my complete salary for 1999. 
3. Marv continues to pay my insurance as agreed. 
4. Marv continues to pay off my truck. 
5. Marv signs over the Guardian policy and he pays the premiums at no cost to me 
until he does. 
6. Marv pays for fixing up the rental units on the farm and produces books for 
Westco to determine how much money is available. 
7. Marv produces books for ABCO from 1988 to January 1,2000 and a review is 
made to determine how much money has been misappropriated and how much went to 
Aspen Springs.. 
8. Marv pays me $250,000.00 for equipment and tools since he has denied me 
access to them. 
9. Marv complies with my salary continuation plan with ABCO. 
10. Marv pays me 1/2 of what ABCO made in 1999. 
Since I can no longer trust Marv, I think it appropriate that he pay me the rest of 
what he owes me in a lump sum and also pay the taxes on this sum. 
If Marv is not willing to comply with the above, then please consider this the letter 
required in the contract documents to rescind the buy out contract. I will again become 
part of ABCO and make certain that I am treated fairly. I am not required to turn the 
other cheek again. 
Hope you can help. 
Thank you. x name you. / 
Branson G. Neff 
PS 
On Friday, June 9,2000, ABCO bookkeeper Ken Oakeson, brought me a 
check for $52,000.00. I don't know why the $16,000.00 was not included. I can't even 
call to find out or thank Marv for reconsidering and paying me. 
I think since Marv had me thrown in jail there is no more negotiation left in me. 
My attorney has advised me to give you this letter rather than meet in person in view of 
the court order. He thinks Marvin set me up last time and I was dumb enough to let him. I 
don't think I want to be in that situation again. Please find enclosed the documentation to 
what occurred on May 25,2000. 
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I received a call from Judge Kevin Christensen. He requested to know what 
was happening with Branson Neff• Judge Christensen was contacted by 
^Branson Neff's wife. Judge Christensen had represented Branson Neff in 
I the pasc. Judge Christensen asked if the case would be sent to his court. 
I informed him "Yes." Judge Christensen informed'me he would be releasing 
Branson tfefif on his own recognizance. Judge Christensen told me Branson 
Neff has lived here his whole life and is not a threat to go anywhere. I 
informed Judge Christensen that Branson's brother, Marvin, was going to get 
a"Restraining Order to keep Branson away from, the business. Judge 
Christensen requested to speak with Branson. Branson was allowed to speak 
with Judge Christensen for ^  few minutes before he was booked into jail. 
Branson was instructed by Judge Christensen to stay away from ABCO 
Construction. Branson agreed to do so. 
Branson Neff was booked into the Box Elder County Jail on one count of 
assault. I issued Branson a citation for the assault charge (Citation 
#A10559) • 
This will need to be forwarded to the County Attorney for possible 
charges of assault on Marvin Neff at the request of Branson Neff. 
Branson Neff's statement will be added when it is completed and returned 
to the Sheriff's Office. 
This case will remain active until reviewed by the County Attorney, 
No further action taken* 
REFER TO COUNTY ATTORNEY. 
Case ACTIVE. 
8. Date, Time, Reporting Deputyt 
05-24-2000 1611 jc. Wiggins 1C25 
Received:05-25-00 
ryped-di:05-25-00 
V t V <{ I d 
Marvin told me that Branson was pushing him with his belly and hitting 
him in the chest and throat with his index finger-
I instructed Branson to turn around and place his hands behind his 
back that I was placing him under arrest for assault. ""Branson refused 
the request and took-a .step back away from me. Branson tried to argue 
the fact that he owns the business, and I have no right to arrest: him. 
I informed Branson if he did not comply with my orders, he would be 
charged wirh resisting arrest along with disorderly conduct and assault, 
Branson complied. He turned around, placed his hands behind his back, 
and requested the cuffs be placed on loose due to medical reascns. I 
complied with Branson's request and placed the cuffs on as loose as 
possible. I double locked the cuffs and escorted Branson out of the 
building to my patrol vehicle. 
I had to physically escort Branson out: the door. Branson and Marvin 
were still exchanging words. Marvin followed us out of the building. 
I instructed Marvin to go back inside, or he would be going_along also. 
Marvin complied and went back inside: I placed Branson in the back seat 
of my vehicle. I explained to Branson why he had been arrested and what 
the charges were. I told him I was going back in to speak with Marvin 
and get a written statement frcm him. I told Branson if Marvin wouldn't 
do a statement, I would be issuing him a citation for disorderly conduct 
and releasing him but if Marvin does a statement, I would be booking him 
into jail on assault charges. 
I went back into ABCO and spoke with Marvin and the three witnesses. 
1 informed Marvin of his options - He could press charges for assault 
and Branson would be booked into jail for the assault. If net, I would 
be issuing Branson a citation for disorderly conduct and releasing him. 
Marvin stated he wanted Branson charged with assault. I told him I would 
eed a detailed statement of what happened frcm the time Branson entered 
he building tc the time I arrived. I also requested witness statements 
from the two secretaries and other workers thac were in the office when 
Branson came in. The three witnesses complied with my request:. (See 
witnesses' statements for further information-) 
Marvin asked what he had to do to keep Branson from coming back into 
the business. I instructed him on how to get a Protective Order and 
where he has to go to get one. I informed Marvin I would return and pick 
up the witnesses' statements around 1300 hrs• 
I then returned and informed Branson of what was going on and informed 
him I would be booking him into jail on assault charges. Branson wanted 
to press charges on Marvin for assault also* I told Branson I would give 
him a witness' statement, and it would be forwarded to "the County Attorney. 
I then asked Branson if he had a vehicle in the parking area of ABCO. 
Branson stated "Yes". I asked if it was locked. He replied, "No, can my 
wife come and get it". I told him "Yes". He requested I call his wife to 
come get his truck. I returned inside and asked the secretary if she could 
contact Branson's wife to come pick up his truck. She did. When Branson's 
wire arrived, I informed her of what was going on and that she could come 
and bail Branson out of jail in Brigham City. : allowed Branson to speak 
with her for a few minutes to arrange bail. 
I then transported Branson to jail. While doing the booking paperwork, 
t 
ocom 
narrative:. 
Assault Investigation Narrative 
!• Brief Description of the Offense: 
Suspect entered victim's business, started threatening him, became 
physical hitting him, and pushing him around. 
2^ Location of Occurrence * 
24 35 North 7600 West, Corinne 
ABCO Construction 
3. Relationships Between the Parties; Motives, Mutual Consent: 
The suspect and victim are brothers. They were in business together 
at one time. 
4. Weapons or Force Used: 
Weapons were hands and fist. 
Force was hitting and pushing. 
5. Description of victim's Injuries & Medical Treatment Given? 
No medical treatment required, 
5. Witness Observations: 
There were three witnesses. See three statements for further 
Information. 
1. Deputy's Narrative, Date, Tine, Action Taken* 
On 05-2S-2000 at 1054 hrs, I was dispatched to the above location on 
i civil disturbance/911 hang up. While en route to the location, I was 
.nformed by dispatch that they were placed on hold. 
When I arrived at ABCQ Construction as I was exiting my vehicle, I 
'as met by Kyle Smoot. Kyle requested I wait outside for a few minutes. 
e stated they are inside trying to talk it out- I walked past Kyle 
nd into the business. As I entered I saw two male individuals toe to 
oe* The two were identified as Branson Neff (DOB: 07-13-38 5 and Marvin 
eff (DOB:0?-26-51) victim/complainant. 
1 could tell Branson was very upset over something. Branson was 
Ding oiosc of the yelling and finger pointing, i instructed both 
ranfion and Marvin to separate. Marvin took a step backwards* Branson 
allowed Marvin by stepping forward toward Marvin. I stepped between the 
<o of them. I ordered Branson to back up. I told Marvin to back up to 
xe open door behind hiuw Marvin complied. Branson stood his ground 
iysically refusing to comply with my order. I told Branson a second 
.me to back up, or I would arrest him for disorderly conduct, Branson 
tplied, ,rYou have no right to arrest me. I have a right to be here. 1 
rn this place.11 I had to tell Branson a third time to back away* He 
implied by taking two steps backwards. I informed Branson he was being 
scrderly at this time, and I could arrest him. 
Marvin stated, "I want him arrested for assault. He hie me three 
mes. Once in the chest with his fist, and he pushed me back against 
drafting table by my shoulder while I was sitting in my chair.11 
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September 19,2000 
To Whom It May Concern: 
During the month of June, 2000,1 was employed as a paralegal by the Law Offices of 
Travis L. Bowen, P.C. Travis L. Bowen and Gregory Burdett are attorneys that work for the 
same firm. During the same month, I attended a meeting with Marvin Neff and Branson Neff at 
the Law Offices of Travis L. Bowen, P.C "Travis L. Bowen attended the first hour of the 
meeting and then left, and Gregory Burdett attended the final half-hour of the meeting. Marvin 
and Branson were trying to come to an agreement about several business dealings and a piece of 
property in Corinne, Utah. Aa th<s mating progressed, Branson became frustrated and 
aggravated to the extent that he paced around the conference room during the negotiations. 
Throughout the meeting, Marvin and Branson argued about their various business dealings and 
also directed offensive, non-threatening, remarks (such as name calling) at each other. Marvin 
remained calm as the remarks were exchanged, but Branson became more and more aggravated. 
The meeting ended with no agreement or compromise by the Neffs. Upon walking to the 
conference room door, Branson instigated a verbal altercation with Marvin. Bransombecame 
more aggravated and I eventually separated him from Marvin to avoid any phyacaTconfact. 
Neither brother physically touched each other, however, Branson made several remarks to 
Marvin regarding a previous.altercation involving assault. I do not recall exactly what Branson 
said to Marvin, although, I know that Marvin felt threatened by Branson's remarks. 
Josh Fbukas 
oec-4 
My wife tfiett came down to the office fe> seeme carted away tojail like a common 
cnmfnat What a travesty f 
I then grabbed Marv by the shoulder and pulled him up so he could get his feet oir 
the floor. We both walked out of the office chest to chest, yelling at each other. When* 
we got out in the general office, the secretaries looked aghast. I said^  well I guess I wilf 
tell you what this all about. I told them that the reason I left the company was not to 
retire, but that I couldn't stand to work with Marvin after I discovered he was stealing 
from me. I told them that I had taken it in the shorts, by trying to work something out 
that would not destroy the business and now he was reneging on that deal. 
I told them that he was a thieving bastard (being used as an adjective,, rather than a 
swearword). Marvin stuck his chin out and 3aid,"Hitme! I know you are dying to hit 
me!" I told him if he would sign off that he would not get me for assault, I would be glad 
to duke it out with him right here and now. 
He again stuck out his chin and came over chest to chest said hit me, hit me. I 
said, sign and motioned to the desk, and you've got it 
The Sheriff now came and stood at the corner of our counter and told us to get 
away from each other. We then stepped back from each other The Sheriff said he was 
there on an assault charge. I told him there was not assault, I was just trying to collect my 
money, I then said all I did was poke him in the chest with my index finger, and as I told 
him, I put my index finger on Marvin's chest. The Sheriff said that was assault 
I said I couldn't believe it The Sheriff then told me I was under arrest and to put 
my hands behind my back. I told him there was no need to cuff me, I would go with him 
peaceably. He told me that it was the law that he had to cuff me and to put my hands 
behind my back. I complied, but was dismayed 
The Sherifftold me that I had no right being tho*e. I told him that I owned the 
property and the building and that I had every right to be there, he grabbed me and 
ushered me to hi$ car and told me he did not believe me. I told him to check the deeds at 
the court house. 
I told the Sheriff I could not believe what was going on. As brothers we have had 
may arguments over the years and that the company was better fbrit I believe that if in a 
partnership there are no debates or conflicts, one of the partners is not needed. I told him 
that it was not always me that was the aggressor. 
Tins time he owned me money and was reneging on our deal I told him that over 
the years we had plenty of conflicts but I had never even thought of calling the police. I 
figured if we could not handle the problem, we were not worth much. 
The Sheriff then told me he had seen this situation a million times and would go 
back in the office and see if they would reduce the charge to a domestic squabble and he 
would be back and take the cuffs off. 
When the Sheriff came back, he told me that Marvin would not budge from assault 
charges and did not want me to be able to come to the office. I told him I could not 
believe what was happening and that maybe Marvin really did not have the money to pay 
me and was creating a smoke screen to keep me from approaching him for the money at 
the office in front of ABCO personnel 
Marvin called by wife when I was in the Sheriff car and started to recite all the 
things I had said to him trying to justify what he was doing to me. My wife said, No 
Marvin that is not what Branson said to you. He said, how do you know. My wife said 
because Branson does not use the * Y"woirt 
The following is a chronology of events that took place at ABCO Construction 
office on May 25,2000: 
These events would not have taken place if Marvin had paid me as per our 
previous agreement. 
Since the first of the year, Marvin has owed me $16,000.00 phis for an insurance 
policy I signed ova: to him. Another payment of $52,000.00 was due March 21,2000, 
which he has failed to pay. 
A few weeks ago, I asked Marvin if he had forgotten me and asked him fbrthe 
money. He told me he had to borrow it and did not have it I told him that was bogus; he 
had enough money in the hank and to just write me out a check. He told me he would 
have to gather up the money. I told him he had three months already to gather up the 
money and if he kept delaying payment, he would have to pay me 10% on the money per 
month as that was what it was costing me not having the money on March 21st as agreed 
upon including the $16,000.00 which had been due for five months. 
Last weekend, we all went to California to a nieces' wedding. While there Marvin 
took a couple of extra days and visited all Southern California theme parks with his family. 
I figured since he had time and money to spend on himself he ought to have enough 
money to pay me. 
On the day mentioned, I went down to ABCO office with the intent of collecting 
my money. I sat down across from Marvin and we exchanged pleasantries. I then asked if 
he were ready to pay me. He said no. I said: How can you treat me like this? Youhave 
already cheated me out of 1/4 million and whatever amount you have embezzled from the 
Company. How can you sit there and tell me you won't pay? You need your ass kicked 
right up around your ears. You cheated me out of 20% of the business and cheated my 
boys out of having an opportunity to have a piece of the company. J am not going to let 
you add insult to injury, you are abusing me - the guy who provided you with the most! 
Marvin sat smugly back iniiis chair and said, "I am not going to pay you." I asked 
why? He told me I had been saying bad tilings about him and was trying to destroy him. 
I told him I didn't have to tell anyone anything, the neighbors were not dumb. 
They could see how he had cheated me and my boys. I told Mary the neighbors had 
watched us for 20 years and I was sure they had a pretty good idea of what was going on. 
I told him t had not told anyone in the company that he was embezzling, but if he 
wasn*t going to pay me, I wanted the books (accounting) of both ABCO and WestCo. He 
told me he wasn't going to give me the books and that no one was coming to the office to 
look at therm No one was going to look at the books. 
I said, then pay me. He just sat there and told me he wasn't going to pay me. I 
jumped up and said, the hell you're not You can't do this to me. I went toward him 
shaking my index finger at him and poked him in the chest to make an explanation mark 
on what I had just said. 
He tried to get up fast out of his chair and tipped over backwards where he had his 
neck laying on the edge of the drawing table, sitting in the chair with his feet off the 
ground and with me standing directly in front of his. He could not move in any direction. 
Marvin starting yelling to Melanee to call the police,! was hitting hint The door 
to the office was open and I yelled to Melanee to come and see that I was NOT hitting 
him and that if I was, he would be bloody on the floor. 
September 23, 2000 
Marvin NefF 
2495 N. 7600 W. 
Corinne, Utah 84307 
Dear Marv, 
I am writing this letter in hopes that we can work out our differences. Prior to the 
company buyout and property settlement, we did not see eye to eye on a number of issues but we 
finally came to an agreement. I am committing myself to rise to a higher level and get along on a 
complementary, giving and brotherly manner and I am asking you to do the same. I have been 
upset because we have apparently betrayed our trust in each other and it is a shame after so many 
great years together. I know I have mispoken and said some regrettable things about you, none 
of which should have been said and for this I am very sorry. 
I want you to know that I do not wish to perpetrate any physical harm upon you in any 
way. I regret expressing myself so vigorously and vocally on April 25, 2000. I should not have 
threatened you either verbally or physically. I apologize for any harm I may have caused, 
emotionally or physically. Again, some terrible things were said, were spoken in anger and 
unfounded. Upon reflection, you repeatedly told me to leave and calm down and I should have 
calmly walked out of the office and gone home. I am sorry this incident occurred. 
We have always been able to work out our business differences and want to continue to 
do so. Perhaps, if we changed our thinking from "what am I not getting" to being grateful for the 
blessings we do have, and, "what can I do to help others succeed", it would make a lot of 
difference. I am very grateful and appreciative for all the things you have done with me over the 
years and know you feel the same way about the things I have done with you. I apologize for 
expressing myself the way I have and hope you will accept this apology. I know that time will 
heal all wounds and hope that our individual lives will again be close and enjoyable. 
Respectfully, 
Branson Neff 
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Exhibit I 
PRIVATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
Region 1/Brigham City 
9 West Forest Street #275 
PO Box 497 
BrighamCity, UTS4302 
(435) 734-2066 
c: 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE REPORT 
Date Due: 11-04-05 
Sentencing Date: 11-08-05 
JUDGE Ben H. Hadfield First District COURT 
Brieham City Box Elder UTAH 
(CITY) (COUNTY) 
Aaron Muir IWESTIGATOR 
NAME: Branson Gray Neff 
ALIASES: Brans 
ADDRESS: 2625 North 7600 West 
Corinne, UT 84307 
BIRTHDATE: 07-19-1938 AGE: 67 
OFFENDER NO. 170051 
PROSECUTINGATTY: Amy Hugie 
DEFENSE ATTY: Blake Nakamura 
MARITAL STATUS: Married 
Court Case No. 
051100300 
Offense Plea 
Violation Of Protective Order, Class A Plea In 
Misdemeanor; Interfere W/Legal Arrest, Abeyance 
Class B Misdemeanor 
Conviction Date 
09-27-05 
RECOMMEND A TION: 
The staff of Adult Probation and Parole respectfully recommends the following additional Plea 
In Abeyance terms be imposed and supervised by a private provider: 
1. Serve 7 days in the Box Elder County Jail. 
2'. NoTto possess or have undeFhis control any firearms or dangerous weapons. 
3. Enter and successfully complete domestic violence counseling. 
4. Complete a mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment. 
5. Have no contact with the victim, or be within 500 feet of his person or property. 
nnr* •* r\f\ 
6. Choose to either remove all barriers preventing the victim from relocating, or submit to 
24 hour GPS tracking through a private provider. 
7. Write a letter of apology to be approved by the court, and submitted to the Box Elder 
News Journal. 
EVALVATB^E ASSESSMENT AND PROBLEM AREAS: 
Mr. Neff scored low on The Level of Service Inventory Assessment. The standardized test itself 
may not be an appropriate indicator for determining which areas need to be worked on, in order 
to minimize risk and avoid future legal problems. There are warning signs with this case 
indicative of a tragedy waiting to happen. 
OFFENSE: 
A. Plea Agreement: The defendant was originally charged under a different case number 
with: L) Aggravated Assault/Domestic Violence, a Second Degree Felony; II.) Assault 
Against Peace Officer, a Class A Misdemeanor; III.) Violation* Of Protective Order, a 
Class A Misdemeanor; IV.) Interfering With Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
These charges, filed under ease no. 051100023 were dismissed, and then re-filed as: I.) 
Protective Order Violation, a Class A Misdemeanor; and II.) Interfering With Arrest, a 
Class B Misdemeanor. 
B. Factual Summary of the Offense: Officers responded to the report of a citizen dispute 
between Branson and Marvin Neft; and that Branson Neff possibly had a gun in his truck. 
Dispatch also stated there was a protective order on statewide against Branson Neff. The 
petitioner of that protective order was Marvin Neff Statements made during 
investigation of the incident from the brothers were conflicting about what happened. 
Marvin Neff said Branson hit him with his truck and attempted to run him over. Branson 
Neff said Marvin hit him in the shoulder and ear with his hand, and that he sped away to 
avoid being assaulted. Both parties received minor injuria during fc fttoffllh 
Marvin had a cut on his head in his hairline. His right knee was cut and bleeding, his 
pants were- ripped, and his right hand was cut and scratched. These injuries were 
sustained when he let go of the vehicle as it was in motion and the subsequent rolling 
down the road. He said he did not need medical attention at that time. Branson had a 
small cut on his left ear. He also said he did not need medical attention. 
The officer asked Mr. Neff if he wanted to pursue assault charges on Marvin. Branson 
said he did not want to pursue charges on his brother. The officer told Branson he was 
arresting him for a protective order violation. The officer asked him to turn around and 
submit to being handcuffed. Branson moved away and said he would come peacefully, 
but would not be handcuffed, and that he could take all the officers on. He was told it was 
policy that he had to be handcuffed. He stepped over his dog, taking a fighting stance, 
and clenched his fists. One officer took his left arm in a twist lock. He flexed and 
attempted to pull away. Another reserve deputy secured his right arm as he was placed in 
handcuffs. He was escorted safely to jail. 
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C. Defendant's Statement: My version is the true version. Here's what happened I think it 
was January 25, 2005. You need to keep in perspective the whole reason this occurred. 
Somewhere in 1999 I found that my brother who is in business with me was embezzling 
from me. He had been writing checks in the amount of 1000s of dollars from the 
corporate funds to his kids When I found this I requested a printout of the checks that he 
had written. That printout showed that he had written his kids $63,000 to his kids in the 
last couple of years to his kids without my knowledge. To keep this m proper 
perspective, you need to understand that in years previous we had given all our kids 
money, from the company as directed by our CPA. But we had had some tough problems 
and lost a lot of money one year therefore, we hadn't given them any money for a few 
years. Now, previous to the time I just mentioned, I saw that in the book that some 
checks were written to his kids51 asfed tlffi Wtty Wj ft had llftt feCfeiVei any money. 
He said that previously my kids had received more money because it was easier to justify 
to the IRS because they were older and now he was just making up the difference. I 
accepted that answer, but when 1 looked in the books later, there were more checks to his 
kids and from my mental calculation, Marvin's kids had received more money in the last 
few years than my kids in total. 1 then asked for the aforementioned accounting of the 
books, I have since found upon having an auditor audit the books that this excuse of 
Marvin's was a lie. I then told Marvin that I could not stand to work with a guy that was 
a liar and a cheat then he told me that he did not feel a bit guilty, because he was so much 
smarter than I was so he deserved more money. When he told me that the shit hit the fan. 
Through numerous time and negotiations we finally agreed that he would buy me out. In 
early 2000,1 went down to collect my payment to the ABCO office. Marvin told me that 
he was not going to pay me. I told him that I was not going to accept that, that he 
deserved the shit beat out of him. I stood up, and he stood up and backed up and fell 
backwards. He started yelling to the secretary that I was beating him up and to call the 
cops. I did not beat him up. He was pinned against his drafting table with his feet off the 
floor with no purchase to get up. I reached down and grabbed his shoulders and pulled 
him up. We went out of his office yelling at each other. The cops came, handcuffed me 
and threw me in jail. Marvin claimed he had the right to do that because he owned the 
office building. This was in fact incorrect because the building had flOt t)OT ^M (111 
to him yet; in fact, much of the buyout had not been accomplished. 
He put a protective order on me at this time. But he was not afraid of me. This was just a 
ruse for him to be able to keep me from using the equipment at ABCO shop as we had 
agreed. I went to Court to try and get the protective order off of me and went before 
Judge Judkins. He directed Marvin that I could call him and that he was to respond by 
providing me with the equipment or tools that I desired or requested. Marvin has failed 
to do this although I have requested tools and equipment numerous times both by written 
certified mail and by fax. He has never responded by furnishing the equipment and tools 
or by giving me reason for not doing so. Marvin protested to Judge Judkins that I could 
caU him. But Judge Judkins told him that I could not hurt him by calling therefore I 
could. Marvin took this to mean that the Judge told him that I could hurt him. Then 
upon arriving home, he called me. He wanted to make certain that I understood that he 
could "clock" me any time he wanted. Showing me that the only reason that he had a 
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protective order on me was so that he would not have to let me come to the shop and use 
tools and/or equipment, and/or associate with the employees of ABCO. 
In the summer of 2000,1 did not receive a tax notice for my farm or my home. My wife 
went to the County Recorder to find out why. She found at the recorders office that my 
farm and my home were no longer in my name, but that Marvin had recorded them in the 
name of an entity that he owned. I wrote him a letter, in fact, numerous letters, and asked 
that he take care of this matter, thinking maybe it may have been a mistake, rather than a 
malicious act. But his response was in a meeting on 7600 West as we walked in the 
morning and discussed this matter was for me to "get fucked". He would not respond to 
numerous letters that are on record concerning this matter, 
I then in the latter part of 2001 went to the hospital for a surgery to replace my aortic 
valve. Marvin thought that I was going to die and he could get away with everything. He 
wrote my wife a letter telling her that he was dropping my insurance. At the time she 
was looking at a $100,000 bill for my surgery. My deal with Marvin was that he would 
pay for my medical insurance until I became age 65 because I have diabetes and I knew 
that I could not get insurance anywhere else. Marvin owed me thousands of dollars and 
my wife called him and asked him to not do away with the insurance. He said that he had 
paid too much money for insurance and that he wasn't paying any more. She asked him 
to pay for the insurance from the money that he owed us but he refused to. My insurance 
was subsequently dropped and I went bare until I became eligible for Medicare. The 
insurance did pay for my heart surgery, but subsequent costs I had to handle on my own. 
There were numerous aspects of our agreement that had not been consummated and I 
could not get Marvin or the attorney Travis Bowen that was handling the buyout to 
respond to numerous letters and pleadings to get this work done. I even went to our 
church leaders and asked them to try and get us together to resolve this matter. They 
refused to do this. I don't really know why, but I think Marvin browbeat them to the 
point that they were afraid to do anything. 
I then had no alternative but to launch a lawsuit against Marvin to recover all ttuft 1$ jftd 
taken from me When 1 Came home k m the hospital my wife was being terrorized by 
Marvir, He had written her and told her that he was dropping the insurant Se had her 
house, he had her farm, and he had all the money that was due me for my work that was 
due me for the work over the last 30 years. I hired attorney Ben Hathaway to try and take 
care of this matter, but he was snowed under by Marv, and I had to fire him. I then 
engaged the services of Jim Magleby to pursue this matter for me and try and recover 
what is rightfully mine. To date we have recovered my home, about four months ago I 
recovered most of my farm. Marvin had agreed to sign my water over to me but it has 
not taken place yet, and we were still in litigation over the money he owes me. Marvin 
has felt the pressure of the community because of his actions. And under this backdrop 
of information the following incident occurred, I think on January 26, 2005. 
It was my practice to come home late at night for the last 25 years to drive past my home, 
past Marvin's home, past the ABCO office, and swing around past the south end of 7600 
west where my lights could sweep the ABCO shop and yard to see if there was any 
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unusual activity, tlL_. *drive home. Marvin knew this was my practice. It agitated him 
that this was my practice, and that I could drive by and observe what he was doing. On 
this particular night, I drove past, not to observe Marvin, but to see if anybody had moved 
into the trailer home that had been put on property that had been ABCO property at the 
end of 7600 West, that had recently been sold to someone. When I swung around the 360 
degrees in order to return home, a vehicle was coming down 2400 North, and I had to 
wait for it to pass. I could not tell who this was because all I could see was their lights 
but it turned out to be my neighbor Maurice Carter, who is also Marvin's neighbor, who 
lives on the east side of 7600 West between Marv's house and mine. When he passed a 
considerable distance I then started north on 7600 West. As I passed the ABCO shop and 
approached Marvin's house, I saw an image of a human being standing in the middle of 
the road. I slowed down not being able to determine who it was and thinking lU^VbC tlM 
someone was maybe drunk because they were not moving as I approached them. I 
slowed down to a crawl, and as I crept past, at about two feet away I saw that the person 
in question was Marvin. I then continued to move forward and he started to wave his 
arms and was yelling. I thought that maybe he was in some kind of emergency and might 
need my help. I therefore, stopped and backed up. I then rolled down my window and 
said "What do you need?" and he said, " You don't need to keep driving by here we've 
moved.11 meaning that ABCO construction had moved from that location over to Perry. 
He then started accusing me of trying to kill his wife and kids. I told him that I liked his 
wife and kids, I even liked him but I didn't like what he was doing trying to steal what 
was mine.*11 then told him that he was a cheat, a thief, an embezzler, a liar, and a Judas. 
Upon telling him that he was a Judas, he swung with his right fist, with him standing like 
the police do behind the front door so that I could not see it coming. It hit me with full 
force on my ear, and split my ear so it bled. However, I did not know it was bleeding at 
the time. He then took a second swing at me. I could not move because I was tethered in 
my seat by my seatbelt. I was able to move just so that the swing hit me in the shoulder 
instead of my head. He then took a third swing, and by this time I had freed my left aim 
from against the door and parried the blow and he grabbed my steering wheel with his 
right hand. I told him "Enough of this, I'm out of here" and took off up the road. He 
kept trying to pull me off to the side of the road and I was pulling for all I was worth to 
keep the truck in the road, and with me trying to pull the steering wheel from him, and 
with the purchase required to Stay Oil the road pulling a p & t i l , ffff tt f l M A&M 
on the accelerator. We started going a speed that was now dangerous for him to let go. 
He yelled out to me as I approached my driveway "You're going to kill me, 
Brans...Stop." I stopped. He looked over and dropped off. I drove in my driveway. It 
was a dark night with no moon or stars. I thought he might be hurt and I better go check. 
I then drove out the north end of my driveway and swung around on 7600 West going 
south, and saw Marvin walking down the road. I then pulled into the south end of my 
driveway and went into my house. 
I went in the house and greeted my wife. She said with great anxiety "What has 
happened? You're bleeding all down the side of you head". She brought a tissue and 
wiped the Slood off my ear and head. Apparently the blow that Marvin hit me with was 
with enough force to split my ear open. I then told my wife that my attorney had told me 
that Marvin would break under the pressure of this lawsuit because it was not going well 
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for him. I then called Mr. Magleby and left a message on his answering service. After 
hanging up the phone the doorbell rang. I told my wife not to answer it because it is 
probably Marv and we are not pursuing this. The doorbell kept linging incessantly. 1 
told my wife to go see if it really was Marv. She said she could not because we had a 
snowman hanging on the door, which covered the peephole. I then went upstairs to look 
out the upstairs window to see what I could observe. To my surprise, there was one 
sheriffs vehicle parked in my driveway and two others coming in each end of my 
driveway with their lights off. The phone then rang and asked if I was Mr. Neff and I 
said "Yes". The person calling infomied me that they were the Box Elder County 
Sheriffs office, that officers were at my door, and that I was required to answer my door 
and let them in. I answered the door and officer Blanchard introduced himself, and a s W 
me if I had a protective order on me. I said "yes". He said we want to talk to you about 
that may we come in?" I opened the door and he and a couple other officers came in. I 
ushered them into our kitchen and introduced them to my wife. I told them the story that 
I have just described. I asked them why they were there because I had not called them. 
They said that Marvin had called them and that they were going to arrest me. I couldn't 
believe that they were arresting me because I felt that I was the victim, not the 
perpetrator. I told them that I would go peaceably but please don't put the cuffs on me. 
They told me that it was the law, I told them that it was not the law and that they didn't 
need to. I stood up and walked behind my table and an officer from each side jumped on 
me. I yielded, and they put the cuffs on me. 
I could not figure out why they were hauling me to jail, I had not done anything wrong 
as far as they were concerned. I later found out that Marvin was accusing me of trying to 
run him down with my truck. This is a complete, fabricated lie. My attorney has since 
deposed and interrogated in pre-trial hearings and during these three different times, his 
story has been different each time. According to Marvin's stories, this could not have 
happened the way he has portrayed it. I felt completely confident that no jury would 
convict me of aggravated assault because it did not happen. I was the victim of an assault 
from Marvin. 
I believe that this was a complete frame by Marvin. He made this part of the civil suit in 
an effort to ingratiate himself in the civil matter, and in an effort to cost me more money. 
Upon my launching this lawsuit, Marvin came to my office in Brigham City and told me 
that I couldn't beat him in a lawsuit because he had all the money. I told him that I had 
been broke* before and that there was no way that he was going to get away with what he 
was doing.' He had been successful in getting the State to do his bidding without him put 
in a dime in attorney fees and it has cost me megabucks to defend myself. 
C Custody Status: Mr. Neff was attested on January 27, 2005. He posted bail a few hours 
later. 
CRIMINAL HISTORY: 
A. Juvenile Record: None. 
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B. Adult Record: 
Til innn ^ f °' °ffeme Disposition 
5-17-JXX) UHP Resisting/Interfering with Convicted of Disorderly 
Arrest, Failure to Comply, Conduct 7-2-2001 
Carrying Concealed Weapon 
01 -27-2005 BESO Aggravated Assault, Threat Instant offense 
Against Life/Property, 
Interfering W/Arresting 
Officer, Protective Order 
Violation 
As early as the 1970s he has shown a propensity to use the threat of violence in order to enforce 
his own style of justice. According to a Box Elder Count}' Sheriffs Sergeant, an incident 
occurred when as a deputy serving civil papers, he first encountered Branson Neff. The then 
deputy introduced himself and stated his purpose. At that time Mr. Neff went to the back of the 
barn and retrieved a rifle. The deputy left at that point without violence. Later another deputy 
attempted to serve civil papers on Mr. Neff. Mr. Neff had been working with a welding torch 
and reportedly grabbed the deputy by his shirt and tie stating, "How would you like to be 
burned?" The confrontation ended when the deputy deployed his sidearm in response with no 
shots fired. 
The incident listed on his adult record was also researched. The trooper who initially pulled Mr. 
Neff over in Davis County no longer works for the Utah Highway Patrol. However, there is at 
least one person who remembers the incident and Mr. Neff vividly. This witness with the UHP 
states that the patrol vehicle video recording clearly shows Mr. Neffunloading the 357 magnum 
pistol that he had brandished after failing to comply with the trooper's instructions. According to 
the witness, this was done in an attempt to conceal the fact that the firearm was loaded. The case 
was drawn out in the legal system until Ml. Mplead to a b e t ekge of ttWerly CotuW 
The firearm was then returned to Mr. Neff 
These incidents could have each ended with deadly consequences. They indicate a pattern of 
disregard for law enforcement and disrespect for the responsible use of firearms. 
C. Pending Cases: None 
D. Gang Affiliation:' None 
E. Probation/Parole History: None 
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VICTIMIMFA CTSTA TEMENTAND RESTITUTION-
MZS^ TnS t h a t hiS f a m i b ; ^ bCen h V m g " C° n S t a i l t te for l h e »«* five years. He believes that Branson is intent on destroying him any way that is possible "with guns vehicles 
^ Z ^ ° t l " ™ - "
 k
He W0Uld l lke to s e e
 the most string** reqmrements posstb 
enforced as conditions of probation, including a lengthy jail sentence. He reports that he has 
attempted to sell his property in order to move away from his brother but was foiled when 
Branson tiled a "Us pendans" preventing the sale. Marvin would like Branson to either buy the 
house for $335,000, or lift the lis pendans. 
Marvin reports that he has incurred more than $800 in medical expenses related to the incident. 
He does not know how to estimate the future expenses as he has developed back related 
problems. He also feels that about $50,000 would help alleviate the mental anguish he has 
experienced due to the slander and threats from his brother. 
DEFENDANTS LIFE HISTORY AND CURRENT LIVING SITU A TION: 
Branson Neff was born July 19, 1938 in Salt Lake City, Utah. He remembers growing up 
helping his father work on the ranch. He helped distribute produce to surrounding communities. 
He claims that his mother was the dearest woman, a Saint, and the finest musician. He currently 
lives with his wife of 43 years in Corinne. 
EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION: 
Mr. Neff has accomplished a lot in his life. He graduated from Olympus High School and 
attended the University Of Utah. When he ran out of money he got a job as an apprentice 
concrete worker. He then went on a mission for the LDS church to Western Canada, and then 
took a job with Neff Engineering, which is relative owned. His sister then talked him into going 
to Provo to attend BYU. While there he majored in Zoology and minored in Botany. He also 
has a schoolteacher's certificate. While at BYU he bid on a job and secured it. He began his own 
construction company as AB Neff And Sons. He was the owner from 1962 to 1977, when he 
merged, and his company became ABCO Construction, which he ran with his brother, who is the 
victim noted in this case. That partnership dissolved when Branson sold out his portion of the 
business to his brother, in the year 2000. Branson now states that he spends his time working the 
stock market. 
Branson reports current monthly income and expenses of about $15,000 a month. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE HISTORY: 
The defendant denies ever using substances. There is no evidence that would contradict this 
assertion. 
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Respectfully submitted, Approved: 
Aaron Muir, INVESTIGATOR Sm Scott, SUPERVISOR 
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Exhibit J 
Prepared by and Return Recorded Deed To: 
Law Office pFTravis Bowen PC 
P.O.Box 11637 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0637 
Mail Tax Notice Tot 
Sandra CNcff 
2625 North 7600 West 
Conine, Utah $4307 
&t 1 6 9 3 ? 8 Bfc 8 0 4 - Po 5 1 2 
Date iMol-2002 12:80PH fee ttlW 
luftan Adaas - Filed By Ep 
Box E l d e r - Co- , CJT 
For TRAVIS BOWEK 
Property Identified As: 
Property Located At 
Personal Residence 
2625 North 7600 West 
Conine, Utah 84307 
QUTT-CLAIMDEED 
For Value Received, Marvin G. Neff, Operating Manager of Steel water Investments, LP., 
General Partner, hereinafter called the Grantor hereby quitclaims unto Sandra C. NefF, hereinafter 
called die Grantee, the following premises, in the County of Box Elder, State of Utah to-wit: 
Beginning at a point on the West line of 7600 West Street, said point being North 
1156.48 feet and West 33.00 feet &om the Southeast Corner of Section 32, Township 
10 North, Range 3 West, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence 
West 20L76 feet; thence North l°5r48H East 202.95 feet; thence East 195,16 feet to 
the West line of 7600 West Street; ihence South along said West line 202.87 feet to 
the point of beginning. Contains 0.924 acres. 
Tax/Parcel No: 04-075-0011 
To have and to hold the said premises, with their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and the 
Grantee's assigns forever. 
Dated this JJL 4>y of M/JeTts^ • 2<>_5L. 
}a/u»^-i 
G.Weff,Operatim 
Steehbater Investments, L.P., 
Ent 1 6 9 3 9 8 Bk 8 0 + Po 5 1 3 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF 
On this J_ day of 
said State, personally appe 
whose name is subscribed to the wit! 
executed. 
ss. 
2££ ) 
^ f^jjf , 2 0 ^ / , before me, a Notary Public in and for 
G. Nef£ Operating Manager known to me to be the person 
in instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was 
"NU'IARY PUBLIC*" 
KATHRVN L BYBEE 
Sjtt Lake City. Ulal> 84114 
My Commission expfo 
Oec*mber £5, gQ03 
_. .STATE OF m m r
 j 
Exhibit K 
Send Recorded Deed To: 
/ Law Office of Travis L. Bowen, P.C. 
P.O. Box 11637 
Salt Lake City, VT 84147-0637 
Mail Tax Notice To: 
Sandra C.Neff 
2625 North 7600 West 
Corjnne, Utah 84307 
€nt X6992T2 Bk BOS PQ B&¥ 
Dst* 3Q-M-2002 L-44PH F*e*i2D,00 
Lufinn ftda&s - Filsd By m 
B o x Eld&r C a - » UT 
f o r TraMIS L B0W6H 
Property Identified As: 
Property Located At: 
Dairy Farm 
2625 NortL7600 West 
Corinne, Utah 84307 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
For Value Received, Steelwater Investments, L.P., hereinafter called the Grantor, hereby 
quitclaims unto Sandra C. Neff, hereinafter called the Grantee, the following premises, in the 
County of Box Elder, State of Utah to-wit: 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A" 
To have and to hold the said premises, with their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and 
the Grantee's assigns foisver. 
y 
Dated Us^f^(hvQfl^^^mJ^ , 20^£r, 
Marvin G. , Neff, Co-Operating Mtfnaj 
of Steel Water Management, L.C., 
Partner 
Ent 1 6 9 9 3 2 6k 8 0 S Pq 0 9 0 u 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF 
B jSjL **y ^S^JMML 
5, peftonally appeared, Marvin G. N 
On this < y . day of (f ^ ^AjQ^Ll !/[ ,20 CV , before me, a Notary Public in and 
for said State, pe&onally appeared, Marvin G. Neff, Co-Operating Manager of Steel Water 
Management, LX.C.,General Partner, known to me to be die person whose name is subscribed to 
the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was executed. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KATHRYN L. BYBEE 
160 EftSt 300 South 
Salt UKeCtty, Utah 64114 
My CommBSlon GxpCrto 
December 25,2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
€nt 1 6 9 V 3 2 Bk 8 0 S P§ 8 9 1 i 
— , EXHIBIT "A" - p.l of 2 
PARCEL C: (TAX PARCEL NO. 04-075-0010 CORRECTION DESCRIPTION): Beginning on 
the West line of 7600 West Street at a point 1654.80 feet North along the section line and 33.00 
feet West from the Southeast Corner of Section 32, T10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence 
West 1308.17 feet to fence line; thence the following four courses along fence lines: (1) N 
00o02,24,r W 342.46 feet, (2) S 89°27,41" E 847.72 feet, <3) S 89°03,47" E 460.79 feet to the 
West line of 7600 West Street, (4) South 326.95 feet along said West line of 7600 West Street to 
the point of beginning. Containing 10.08 acres. 
oA-g'TiS'-cxaaq cios*>v& &&<*-, e>vec.<-/vp tarm-pao/tec s . 
PARCEL D: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning at a point 16S4.80 feet North along the section 
lirte and 1341.17 feet West from the Southeast Corner of Section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M 
and running thence the following Ten courses along fence lines: (1) S 00°26'42 W 72.74 feet, (2) 
S 25*24*17" W219.96 feet, (3) S 00°00'53" E 21128 feet, (4)N M'mr W 449.19 feet, (5) S 
01 ° 14'40" W 366.58 feet, (6) S O0°18'59" W 775.06 feet, (7) N 89°40,2l" W 586.41 feet, (8) N 
00°00'56tt W 1962.10 feet, (9) S 89°23'40" E 1134.31 feet (10) S 00°02'24" E 342.46 feet to the 
point of beginning. Containing36.il acres. 
PARCEL E: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning at a point 2475.16 feet N 89°40'2r W along 
the section line and 33.00 feetN 00°00'56 W from the Southeast Corner of Section 32, T 10 N, 
R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence the following four courses along fence lines: (1) TJ 
89o4021M W 1017.25 feet, (2) N 0O°08M37" W 1967.96 feet, (3) S 89°20'44" E 1021.69 feet, (4) 
S 00°W56" E 1962.10 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 45.99 acres. 
PARCEL F: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning on the West line of 7600 West Street at a point 
1654.80 feet North along the section line and 33.00 feet West from the Southeast corner of 
Section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence West 1308.17 feet; thence the following 
six courses along fence lines: <1) S 00°26,42" W 72.74 feet, (2) 25024'17M W 219.96 feet, (3) S 
00QWSS* E 211.28 feet, (A)VM9IV3TWU9.19 feet, (5) sTff° 14*40" W 366.58 feet, (6) S 
00°I8'59" E 775.06 feet; thence S 89o40,21*' E 795.78 feet, thence N 02o20'26" W 240.51 feet; 
thence N24042'14" E 91.43 feet; thence N 39D06'19" E 48.92 feet; thence N 62°57,36" E 109.14 
feet; thence N"$2°32'05" E 86~.71 feet; thence North 323.62 feet; thence East 189.96 feet; thence 
N 07°29,09n E270.91 feet; thence N 71 °42*31" E 298.41 feet; thence N 85°09'46" E 69.82 feet; 
thence N 11 °23,40" E 165.78 feet; thence N 76<J4r44" E 212.61 feet to the West line of 7600 
West Street, thence North 290.17 Teet along said West line to the point of beginning. Containing 
41.64 acres. 
-4-
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^ 
PARCEL G: (ABPLANALP SURVEY): Beginning on the West line of 7600 West Street at a 
point 990.71 feet North along the section line and 33.00 feet West from the Southeast Comer of 
Section 32, T10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence West 152.17 feet; thence S, 51 °28'58" 
W 849.75 feet; thence North 323.62 feet; thence East 1*9.96 feet; thence N 07°29'09" E 270.91 
feet; thence N 71 °42*31" E 298.11 feet; thence N 85o09'46" E 69.82 feet; tiience S 88o00'23" E 
50.96 feet; thence N 88 °2TSt" E 188.80 feet to the West line of 7600 West Street; thence South 
165,77 feet along said West line to the point of beginning^ontaining 4.95 acres. 
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Send Recorded Deed Tat 
/ Law Office of Travis L~ Bowen, P.C. 
P.O. Box 11637 
Salt Lake City, UT $4547-063? 
Mail Tax Notice To: 
Sandra C. Neff 
2625 North 7600 Wear 
CorinnetUtah 84307 
En\ 1 6 9 9 3 2 L BV 8 0 S PQ 8 8 9 
Dat* 30-Jul-2002 1:44PM Fee't20.Q0 
LuAnn Adafis - Filed By 2m 
B O K E l d e r d o * , U T 
For TKflVJS L B0IO 
Property Identified As: 
Property-Located At: 
Dairy Farm 
2625 North 7600 West 
Corinne, Utah 84307 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Por Value Received, Steeiwater Investments, UP., hereinafter called the Grantor, hereby 
quitclaims unto Sandra C. Neflf, hereinafter called the Grantee, the following premises, in the' 
County of Box Elder, State of Utah to-wit: 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT * A" 
To have and to hold the said premises, Tvith their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and 
the Grantee's assigns forever. 
Dated this , ^ / ^ d a y of^^O^ftd^C » 2 0 £ g - . 
Marvin G. Neff, Co-Operating Mdiiagfl 
of Steel Water Management, L-C, Ger 
Partner 
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Ent 1 6 ^ 9 3 2 Bk S O S Pg 8 9 0
 ; 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF 
On this 
for said State 
 A / day of (^AmJify ,20 0/ 
, personally appeared, Marvin G. Neff, Co-Ope 
before me, a Notary Public in and 
's rating Manager of Steel Water 
Management, LX,C.,General Partner, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to 
the wiihin instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was executed. 
NOTARY PUBMC 
KATHBYN L. BYBEE 
160 £*5* 300 South 
8aK Lake City Utah 841 f 4 
My Cotmrassfoft Expires 
Dee«mb*r25,20O3 
STATE OF UTAH 
Quit-Claim Deed •2-
" ^
 r^<C 
n ^ - i - ° *J*X 1 6 9 9 3 2 Bk BOS P9 8 9 1 
\ 
EXHIBIT "A"-p.l of 2 
PARCEL C: (TAX PARCEL NO. 04-075-0010 CORRECTION DESCRIPTION): Beginning oa 
the West line of 7600 West Street at a point 1654.80 feet North along the section line and 33.00 
feet West from the Southeast Comer of Section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence 
West 1308.17 feet to fence line; thence the following four courses along fence lines: (1) N 
C? 00*0274" W 342.46 feet, (2) S 89°27*4P E 847.72 feet, (3) S 89°03'47" E 460.79 feet to the 
West line of 7600 West Street, (4) South 326.95 feet along said West line of 7600 West Street to 
the point of beginning. Containing 10.08 acres. 
g>4-itf7iS'-o<36«t CUSLJO^ BWolL, 6VSC Lfip t* rrH-fttfMteC E. 
j. PARCEL D:.(NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning at a point 1654.80 feet North along the section 
& line and 1341.17 feet West from the Southeast Corner of Section 32, T 10 N, R3 W, SLB&M 
&- and running thence the following Ten courses along fence lines: (I) S 00o26*42 W 72.74 feet, (2) 
k S 25°24'17" W219.96 feet, (3) S 00°00'53"_E 211.28 feet, (4) N 88018'37" W 449.19 feet, (5) S 
* 01°14'40" W 366.58 feet, (6) S 00°18'59" W 775.06 feet, (7)N 89o40,2tM W 586.41 feet, (8)N 
00°00'56" Wl962Jj0^et, (9) S 89*23'40" E 1134.31 feet (10) S 00o02'24" E 342.46 feet to the 
point of beginning. Containing 36.11 acres. ^ 
PARCEL E: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning at a point 2475.16 feet N 89°40,2I" W along 
£ the section line and 33.00 feet N 00*00'56 W from the Southeast Comer of Section 32, T 10 N, 
• <h R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence the following four courses along fence lines: (1) N 
* 89°40'2r W 1017.25 feet, (2) N 00o08M37" W 1967.96 feet,,(3) S 8902p,44H E 1021.69 feet, (A) 
N S 00o00'56n E 1962.10 feet to the point of beginning. Cor^^45.9f bais. n 
PARCEL F: (NEW DESCRIPTION): Beginning on the West line of 7600 West Street at a point 
1654.80 feet North along the section line and 33.00 feet West from the Southeast comer of 
rj Section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M and running thence West 1308.17 feet; thence the following 
K six courses along fence lines: (1) S 00°26,42" W 72.74 feet, (2f25°24'l 7" W 219.96 feet, (3) S 
j WOO^" E 211.28 feet, (4) N 88°i8^ 37M W 449.19 feet, (5) SoT° 14'40" W 366.58 feet, (6) S 
U WWSy E 775.06 feet; thence S 89B40,21" E 795.78 feet; thenceN 02°20,26M W 240.51 feet; 
thence N 24°42'14" E 91.43 feet; thence N 39t>06'19M E 48.92 feet; thence N 62°57,36tt E 109.14 
feet; thence N"82°32i05n E 86~.71 feet; thence North 323.62 feet; thence East 189.96 feet; foence 
N 07o29'09" E 270.91 feet; thenceN 71042'3r E 298.41 feet; thenceN 85p09'46" E 69.82 feet 
thence N llo23'40" E 165.78 feet; thence N 76°41,44H2 212.61 feet to the West line of 7600 
West Street thence North 290.17 feet along said West line to the point of beginning. Containing 
41.64 acres. 
^ 
-4-
Q 
y" Ent 1 6 9 9 3 2 8k 80S . P§ 8 9 2 O' jo4~crr&-cx=i/ot:r 04-07^-000 qt c<-*«<*>o 
PARCEL G: (ABPLANALP SURVEY): Beginning on the West line of 7600 West Street at a 
pohn 990.71 feet North along the section line and 33.00 feet West from the Southeast Corner of 
feet; thoice N 71 M2'31" E 298.11 feet; thence K 85 °09,46" E 69.82 feet; thence S 88 °00'23" E 
50.96 ^eet; thence N 8862758n E 188.80 feet to the West line of 7600 West Street; thence South 
165.77 feet along said West line to the point of beginning. Containing 4.95 acres. 
Exhibit L 
Ent 1 7 4 9 1 3 Bk 8 2 0 Fc 5 5 0 
Dsi* 2Mov-2Q02 9i4QAH P<* *13J30 
Return Recorded Deed To: 
Marvin G. Neff O-l -ti7&~°b\^ 
2495 North 7600 West ~~ 
Corinne, Utah 84307 
Mail Tax Notice To: 
Backcountry Investments, LJP. 
2495 North 7600 West 
Corinne, Utah 84307 - hlG[K&{ ^ ^ O M p ^ ? ^ 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED _ ^ cH***^ M/vo^ 
For Value Received, Steelwater Investments, LP., hereinafter caUedthe Grantor, hereby quitclaims 
unto Backcountry Investments, LP., hereinafter called the Grantee, the followingpremises, in the County 
of Box Elder, State of Utah to-wifc 
Beginning at a point 33,00 feet N 89 degrees 40* 21" W from the Southeasteorner 
of section 32, T 10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M thence N 89 degrees 40r21" W 1059.97 
feet along the South line of said section 32; thence North 33*00 feet; thence N 02 
degrees 20'26" W 240.51 feet; thence N 24 degrees 42r14" E 91.43 feet; thence 
N 39 degrees 06r19" E 48.92 feet; thence N 62 degrees 57f36" E 109*14 feet; 
thence N 82 degrees 32f05" E 86,71 feet; thence N 51 degrees 28*58" E 849.75 
ft; thence East 15167 ft. to said West line of 7600 West Street; thence South 
990.52 feet along said West line to the South line of said section 32; thence S 89 
degrees 40,21!r E 33.00 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 16.88 acres, 
more or less, and 6 lots* 
Excluding therefrom the following described property: 
Beginning at a point in the West line of 7600 West Street, said point being North 
606 .18 feet and West 33.00 feet from the Southeast corner of section 32, Township 
10 North, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence 
West 170.00 feet; thence North 233.00 feet; thence East 170.00 feet to the West 
line of 7600 West Street; thence South along said West line 233.00 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
To have and to hold the said premises, with their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and the 
Grantee's assigns forever. 
Dated t h i s ^ r day of A f e v ^ a ^ ^ 20 # 2 . . 
STEELWATER INVESTMENTS, L.P. 
Marviiu}. NefE Manager 
G* Wj 
Ent 1 7 4 9 1 3 8k 8 2 0 Pq S 5 1 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF ^/aU^ 
J 
: ss. 
J 
Onthis ftflky of ^ ^ ^ ^ , 20^^7beforeme, aNotary Public inandfor 
said State, personally appeared Marvin G. Neff, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed 
to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was executed. 
2-KATIE HANSEN 
liormmuc'Simdunif 
72t HORSESHOE OR 
R1CHRELD.UTAH84701 , 
COMfciEXP^3-30-2004 
totaiy Public 
tnt 174-913 8k 8 2 0 Pc 5 5 0 
Date 26-t)ov-2002 VAm Fee- $13^8 
ituni Recorded Deed To: 
Marvin G. Ncff O A ~CT[&22B±?L 
2495 North 7600 West 
Corinne, Utah 84307 
ul Tax Notice To: _
 L B a M ^ D € & c . T^ce^ 
Backcountry Investments* LP. 
2495 North 7600 West N 6 r C / U ^ " 
Corinne, Utah S4307 - MoTftPv/ MCcvtpt£TG-
QUIT-CLAIM DEED _ ^ cM*&& M A O £ 
For Value Received, Steelwater Investments. UP., hereinafter calledthe Grantor, hereby quitclaims 
o Backcountry Investments, LP.5 hereinafter calledthe Grantee, the Mowing premises, in the County 
3ox Elder, State of Utah to-wit: 
Beginning at a point 33.00 feet N 89 degrees 40v! 21" Wf rom the Southeast corner 
of section 32, T10 N, R 3 W, SLB&M thence N 89 degrees 40f21fr W 1059.97 
feet along the South line of said section 32; thence North 33.00 feet; thence N 02 
degrees 20f26" W 240.51 feet; thence N 24 degrees 42f 14" E 91.43 feet; thence 
N 39 degrees 06,19" E 48.92 feet; thence N 62 degrees 57f36" E 109.14 feet; 
thence N 82 degrees 32f05" E 86.71 feet; thence N 51 degrees 28,58" E 849.75 
ft; thence East 152.67 ft. to said West line of 7600 West Street; thence South 
990.52 feet along said West line to the South line of said section 32; thence S 89 
xfeggjBe#B31,f E 33*00 fccHo the point of beginning. Containing 16.88 acres, 
more or less, and 6 lots. 
Excluding therefrom the following described property: 
Beginning at a point in the West line of 7600 West Street, said point being North 
606.18 feet and West 33.00 feet from the Southeast corner of section 32, Township 
10 North, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence 
West 170.00 feet; thence North 233.00 feet; thence East 170.00 feet to the West 
line of 7600 West Street; thence South along said West line 233.00 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
To have and to hold the said premises, with their appurtenances, unto said Grantee and the 
itee's assigns forever. 
Dated this^ST day of AfcVfet t^u^ 2 0 ^ ^ . 
STEELWATER INVESTMENTS, L.P. 
MarvirlG. Nef£ Manager 
Ent 1 7 4 - 9 1 3 3k 8 2 0 Pq S S I 
STATE OF /Jj/ks&~~. 
COUNTY OF _Q ^Uf/aJ^ 
J 
: ss. 
J 
On this , 20 Q& Tbeforeme, aNotary Public inandfor 
said State, personally appeared Marvin G. Neff, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed 
to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that the same was executed. 
R. KATIE HANSEN 
wurwsmtm 
™ HORSESHOE DR 
RfCHRElD. UTAH 84701 
_COMM. EXP 3-30-2004 i 
Notary Public 
r»/">M A O t 4 * 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
BRANSON G.NEFF, 
Plaintiff, 
xr 
V. 
MARVIN G. NEFF, TRAVIS L. BOWEN, 
ESQ., TRAVIS L. BOWEN, P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation, ABCO 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and WESTCO, an unregistered 
partnership between BRANSON G. NEFF 
and MARVIN G. NEFF, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 030100275 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Marvin NefFs (herein, 
"Defendant5') (1) Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, Fraudulent 
Concealment, and Fraudulent Non-Disclosure Claims; (2) Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Malicious Prosecution, Defamation/False Light Invasion of Privacy, and Slander of 
Title Claims; (3) Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Denial of Defendant's Motion in Limine 
and Motion to Find the Contract Binding on the Parties; (4) Defendant's Brief Requesting 
Clarification on the Order Regarding Partial Summary Judgment on the Statute of Limitations to 
Foreclose All Claims to Aspen Springs or Disproportionate Family Payments; (5) Defendant's 
Motion Regarding Violation of Civil Protective Order; (6) Plaintiffs Motion for Civil Contempt 
Against Defendant; and (7) Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Produced by 
Plaintiffs Experts Regarding Any Appraised Valuations of ABCO, Inc., Aspen Springs, LLC, 
1 
Fair West, Lincoln or other Properties Using Data After December 13, 1999. In preparation of 
its decision, the Court has reviewed the parties' memoranda, attachments and/or exhibits, and the 
applicable case law and statutory provisions. Additionally, oral arguments were held on 
November 15, 2006 and November 30, 2006. 
ANALYSIS 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 
appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is never used to determine the 
facts, but only to ascertain whether there are any material issues of fact in dispute. Hill ex rel 
Fogel v. Grand Cent, Inc., 744 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970). Or, to put it another way, summary 
judgment is precluded not "simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a 
material fact is genuinely controverted." Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 
(Utah 1980). Further, doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact properly presented, or the 
nature of inferences to be drawn from the facts, are to be construed in a light favorable to the 
party opposing the summary judgment. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Fraud Fraudulent 
Concealment and Fraudulent Non-Disclosure Claims 
In the first motion, Defendant claims that the undisputed material facts show that summary 
judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff did not rely on Defendant during the dissolution of the 
parties' partnership, citing Rawson v. Conoyer, 2001 UT 24. To Defendant, each of the fraud 
claims are not properly supported with sufficiently supported facts, given Plaintiffs various 
deposition statements. Defendant then argues that ABCO's records and multiple valuations of 
2 
ABCO's value were available to Plaintiff and that in light thereof, Plaintiff does not have a basis 
to assert fraud into these areas. Relying upon Burke, v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1982), 
Defendant states that the parties' Property Settlement Agreement and subsequent dissolution 
agreements were free from fraud because they were entered into at arms length after lengthy 
negotiations and that even if not all aspects of the parties' dealing were disclosed, access to the 
accounting records were uninhibited. Defendant purports that Plaintiff asserted fraud claims are 
supported with bald statements or improper opinion evidence and that Plaintiff received more than 
he bargained for in light of the available accounting. 
Responding, Plaintiff argues that the Court has repeatedly ruled that there are disputed 
issues of fact and that attorneys fees are appropriate for responding to the repeated summary 
judgment motions. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's statute of limitations arguments have been 
briefed, heard, considered and rejected and that the arguments are moreover illogical because in 
essence Defendant asserts that his known questionable actions should have put Plaintiff on notice 
and act as a bar for all other claims of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment and 
fraudulent non-disclosure claims. To Plaintiff, Defendant's arguments contain disputed issues of 
material facts in light of the evidence already submitted to the court and Plaintiffs understanding 
of the Property Settlement document. Next, Plaintiff states that the two brothers had a 
confidential relationship and that Defendant's purported silence on various material facts 
constituted a fraud, under the disputed facts and in accordance with Onglntl (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). Then, specifically responding to Defendant's reliance 
arguments, Plaintiff states that in light of Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App 
1990), whether Defendant's statements were his opinions or affirmative representations are 
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question facts for the jury, and that whether Plaintiff was reasonable in relying upon the asserted 
statements is also a question for the jury, citing Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 
1060 (Utah 1996). Plaintiff also states that whether he had access to ABCO's books and records 
is a disputed issue of fact and that Plaintiffs affidavit and deposition sufficiently disputes 
Defendant's contention that access was available through certain ABCO employees. Lastly, 
Plaintiff states that Defendant's actions caused various damages to Plaintiff, in additional to 
whether Branson received payment for a 50% share of ABCO. 
In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proving a prima 
facia case with clear and convincing evidence and that his failure to do so supports a dismissal or 
summary judgment order. Specifically, Defendant states that Plaintiff has failed to show what 
material information Defendant failed to disclose, or that Defendant represented a value of the 
business which was different from the actual value, or that any of the accounting books (now 
open) support a different value than the value given to Plaintiff. Defendant further argues that the 
Plaintiffs knowledge of the value of ABCO at the time the parties initially sought dissolution is 
undisputed and that Plaintiffs contention that he wanted to "wait and see" if the value of ABCO 
increased after the dissolution or check on ABCO's value after he agreed to a dissolution 
agreement simply supports Defendant's position that the statute of limitations should restrict these 
claims because they were known prior to October 29, 1999. To Defendant, statements as to 
value do not ordinarily constitute fraud, as they are regarded as mere expressions of opinion and 
when asserted, must be supported by "substantial evidence," based on Wright v. Westside 
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 513 (Utah App 1990). Moreover, Defendant states that Plaintiff has 
failed to show that ABCO was wrongly valued in light of any facts or accounting or that he made 
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any attempts to look at the accounting records which were alleged not accessible. Absent any 
proof of damages or injury, Defendant claims that Plaintiffs fraud and breach of fiduciary duty 
claims are moot. 
A. Previous Court Rulings 
Addressing the Court's previous rulings, the Court's December 2005 Memorandum 
Decision was memorialized by the Court's own order, which expressly stated that it granted 
Defendant's partial summary judgment motion regarding certain statute of limitation arguments, 
finding sufficient notice, actual notice or imputed notice to trigger the application of UCA §78-
12-26 and UCA §78-12-27 in regards to certain claims related to Aspen Springs and certain 
alleged disproportional payments. (March 2006 Court Order). The Court did not, however, 
address whether the fraud claims or breach of fiduciary claims were sufficiently supported until 
this motion. By way of supplementation, the Court recognizes that the statutes of limitation 
arguments issues were a close call, in that the Court struggled whether later developments of 
Aspen Springs should be barred under the statute of limitations under the theory of imputed 
knowledge due to Plaintiffs knowledge of ABCO's involvement in Aspen Springs, Phase I and II 
in mid-1999. The Court, however, chose the more cautious alternative given the disputed facts 
before it at the time, in lieu of Plaintiff s discovery requests into ABCO records Defendant 
allegedly blocked access to, and in viewing the facts in light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court 
opted to only bar those claims that the Court could expressly ascertain Plaintiffs knowledge was 
not disputed. 
Additionally, the Court notes that its July 2006 Memorandum Decision likewise did not 
rule on the sufficiency of Plaintiff s fraud, misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duties claims. 
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Last July the Court stated that relying upon Spor, the Court disagreed with Plaintiffs assertion 
that the Property Settlement Agreement was an unenforceable agreement to agree, similar to 
Brown Shoe Fit Co because (a) "disputed issues of fact exist regarding certain tenable 
interpretations of the Property Settlement Agreement and their effect," (b) the relevant, though 
disputed evidence demonstrated Plaintiffs assent and ratification of the Property Settlement 
Agreement in light of his acceptance of certain Defendants' partial performance, and (c) Plaintiffs 
claims equally challenged the validity of those assent and ratifying statements and actions, in that 
certain fraud, misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty claims are asserted. Therefore, the 
Court simply held the binding effect of the Property Settlement was voidable but not void as 
presently pled. Further, the Court found that Defendant's merger, integration, and ratification 
summary judgment arguments, again under the disputed facts presented at that time, could not be 
granted while fraud claims survived. The Court again did not weigh the sufficiency of the fraud 
claims in this ruling. 
Exercising patience with the parties' excessive briefing practice and in an effort to 
properly shift through the materiality of the presentment of an exuberant number of facts in light 
of the arguments proffered, the Court fails to see any record created by the Court which expressly 
ruled on Defendant's direct challenge to Plaintiffs claims, or which may preclude the Court from 
revisiting this area in light of the parties' continual discovery and equally excessive briefing. Of 
particular relevance, the Court notes that following the December Memorandum Decisions, 
Defendant has submitted two affidavits to support the contention that ABCO records were 
available with certain ABCO employees, Ken Oakeson and Melanie Bingham, and that Plaintiff 
never attempted to gain access through these known record holders. Plaintiff disputes that Mr. 
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Oakeson or Ms. Bingham had complete access to ABCO records, but does not sufficiently dispute 
that he attempted to gain access to ABCO records through these employees or that these 
employees could get access for Plaintiff upon a request. Given such, the Court finds that 
revisiting below claims in this motion, especially those relating to Aspen Springs, appropriate and 
will aid the trier of fact in sorting through certain matters of law. 
B. Fraud claims 
On a motion for summary judgment, "once the moving party challenges an element of the 
nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then 
shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact." Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, P31, 54 P.3d 1054. The 
nonmoving party must present "evidence that could be interpreted to satisfy the elements of the 
claim." Id. at P35. The trial court "must consider each element of the claim under the appropriate 
standard of proof " AndalexRes., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Moreover, it is also required that "[t]he nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory 
assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Waddoups, 2002 UT 
69 at P31." See also Dairy Prod Servs., Inc. v. Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, P24, 13 P.3d 581 
(Stating 'bald statements do not suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact.1) 
Looking next at Plaintiffs fraud claims, the Court finds Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24 
applicable. The Rawson Court provided: 
"Fraud is fa false representation of an existing material fact, made knowingly or 
recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, upon which plaintiff 
reasonably relies to his detriment.f" 
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2001 UT at 1J28; see also OtsukaElecs. (USA) v. Imagining Specialists, 937 P.2d 1274, 
1278 (Utah App 1997) (holding that the elements of fraud are: (1) That a representation 
was made; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which 
the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) 
to his injury and damage.). "To have made a false representation recklessly, defendants 
would have to know they had insufficient knowledge upon which to base the 
representation made." Rawson, 2001 UT at TJ28. Yet, according to Ong InVl Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp., a partners's silence may constitute fraud, if the silence regards a material 
matter. 850 P.2d 447, 454 (Utah 1993); See also D 'Elia v. Rice Dev., 2006 UT App 416, 
1J52 (holding that to demonstrate constructive fraud in Utah, a party need only 
demonstrate "two elements: (i) a confidential relationship between the parties; and (ii) a 
failure to disclose material facts."). 
Under either Onglnt'l or Rawson, the issue is simply whether Plaintiff presents sufficient 
material facts to support the fraud claims, or that material facts support a finding Plaintiffs 
reliance upon a falsity, upon which Defendant's alleged omission constitutes as fraud. Reviewing 
first Defendant's alleged omissions regarding Aspen Springs (i.e. the alleged $80,000 unexcused 
profits and Grave's payments), Plaintiffs asserted facts do not rise to the level of sufficient 
materiality to preclude summary judgment. Plaintiffs alleged claim that the $80,000 profits 
belong to ABCO equates to a bald speculation of impropriety, not evidence of a material fact 
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because the funds were the undisputed remaining amount from Defendant personal and 
independent loan used in Defendant's independent business dealings. Further, there is no 
supporting evidence that these funds were owed to ABCO or ABCO was owed any 
payments/profits from the loan which should have been reported by Defendant during the parties' 
negotiations toward dissolutions. The loan in question related to Aspen Springs, to which ABCO 
had some involvement, but Plaintiff has no supporting evidence despite lengthy discovery into 
Aspen Springs to contend that ABCO carried any liability in Aspen Springs in connection with the 
loan or entitlement to the excess loan amount, and Plaintiff concedes that the Aspen Springs 
project was treated as an outside job. 
Second, the alleged omission regarding the Grave's payments the falls under those claims 
barred under the Court's previous statute of limitation arguments. Thus, whether paid or not, 
Plaintiff had sufficient notice of ABCO's business dealings with Aspen Springs Phase I and chose 
not to pursue any of those claims during the parties' negotiations and dissolution of their 
partnership, expressly stating such knowledge to ABCO's attorney in the summer of 1999. 
Plaintiff cannot now assert that he was unaware of such concerns with Aspen Springs. 
Additionally, Defendant asserted that such payments were paid back to ABCO and that ABCO 
records merely fail to memorialize these payments, to which Plaintiff has no further supported 
argument to refute the same. Plaintiffs part incredulity does not an issue of fact make. Here, 
Plaintiff's fraud allegation fails because a lack of a records does not equate to sufficient proof of 
fraud in the face of Defendant's contrary depositions and affidavits on point. Plaintiff may not, in 
response, rest an incomplete records to support a fraud allegation. Thus, regardless of 
Defendant's silence on these two issues, Plaintiff has not sufficiently supported his fraudulent 
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claims or demonstrated the same fall outside the Court's previous statute of limitation ruling. 
Lastly, the Court notes that the presentment of an expert report does not constitute a 
fraud unless is supported by sufficient facts. Here, Plaintiffs expert asserts certain damages but 
uses figures that are not specifically connected to supported material facts of fraud, and therefore, 
cannot be used to get around the immateriality of Plaintiffs facts. 
G Misrepresentation 
Misrepresentation carries the same mental state as fraud, and in reality, largely mimics the 
elements of fraud. Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 2000,1J12-13.1 Similar to the 
above, Plaintiffs again fails to support his claims of misrepresentation. Plaintiffs claims that he 
relied upon Defendant's obligation that he would "open the corporate books and settle" does not 
rebut Mr. Oakeson's and Ms. Bingham's affidavits that the corporate books were available to 
Plaintiff, or that Plaintiffs alleged impeded right to the records caused accountants or persons 
whom Plaintiff relied upon to value the business at the time of the parties' dissolution to 
misrepresent ABCO's overall value. The Court fails to ascertain what evidence was in the 
corporate books which would have changed the values discussed by Plaintiff and Defendant 
during their negotiations to dissolve the partnership. Given Plaintiff's clear deposition assertions 
that he did not rely upon Defendant when entering into the Property Settlement Agreement, the 
Court finds Plaintiff's reliance upon Defendant to "open ABCO books for review" does not 
translate into a misrepresentation on ABCO's value. Instead, Plaintiff arguments suggests that he 
1
 The Court notes that Plaintiff does not assert negligent misrepresentation, nor does 
Defendant seek summary judgment against the same. 
10 
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entered into the Property Settlement Agreement perceiving the negotiation period as ongoing 
until all of his concerns were resolved, while Defendant concludes that the Property Settlement 
constituted the valued exchange and dissolution of the partnership and that Plaintiff suffers from 
buyer's remorse. Under either argument, the Court fails to find sufficient proof to support the 
claim of misrepresentation in connection with ABCO's value when Defendant stated that he 
thought ABCO "made" around $40,000 in net profit in 1998. Nor is sufficient specificity 
provided showing that Rasmussen's valuation of ABCO, or any other person whom Plaintiff 
relied upon to value ABCO, would have materially changed in light of any information in the 
corporation books allegedly not available to Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs other misrepresentation claims are somewhat more problematic but produce a 
similar result. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant misrepresented and falsely included an employment 
continuation provision and a provision promising equipment use while not planning on carrying 
out the provisions is unsupported. Of particular concern, the Court finds that Defendant admits 
that the employment provision was placed to "largely appease" Plaintiff, but this does not raise to 
making a knowingly false or reckless statement, although such braces the line. The Court rather 
finds that the parties' Property Settlement Agreement contained these vague references, that such 
provisions were not specifically valued, and that the parties ascertained different meanings 
regarding them, in that the issue of how the provisions would fit in with Plaintiffs plan to begin a 
competing construction outfit was not resolved with these two provisions. Thus, to the Court, 
the issue turns on breach of contract and vagueness, rather than any misrepresentation, given 
Plaintiffs repeated skepticism toward Defendant and Plaintiffs deposition statements providing 
he did not rely upon Defendant's representations when entering into Plaintiffs agreement. 
11 
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D. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims 
Utah's partnership law is embodied in the standard articulated in Onglnt'l, which 
provides that "normally, partners occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal with each other in 
the utmost good faith." 850 P.2d at 453-54. However, "when a relationship involving partners 
becomes adversarial and the partners deal at arm's length, their fiduciary duties to one another 
may be extinguished." Id. Addressing PlaintifFs claims of breach of fiduciary duty, the Court 
holds that none of PlaintifFs assertions are sufficiently supported with material facts in regards to 
Defendant's fiduciary duties prior to the parties' entering into the Property Settlement Agreement. 
However, the Court sees disputed issues of fact regarding whether Defendant breached his 
fiduciary duties to Plaintiff following the parties' entering into the Property Settlement 
Agreement, or during the "winding up" of the partnership's dissolution. These post-dissolution 
issues are more akin to breach of contract assertions than of breach of fiduciary duty, but 
regardless of the semantics the result would likely be the same. 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons articulated in Defendant's memoranda, 
Defendant's motion is granted, in accordance with the above. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Malicious Prosecution. Defamation/False 
Light Invasion of Privacy, and Slander of Title Claims 
Next, Defendant argues in this motion that Plaintiff cannot meet the required elements to 
support a claim of malicious prosecution. Citing Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 
(Utah 1991), Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to show the probable cause element 
because Judge Hadfield has already determined that the criminal charges against Plaintiff in State 
v. Neff, Case No. 051100023. Even looking in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant 
12 
attests that Plaintiff is unable to prove that Defendant initiated or procured the initiation of 
criminal proceedings against an innocent defendant, that there was no probable cause or that the 
proceedings terminated in favor of Plaintiff. Further, Defendant alleges that the malicious 
prosecution litigation is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the criminal court 
already determined probable cause against Plaintiff. 
With respect to Plaintiffs defamation/false light invasion of privacy claims, Defendant 
asserts that all of the purported statements allegedly proffered in Plaintiffs Second Amended 
Complaint fails to satisfy the required intentional or reckless conduct. Defendant contends that 
Plaintiff fails this standard because a witness's statements supports one of Defendant's statements 
and Defendant's statements were based on Defendant's perception of Plaintiffs actions and 
threats. 
Lastly, Defendant professes that Plaintiff cannot support a slander of title claim where 
statements are not maliciously made and no special damages can be proved, comparing the facts 
of the parties' conveyance of property to First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 
1253 (Utah 1989) to assert that Plaintiff could all time correct the wrongly recorded deed. 
Plaintiff again responds with the position that this summary judgment is baseless because it 
fails to consider material issues of fact previously ruled by the court to preclude this type of 
motion and that in light of the Court's previous rulings, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees. 
Addressing Defendant's arguments, Plaintiff states that Hodges clearly holds that the court's 
finding of probable cause is irrelevant and that the test is whether the complaining party had 
probable cause. Plaintiff attests that similar to Hodges, the issue of whether Defendant had 
probable cause to initiate the charges against him should be presented to a jury because Plaintiff 
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has sufficient evidence to support his position that Defendant lied to initiate the charges against 
Plaintiff and that the dismissal of the aggravated assault charge is in effect a resolution in 
Plaintiff's favor. 
Secondly, Plaintiff states that even if Defendant has evidence of the truth of his 
accusations against Plaintiff, this defense does not support a summary judgment motion. Given 
that Defendant admits to making certain statements which Plaintiff references as the basis for the 
defamation claims, Plaintiff argues that the question of facts regarding their veracity are 
appropriate for the trier of fact. 
Plaintiff lastly claims that Travis Bowen's letter to Defendant and other fact evidence 
supports Plaintiffs slander of title claims and while certain material facts are disputed, no legal 
authority supports granting summary judgment against Plaintiff. To Plaintiff, Defendant's reliance 
upon Banberry Crossing is improper because Plaintiffs ability to correct the deed error is 
irrelevant as to whether Defendant caused the improper filing, and Plaintiff should not be faulted 
for mirroring the belief of his counsel, Travis Bowen, that Defendant alone could correct the 
deed. 
Defendant replies that Plaintiff simply does not have a basis to support his claim for 
malicious prosecution when probable cause has been found to exist at the time of the criminal 
proceeding, citing Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App 1987). Defendant 
argues further that the criminal proceeding did not result in Plaintiffs favor because Plaintiff was 
not absolved of responsibility. Contending that Defendant's statements are true, were based on 
facts known in the general public, and/or were not proffered maliciously, Defendant asserts that 
the underlying facts do not support Plaintiffs defamation claims. Defendant then claims that 
14 
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Plaintiffs asserted facts do not support a slander of title claim because Travis Bowen's clerical 
error does not meet the malicious requirement in Banberry Crossing. 
A. Malicious Prosecution 
Pursuant to Agler v. Scheidle, 2006 UT App 495, a malicious prosecution claim has four 
elements: "(1) A criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the plaintiff; 
(2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of probable cause for the 
proceeding; [and] (4) 'malice,' or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to 
justice." 
To this Court, the finding of probable cause by the magistrate in the Plaintiffs criminal 
proceeding is dispositive of the matter. Nevertheless, addressing the probable cause element, the 
Agler Court provided that a defendant in a malicious prosecution claim "has probable cause only 
when a reasonable man in his position would believe, and the defendant does in fact believe, that 
he has sufficient information as to both the facts and the applicable law to justify him in initiating 
the criminal proceedings without further investigation or verification." 2006 UT App 495. Similar 
to Agler, under either version of the facts Plaintiff knowingly carried the Defendant a number of 
feet with his truck until the Defendant verbally expressed that the parties' actions qualified as a 
risk to his life. Disputed facts may exist regarding who started the altercation and Defendant's 
role when clinging to Plaintiffs truck may, yet, there is no dispute that Plaintiff's actions may 
have qualified as an assault, in that he alone controlled the speed of the vehicle. The point is 
Plaintiffs has not sufficiently asserted complete absolution of criminal responsibility, distinctly 
different from the plaintiff in Hodges. While the Court is unsure as to why the criminal court 
found probable cause against the Plaintiff in the criminal proceedings or why the State choose to 
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dismiss the matter following the same matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to demonstrate 
sufficient facts to support the probable cause element, in that Plaintiff concedes that certain risks 
were present and perceived by Defendant in relation to his driving of the vehicle and that he alone 
controlled the speed of the vehicle. Or to put it another way, there is not sufficient material facts 
to support the opposing party's innocence at levels of the parties' altercation at the time 
Defendant initiated the legal proceedings. 
Second, the Court likewise fails to find that the malice element is sufficiently supported. 
According to Agler, "the malice element means that Defendants initiated criminal proceedings for 
"a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." 2006 UT App 495. " [I]n 
proving malice in a civil action it is not necessary to prove actual spite, ill will or grudge, but it is 
only necessary to prove wrongful or improper motive. "Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enters., 23 
Utah 2d 169, 460 P.2d 333, 335 (1969). Again, similar to Agler, the record is void of any 
evidence beyond Plaintiffs speculation that Defendant initiated the prosecution allegations for any 
wrongful or improper motive. While the Court admits that the neighbor's affidavit is troubling, it 
is neither conclusive of actual innocence nor is it sufficient proof of malice. Absent any additional 
proof of a wrongful or improper motive, the Court fails to discern how Defendant's action in 
calling the police and raising an allegation of assault translates into any benefit in the parties' 
currently contested partnership dissolution litigation, in light of the numerous facts and issues 
previously submitted to the Court. 
Once again however, irrespective of the alleged motive of the Defendant in complaining to 
the executive branch about the alleged behavior, the bringing of the criminal action by that agency 
and the criminal court's finding of probable cause disposes of the Plaintiffs claim here. While the 
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probable determination may not collaterally estop a malicious prosecution claim, the criminal 
court's determination should be given great weight, in that Defendant did not initiate a civil 
prosecution but turned the matter over to first the executive branch to file criminal charges after 
their independent investigation and then to judiciary to determine the sufficiency of those charges. 
This weight is given because as a matter of public policy, victims of crimes should not be subject 
to nakedly defending a harassing malicious prosecution tort action after an independent State 
executive branch has established probable cause through a judicial determination finding that a 
crime has occurred. Therefore, Plaintiff must show that evidence exists which 'vitiates the 
probable cause for the arrest warrant' to survive summary judgment. Wolfordv. Lasater, 78 F.3d 
484, 487 (10th Cir. 1996). This simple has not happened in this case. 
For the forgoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the malicious 
prosecution claim is granted. 
B. Defamation/False light invasion of privacy 
"Defamation is the act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to 
a third person." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, p 5 ; See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 
P.2d 999, 1007 (Utah 1994) ("To state a claim for defamation, [one] must show that defendants 
published the statements concerning him, that the statements were false, defamatory, and not 
subject to any privilege, that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and 
that their publication resulted in damage." 
In this case, Defendant's summary judgment arguments rest on the fact that his statements 
were based on truthful perceptions of the Plaintiflf and/or were not malicious. However, Plaintiflf 
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disputes these allegations, challenging directly the veracity of Defendant's statements. As such, 
the Court finds disputed issues of fact precluding summary judgment on this claim. 
C Slander of Title Claim 
Under First Sea Bank, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989): 
[t]o prove slander of title, a claimant must prove that (1) there was a publication of 
a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, (2) the statement was false, (3) 
the statement was made with malice, and (4) the statement caused actual or special 
damages. A slanderous statement is one that is derogatory or injurious to the legal 
validity of an owner's title or to his or her right to sell or hypothecate the property 
Banberry further states: 
A published false statement, however, does not constitute slander of title without 
the element of malice. Malice may be affirmatively proven or implied. Affirmative 
proof requires a showing that the wrong was done with an intent to injure, vex, or 
annoy. Malice may be implied where a party knowingly and wrongfully records or 
publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a false or misleading 
impression adverse to one's title under circumstances that it should reasonably 
foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property. While preparation of 
the original notice of default may have been less than proficient, there is a 
difference between poor performance and malice. 
Here, the parties concede that Defendant's recording of the title deed in questionarguably 
disparaged Plaintiffs title, but the Plaintiff fails to present sufficiently disputed issues of fact 
whether malice was present, and whether Defendant's statements caused actual or special 
damages. Plaintiff supports the latter two elements of slander of title with PlaintiflPs deposition 
and Bowen's deposition regarding Defendant's lack of cooperation on repairing the deed error. 
While there may be a question in regards to the suffering of actual damages, they are absent from 
the record before the Court. The Court, however, denies Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment on this claim, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the non-moving 
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party, finding Plaintiffs deposition raises sufficient issues of material facts to support the elements 
of slander of title and challenge Defendant's contestation. 
Defendant's Motion Requesting Clarification on the Order Regarding Partial Summary 
Judgment on the Statute of Limitations to Foreclose All Claims to Aspen Springs or 
Disproportionate Family Payments; Defendant's Memorandum of Points of Authorities 
in Support of Complete Denial of the Aspen Springs Claim. Any Disproportional 
Payments to Family Members, and the Value ofABCO 
Seeking to clarify the Court's Memorandum Decision entered on December 15 2005, 
which allowed PlaintiflFto "assert separate and distinct breach of fiduciary claims and fraud claims 
outside of those committed by Defendant's known or reasonably discovered actions pertaining to 
either the Aspen Springs Development project or the alleged disproportional payments of family 
members," Defendant argues for a complete bar on those claims in their entirety. To Defendant, 
because Plaintiff had access to records and Lee Rasmussen's value ofABCO, the Court should 
have specifically barred the undervalued claim on ABCO in that Plaintiff could have discovered 
those claims prior to October 29, 1999. Defendant supports this position with asserted facts 
regarding Plaintiffs alleged knowledge of ABCO's involvement with Aspen Springs and the 
various accounting of ABCO's payment to Defendant's and Plaintiffs children, coupled with 
various case law supporting the statutory discovery rule. Defendant then requests the Court deny 
Plaintiffs entire claim on the Aspen Springs Project, any allegations of disproportional payments 
to family members and ABCO's value, and to limit Plaintiffs fraud claims or breach of fiduciary 
claims unless he can prove absolutely no constructive knowledge prior to October 29, 1999. 
Responding, Plaintiff submits a motion to strike Defendant's brief and memorandum, 
arguing that the Court drafted order specifically ruled on the fraudulent claims relating to Aspen 
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Springs, reserving the claims outside of Plaintiff's knowledge prior to October 29, 1999. In light 
of the Court's Order, Plaintiff seeks to strike Defendant's Motion. 
Defendant's Reply then asserts that summary judgement is justified because of Plaintiffs 
failure to supply evidence, affidavits or proof that he discovered his alleged fraud or breach of 
fiduciary duty claims prior to October 29, 1999. Absent any specific facts to support Plaintiffs 
claims being outside the allegations barred by the Court's December 15, 2005 Memorandum 
Decision, Defendant states that his general summary judgment motion should be granted. Lastly, 
Defendant states that to allow Plaintiff to continue his assertion that he was misrepresented in 
regards to ABCO's value, when its value was known or discoverable to Plaintiff, is harmful and 
prejudicial to Defendant in that the statute of limitations should apply. 
Plaintiff then submits a formal response to Defendant's Motion for Clarification, arguing 
that the Court should reiterate its original ruling because Defendant fails to present any "new" 
facts to support this restyled 'motion for reconsideration' and the Court has already rejected 
Defendant's arguments. Plaintiff states that the Court specifically reserved fraud and breach of 
fiduciary claims with Aspen Springs, such as those supported by the $80,147.63 differential in 
Defendant's loan and the authorized loan amount in connection with Aspen Springs, Phase Two. 
Next, Plaintiff argues that claims regarding ABCO's 'misappropriation' of funds to Defendant's 
children known after April 1999 should also be allowed because the Court specifically reserved 
those claims as well. To Plaintiff, the reservations of these claims is important because Defendant 
precluded Plaintiff from gaining access to accounting books and records needed to properly value 
ABCO, Defendant induced Plaintiff to sign the Property Settlement Agreement with no intention 
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of honoring his promises, and that Defendants' actions toll the statute of limitations because they 
qualify as further acts of fraud and concealment. 
Plaintiff then refutes Defendant's arguments, asserting that Plaintiffs fraud based claims 
should survive because the Property Settlement was understood by Plaintiff to be preliminary only 
upon the alleged but unwritten condition to "open books and settle," and upon Defendant's 
material omissions of fact. Second, Plaintiff states that Defendant's ratification arguments fail 
because Defendant concealed substantial evidence and that at best, Plaintiffs retention of benefits 
should be deducted from damages awarded. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendant's 
integration arguments fail because the fraud claims are substantiated and rebut the presumption of 
integration, the Property Settlement Agreement was clearly not integrated, only two of the nine 
buyout documents contain integration clauses and required in turn the execution of further 
transactions, and that the two integration clauses cannot fix an unenforceable agreement to 
agreement. Plaintiff requests that the Court orders no further briefing on these issues. 
In reply, Defendant states that the Court should hold that Plaintiffs claims regarding 
Aspen Springs in all phases, the disproportionate payment claims up to October 1999, and claims 
on ABCO's disputed value are barred under the applicable statutes of limitation. Defendant 
professes there is no disputed material fact that constructive discovery of those claims began 
before October 29, 1999, that Plaintiff questioned facts underlying the same claims prior to 
October 29, 1999, and that Plaintiff continues to sufficiently support all of the elements of theses 
causes of action. Defendant then contends that Plaintiff must rebut or supply material facts to 
dispute Defendant's constructive discovery arguments or that he was denied access in light of 
certain ABCO employees deposition and/or affidavits. Defendant lastly asserts that there is no 
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refute for Defendant's legal constructive discovery arguments and time-line and that the Court's 
appointed Special Master found nothing unusual with ABCO's dealings with Aspen Springs or the 
alleged disproportionate payments to the parties' family members. 
Given the Court's granting of Defendant's summary judgment regarding the fraud, breach 
of fiduciary duties (in part), and misrepresentation claims, the Court holds that Defendant's 
primary clarification concerns have been addressed and resolved. Defendant's Clarification 
Motion is therefore granted, in accordance with the Court's grant of Defendant's Summary 
Judgment of certain fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Denial of Defendant's Motion in Limine and Motion 
to Find the Contract Binding on the Parties 
Defendant argues in this motion that the Court may have overlooked the rule of law that 
states that allegations of fraud and misrepresentation claims can be waived and the Contract 
ratified by either subsequent conduct or performance, and the continuation in receiving benefits. 
Defendant claims that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiffs fraudulent claims fail to carry a 
prima facia case in light of Plaintiffs letter to Travis Bowen in June 2000, various statements in 
Plaintiffs deposition. Supporting this position, Defendant cites Zuniga v. Leone, 297 P. 1919 
(Utah 1931), Taylor v. Moore, 51 P.2d 222 (Utah 1935), Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1968), and their progeny, arguing that Plaintiff cannot now rescind the parties' contract by 
asserting fraud claims because he has elected his remedy when he failed to return the benefits from 
the parties' contract. Defendant further argues that the parties' contracts, namely the Stock 
Redemption Agreement, the Partnership Interest Redemption Agreement and Membership 
Interest Redemption Agreement, contain integration clauses which precludes the allowance of 
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parole evidence. Then, Defendant reasserts its initial argument that parole evidence should be 
excluded because Plaintiffs allegation of fraud is unsubstantiated and lacking sufficient support 
with clear and convincing evidence. 
Responding, Plaintiff submits a motion to strike Defendant's brief and memorandum, 
arguing that the Court drafted an order that specifically ruled on the fraudulent claims relating to 
Aspen Springs, reserving the claims outside of Plaintiffs knowledge prior to October 29, 1999. 
In light of the Court's Order, Plaintiff seeks to strike Defendant's motion to reconsider. 
Additionally, Plaintiff formally responded to Defendant's reconsideration motion, arguing 
that the Court has already ruled extensively at each of the issues raised in Defendant's Motion. 
Plaintiff attests further that all of Defendant's arguments fail to defeat the issue of fact that the 
parties' Property Settlement Agreement constituted an unenforceable agreement to agree as a 
matter of law because (a) there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the parties had a 
meeting of the minds, (b) there are issues of fact regarding a mutual mistake rescinding the 
agreement, and (c) Defendant's constructive theft of the farm property nullified the parties' 
agreement. Plaintiff then incorporates the arguments raised in his opposition to Defendant's 
motion for clarification. 
Defendant then submits a final reply, arguing that the Court should revisit two issues, (1) 
whether Plaintiff elected their remedy and can no longer void the contract because Plaintiffs right 
of rescission has been waived, and (2) what parole evidence will be limited, in light of the 
integration clauses. Looking at the first, Defendant contends that the undisputed part 
performance by the parties supports the conclusion that the Property Settlement Agreement is 
binding upon the parties, in that Plaintiff chose to retain the benefits of the dissolution agreement. 
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Next, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiffs actions ratified the Property Settlement Agreement and/or 
constitutes a waiver of his right to rescind the contract under Utah law. Defendant then asserts 
that the Court must determine if the Property Settlement is fully or partially integrated when 
determining the application of the parole evidence rule and must likewise ascertain whether the 
parole evidence sought to be admitted is inconsistent or supplementary to the agreement under 
Cantamar, LLC v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321. Lastly, Defendant states that Plaintiff should 
be required to adhere to the representations that Plaintiff understood the Property Settlement 
Agreement to be, namely those asserted in paragraph 50 of his Complaint. 
Again, in light of the Court's above ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the fraud, misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the Court finds that in large 
part, Defendant's underlying concerns in seeking a reconsideration motion is largely met. Given 
that the Court has granted summary judgment on the fraud and misrepresentation claims in 
connection with the parties valuation of ABCO, the Court agrees with Defendant that Cantamar 
has application. The Cantamar Court stated that: 
before a trial court applies the parol evidence rule, it must determine as questions 
of fact: (1) whether the agreement is integrated and, if so, (2) whether that 
integration is complete or partial. See Eie v. St Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 
1194 (Utah 1981) (f,,[T]he court must determine as a question of fact whether the 
parties did in fact adopt a particular writing or writings as the final and complete 
expression of their bargain.1" (quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 
261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972))). Additionally, if the court determines an agreement is 
partially integrated, it must also consider whether the parol evidence the parties 
seek to introduce is inconsistent or supplementary to the agreement. See Novell, 
2004 UT App 162 at PI5. In resolving these preliminary questions, parol evidence, 
"Indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible.'" Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App 
361, PI8, 58 P.3d 854 (explaining that any relevant evidence is admissible in 
determining whether agreement is integrated) (quoting Union Bank, 101 P.2d at 
665); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 210 cmts. b-c (stating that "any 
relevant evidence" is admissible when considering whether an agreement is 
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completely or partially integrated); id. § 213 cmt. b (directing that determination of 
whether a term is inconsistent with an integrated agreement is "made in accordance 
with all relevant evidence"). 
In harmony with previous Court decisions, the Court holds under the undisputed facts, that the 
Property Settlement Agreement was entered into after the parties discussed the overall worth of 
ABCO and coming to some resolution regarding a dissolution that Plaintiff would get the farm 
plus some cash incentives, and that Defendant would get the corporation's business assets, minus 
some use and value given to Plaintiff. While the Property Settlement Agreement is vague in parts 
and several terms are unknown under the disputed facts, the agreement's vagueness does not 
preclude its partial integration given Defendant's receipt of significant benefits of the agreement. 
Additionally, the Court agrees that in light of the lack of sufficiency of evidence to support 
the fraud claims, that Plaintiffs receipt of ABCO assets constitutes a wavier of his right to rescind 
the contract. Under UCA § 48-l-29(l)(f), the Court may decree dissolution of a partnership 
whenever circumstances render a dissolution equitable. Given the lengthy presentment of facts 
surrounding the parties' claims and taking into consideration the circumstances of the parties' 
lengthy negotiations leading up to the Property Settlement Agreement, Defendant's numerous 
payments made and/or offered in accordance with the agreement, Plaintiffs undisputed receipt of 
large sums of cash and other benefits of the agreement, and Plaintiffs undisputed efforts and 
desire to enforce the terms of the agreement, the Court finds equitable grounds exist to support a 
decree that the parties' dissolution took place at or around December 1999. As such, the Court 
will entertain parole evidence offered to assist the Court in interpreting the parties' dissolution 
agreement, namely the vague terms previously discussed, and evidence of damages of breach 
25 
under the agreement or in connection with any of claims not subject to the Court's rulings 
outlined above or previously. 
Defendant's Motion Regarding Violation of Civil Protective Order; Plaintiffs 
Opposition to Marvin G. Neff's Motion Regarding Violation of Civil Protective Order; 
and Plaintiff's Motion for Civil Contempt Against Marvin G. Neff 
Defendant states that on or about August 16, 2006 Plaintiff drove his truck over to a job 
site where Defendant was working in violation of a civil protective order. In support of this 
attestation, Defendant attaches pictures of Defendant's truck on an ABCO work site. Defendant 
seeks sanctions against Plaintiff, an award of attorney's fees and costs and asks the Court to refer 
to Judge Hadfield under the alleged probation violation. 
Retorting, Plaintiff admits that he drove his truck around the vicinity where Defendant was 
working, but asserts that he did not get out of his truck or make any gestures to Defendant and 
that he drove away upon realize Defendant's presence. Plaintiff attests that he had a valid reason 
to talk with person at the job site, did not know of Defendant's presence on the site until pulling 
up at the site, and that Defendant has fabricated the parties' interaction. Plaintiff asserts in 
contrast that Defendant refused to timely leave a wedding reception on August 11, 2006 and that 
Defendant attempted to provoke Plaintiff by making a public scene at the reception. 
In reply, Defendant contends that the statement of Officer Trujillo's narrative supports 
Defendant's presentment of the facts and a finding that Plaintiff knowingly violated the Amended 
Civil Protective Order under Defendant's assertion of the facts. Second, Defendant states that the 
alleged interaction at a neighborhood function did not constituted a violation of the parties' 
protective order because Plaintiff never came with 100 feet of Plaintiff. 
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The Court recognizes that disputed issues of fact exist which preclude granting summary 
judgment in regards to either asserted violation of the parties' civil protective order. As such, 
Defendant's and Plaintiffs motions for civil contempt are denied. 
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Produced by Plaintiffs Experts 
Regarding Any Appraised Valuations ofABCO. Inc. Aspen Springs Storage. LLC, Farr 
West Lincoln or other Properties Using Data After December IS. 1999 
Defendant argues in this case that the Court should exclude a report by John Brough 
because it is excluded under the Scheduling Order. Defendant contends further that such 
information is irrelevant in that Plaintiff has elected his remedy by retaining benefits through the 
contractual buyout and prejudicially considers data used after December 13, 1999, in that it fails 
to take in to light the efforts of Defendant and the lack of efforts of Plaintiff following the parties' 
Property Settlement Agreement. Lastly, Defendant states that Brough's appraisal and opinions of 
ABCO's post-1999 value are highly prejudicial and irrelevant. 
Plaintiff retorts that his damages expert testimony is extremely relevant and that this 
testimony is more probative than prejudicial because it is the only way to address the factual 
issues before the Court. Plaintiff argues that Defendant's various motions are simply a rehashing 
of the arguments that the Court has already ruled on and that Plaintiffs experts appropriately 
includes in his calculations ABCO's goodwill, that such testimony presents an accepted, present 
value method for valuing ABCO, and that such testimony is highly relevant to a jury because 
under Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, the jury should determine damages 
from either the date of the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty or the date the case was ready for 
trial. Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that the Court at .the August 29, 2006 hearing expressly extended the 
deadline for expert reports to be filed to September 18, 2006 and that Defendant is the one that 
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has abused the Second Scheduling Order, submitting three dispositive motions after the July 14, 
2006 deadline for the same. 
In final reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs experts' testimonies and the James & 
Co's valuation of ABCO are irrelevant because Plaintiffs fraud claims fail as a matter of law, in 
that they are insufficiently supported with the facts. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs attempts 
to bolster the experts' testimonies through the inclusion of goodwill when under Utah law, 
goodwill is appropriately considered when there are ongoing or habitual customers which gives a 
business a reasonable expectancy of preference in the race of competition, citing Jackson v. 
Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667 (Utah 1966). Yet, ABCO's business relies on being the lowest bidder on 
each particular construction project, according to Defendant. Defendant asserts that if the 
parties' interests in ABCO were both terminated, no intangible value would be evident. Lastly, 
Defendant reargues issues regarding the effect of the Share Redemption Agreement and Plaintiffs 
election to retain the benefits of the Property Settlement Agreement, and asserts that the instant 
motion is not a violation of the parties' scheduling order because it is offered in response to 
Plaintiffs experts' testimonies. 
The Court again holds that Defendant's underlying concerns for raising the instant motion 
are largely addressed in the Court's initial ruling on the fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims. As such, the Court is unsure if Plaintiff s damage expert is necessary. That 
said, Plaintiff has existing claims equivalent to breach of contract damages and particular its 
slander of title claim which allow for relevant damage testimony. So long as the damage expert's 
testimony relates to the remaining claims, the testimony is allowed and to the extent it reaches 
into barred claims or claims now denied for lack of sufficient evidence, the testimony is stricken. 
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In accordance with the above, Defendant's Motions are granted in part, and denied in part. 
Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare an order in accordance herewith. 
Dated this ^ day of January, 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
•—• ST— -' * 
Judge Gordon7. Low 
First District Court 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
{^/"/J/'^'r / 
BRANSON G NEFF, 
vs. 
MARVIN G NEFF, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Case No. 030100275 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: Please answer the following questions based upon the evidence. If 
you find that the evidence satisfies the applicable burden of proof, answer "Yes." If you find that the 
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine whether the evidence satisfies the applicable 
burden of proof, or if you find that the evidence does not satisfy the applicable burden of proof, answer 
"No." 
BRANSON'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM 
QUESTION NO. 1 : Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Branson suffered 
damages as a result of Marvin's breach? 
Yes X No 
(A) If the jury answered Question No. 1 as "Yes," then proceed to Question No. 2 
(B) If the jury answered Question No.1 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of 
Marvin and against Branson on Branson's breach of contract claim. 
Proceed to Question No. 3 
QUESTION NO. 2 : What amount of damage does the jury find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Branson suffered as a direct and proximate result of Marvin's breach? 
$ YyODc? „ O^ This amount constitutes the amount of damages that the jury awards to 
Branson on Branson's breach of contract claim. 
Proceed to Question No 3. 
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BRANSON'S ASSAULT/BATTERY CLAIM 
QUESTION NO. 3: Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Marvin committed 
an act against Branson intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with Branson's person, or 
intending to place Branson in imminent apprehension of such a contact? 
Yes A No 
(A) If the jury answered Question No. 3 as "Yes," then proceed to Question No. 4. 
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 3 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of 
Marvin and against Branson on Branson's battery claim. Proceed to Question No. 6. 
QUESTION NO. 4 : Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Marvin's act 
either directly or indirectly resulted in a harmful contact with Branson's person? 
Yes >C No 
(A) If the jury answered Question No. 4 as "Yes," then the jury has given judgment in favor of 
Branson and against Marvin on Branson's assault/battery claim. Proceed to Question No. 
5. 
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 4 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of 
Marvin and against Branson on Branson's assault/battery claim. 
Proceed to Question No. 6. 
QUESTION NO. 5 : What amount of damages does the jury find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Branson suffered as a direct and proximate result of Marvin's conduct? 
_. This amount constitutes the amount of damages that the jury awards to Branson 
on Branson's assault/battery claim. Proceed to Question No. 6. 
BRANSON'S SLANDER OF TITLE CLAIM 
QUESTION NO. 6 : Does the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that Marvin slandered 
title to Branson's property? 
Yes / ^ No 
(A) If the jury answered Question No; 6 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in favor of 
Branson and against Marvin on Branson's slander of title claim, and hereby awards damages to 
Branson in the amount of $ Q . If the jury answered this question, then proceed to 
answer Question No. 6(C). 
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(B) If the jury answered Question No. 6 as "No," the jury has given judgment in favor of Marvin 
and against Branson on Branson's slander of title claim. Proceed to Question No. 7. 
(C) If the jury awarded Branson damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find that Marvin 
should be held to pay Branson's attorney fees? 
Yes f^ No 
Proceed to question no. 7. 
BRANSON'S BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CLAIM 
QUESTION NO 7 : Does the jury find that Marvin breached the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing owed to Branson? 
Yes A No 
(A)lf the jury answered Question No. 7 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in favor of 
Branson and against Marvin on Branson's breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim, 
and the jury awards damages to Branson in the amount of $ Q Proceed to 
Question No. 8. 
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 7 as "No," the jury has given judgment in favor of 
Marvin and against Branson on Branson's breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim. Proceed 
to Question No. 8. 
BRANSON'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM 
QUESTION NO. 8 : Does the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that Marvin breached 
his fiduciary duty to Branson? 
Yes X No 
(A) If the jury answered Question No. 8 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in 
favor of Branson and against Marvin on Branson's breach of fiduciary duty 
claim, and hereby awards damages to Branson in the amount of 
$ O . If the jury answered this question, then proceed to 8 (C). 
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 8 as "No," the jury has given judgment in 
favor of Marvin and against Branson on Branson's breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. Proceed to Question No. 9. 
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(C) If the jury awarded Branson damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find that Marvin 
should be held to pay Branson's attorney fees? Yes / \ No . Proceed to next question. 
BRANSON'S BREACH OF SALARY CONTINUATION AGREEMENT CLAIM 
QUESTION NO. 9 : Does the jury find that Branson's retirement value was included in the 
Property Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 147)? 
Yes fo No . Proceed to the next page. 
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MARVIN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM 
QUESTION NO. 10 : Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Marvin 
suffered damages as a result of Branson's breach? 
Yes K No 
(A) If the jury answered Question No. 10 as "Yes," then proceed to Question No. 11. 
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 10 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of 
Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's breach of contract claim. 
Proceed to Question No. 12. 
QUESTION NO. 11 : What amount of damage does the jury find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Marvin suffered as a direct and proximate result of Branson's breach? 
. This amount constitutes the amount of damages that the jury awards to 
Marvin on Marvin's breach of contract claim. 
Proceed to Question No. 12. 
MARVIN'S ASSAULT/BATTERY CLAIM 
QUESTION NO. 12 : Does the jury find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Branson 
committed an act of assault or battery against Marvin? 
Yes X No 
(A) If the jury answered Question No. 12 as "Yes," then proceed to Question No. 13. 
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 12 as "No," then the jury has given judgment in favor of 
Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's assault/battery claim. Proceed to Question No. 14. 
QUESTION NO. 13 : What amount of damages does the jury find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Marvin suffered as a direct and proximate result of Branson's conduct? 
$_ / l j 55 . This amount constitutes the amount of damages that the jury awards to Marvin on 
Marvin's assault/battery claim. Proceed to Question No. 14 
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MARVIN'S SLANDER OF TITLE CLAIM 
QUESTION NO. 14: Does the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that Branson slandered 
title to Marvin's property? 
Yes No n 
(A) If the jury answered Question No. 14 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in favor of Marvin 
and against Branson on Marvin's slander of title claim, and hereby awards damages to Marvin in the 
amount of $ . If the jury answered this question, then proceed to answer Question 
No. 14(C). 
(B) If thejury answered Question No. 14 as "No," the jury has given judgment in favor of Branson 
and against Marvin on Marvin's slander of title claim. Proceed to Question No. 15. 
(C) If the jury awarded Marvin damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find that Branson 
should be held to pay Marvin's attorney fees? \yf 
Yes NoJlL 
Proceed to question No. 15. 
MARVIN'S BREACH OF DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CLAIM 
QUESTION NO 15 : Does the jury find that Branson breached the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing owed to Marvin? 
* Yes n No 
(A)lf the jury answered Question No. 15 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in favor of 
Marvin and against Branson on Marvin's breach of duty of goodfaith and fair dealing claim, 
and the jury awards damages to Marvin in the amount of $ _ _ ^ _ _ . Proceed to Question 
No. 16. 
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 15 as "No," the jury has given judgment in favor of 
Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim. Proceed 
to Question No. 16. 
MARVIN'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM 
QUESTION NO. 16 : Does the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that Branson 
breached his fiduciary duty to Marvin? 
n H Q l Q ! ! 
Yes / \ No 
(A) If the jury answered Question No. 16 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment 
in favor of Marvin and against Branson on Marvin's breach of fiduciary duty 
claim, and hereby awards damages to Marvin in the amount of 
. If the jury answered this question, then proceed to 16(C). 
(B) If the jury answered Question No. 16 as "No," the jury has given judgment in 
favor of Branson and against Marvin on Marvin's breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
Proceed to closing instruction. 
(C) If the jury awarded Marvin damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find that Branson 
should be held to pay Marvin's attorney fees? Yes No X^ . Proceed to closing instruction. 
CLOSING INSTRUCTION 
After answering the questions set forth above as instructed, the jury has completed this Special 
Jury Verdict Form. The Jury Foreperson should then sign this document for return to the Court. 
Disparaging: Questioning the right or title of another to a particular property 
Pecuniary: Relating to money. 
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